Адам Андраде — Книга 2: Логика. Рассеивая тьму, занятие 34

[Speaker 2]
I'm going to get started here. Let's do it. Yeah, I think so.

You know, all of these questions are pretty straightforward. Don't overthink them. How do the functionalists define Rongsen?

Oh, yeah.

[Speaker 1]
Sanjay Nepa?

[Speaker 2]
Two-part definition? No, I think... Right, so one, it's unique in time, place, and identity.

[Speaker 3]
Nature, yeah.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah.

[Speaker 3]
There's another one. I don't remember.

[Speaker 2]
And what did Nick say?

[Speaker 3]
It's able to perform on a function.

[Speaker 2]
Sanjay Nepa, yeah. Okay, great. Let's see here.

Oh, just space.

[Speaker 1]
Oh, we nailed it together.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, that's pretty succinct, right? Yes, quite.

[Speaker 1]
Succinct it is.

[Speaker 2]
So what does K.J.P.J. give as our own position, Rongloop, on the definition of Rongsen? And what philosophical school is he presenting from? Oh.

Is he saying that this definition is the Gacha of the highest school? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

[Speaker 1]
Hi, Adam, are you there?

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, again, I'm here. I don't hear you. It might have given us great quiz questions.

Can you not hear me again? Test, test? You're fine, Adam.

It's not you. You're doing your part, Adam.

[Speaker 1]
I'm sorry.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, can you stream together some English that would represent the second school? I'll go ahead and give you that. The second school's definition of Rongsen.

Yeah, thank you. Anybody? Oh.

[Speaker 1]
It's so quiet, Adam.

[Speaker 2]
He doesn't like that definition for second school. It's still a functionalist, right? Yeah, it is.

I was just looking for something more than just Gacha. Oh, yeah. Which is what I heard, so.

Sure. But that plays a large part in the broader definition, yeah. Oscar said Gacha.

What's a Gacha, Oscar? Well, it's the thing that we deny. Yeah.

Both.

[Speaker 1]
Adam, go ahead, Oscar. Go ahead.

[Speaker 3]
No, I was just going to say that in the highest school, the thing that we deny is the actual reality in the lower schools.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, exactly. Yeah, which that is, I thought about making that a separate question. So I'm glad you got that.

Yeah. So from the position of the fourth school, what the, excuse me, the highest middle way, um, what you're doing is negating the ultimate reality of the second school. I think it would be a better way of saying it.

So let me go ahead and zoom this down for you just so you can see. Yeah. So our own position is that the definition of an actual thing is something that is not a creation of projections and from its own size working thing that resides in its own basic nature.

And I think if you wanted to kind of crowbar a highest middle way view in there, you'd probably just say, and is a working thing that resides in its own basic nature, but not from its own side. Let's see. Question three, what, what three metaphors did Kendrick use to highlight the meaning of unmixed in space, time and nature?

Hmm. It's like, you want an example of something that's unmixed in space and time. Well, then if, uh, if something is.

Coffee cup. I mean, yeah, I guess you could, yeah, you could do that. He, he specifically for, uh, yeah, for space he uses, I'll give you a hint, um, for unmixed in space.

It was, if something is not in the east, then it's in the. Right. Yeah.

And, um, in a similar way, how would we apply this, the same kind of metaphor scheme to time? Yeah. If it's.

Yeah, not, not yesterday, but today or something, I think. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Totally.

He's deading and, uh, yeah, he's deading for today. And I think it was Kassong, Kassong for yesterday. Yeah.

Um, and then can you guys fill in the blank for, for nature? Was it blue? I'll give you another hint.

Uh, travel. If it's not checkered, it's blue or something. Yeah.

[Speaker 1]
Okay.

[Speaker 2]
We're looking at Dundalk.

[Speaker 3]
Hmm. The opposite of the opposite. Yeah.

[Speaker 2]
Thank you, Oscar. Yay, Oscar. And Tope Talkbot.

Establish my thoughts. Yeah. Okay.

Nice quiz. Thank you. Yeah.

Nice quiz. So.

[Speaker 1]
Uh, Adam, can you blow that up a little bit?

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, I can try. Here we are. Yeah, I can do that.

One fifth. Is that, is that good? Or should I go up a little bit higher?

Can you read that?

[Speaker 1]
Yeah. Yeah, he starts out with a chair. Right?

Jason. Yeah, the first part's fine. He's got an interesting argument.

He says, this is how he's going. He says, things is a set, right? And things have their own members.

So the group of stuff called things, or working things, subsumes its own members, like, I don't know, coffee or a microphone. And then there is also a group called cups, right? And then that subsumes its own coffee cups, tea cups, water cups.

Okay. So he has an interesting argument here. He says, because working things and because cups are categories that include their own members, they must be...

You're supposed to go, whoa. They must be archetypes and not actual things. Cups and things.

Yeah. Must be archetypes and not actual things. Do you agree?

[Speaker 2]
If there are members of that group. And I think we'd also have to go back to earlier in the text where we were saying that that definitely depends on a context and a perceiver, on a time and who's looking.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, but I mean, just in general, if you say you're talking about the category heading, the category name, as opposed to numbers.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, they're cheats in, yeah.

[Speaker 1]
Is that an archetype or is that an actual thing in the world?

[Speaker 2]
Those are archetypes.

[Speaker 1]
There isn't anything that is that thing. It's a category and then there's stuff in it. And those things are actual things in the world, okay?

So he says, because working things can be a category that has its own members like cars, trucks, okay? And because cups can be a category that has its own members like tea cup, coffee cup, etc., therefore they are not actual things in the world. Cups are not actual things in the world.

Working things are not actual things in the world. Because they're a category name. They have their own members, okay?

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, and this is kācig though, right?

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, this is kācig. Yeah, chinsen yin la rangten yin na. And if they were actual things in the world, okay?

Let me see here. So there's an actual thing, there must be, there be. Which is part of this in the sense of existing in indivisible moments.

Yeah, good, Adam. If something is an actual thing in the world, and if it's mental, it has to be composed of its own... Not atoms, right?

So what's the equivalent of atoms for your mind?

[Speaker 2]
Kācig, kācig.

[Speaker 1]
They say the shortest amount of time of perception. Your brain is a group of tiny perceptions. Your awareness is a collection of tiniest moments of perception, okay?

And your... What was the second example?

[Speaker 2]
It's, and Adam's part was that. Dōchuan, dōchuan chok.

[Speaker 1]
Oh, well what was the dōchuan chok kyi choshe mepay?

[Speaker 2]
Kyi choshe mepay, yeah.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, if something is an actual thing in the world, it must be composed either of tiniest moments of time, as in the case of a perception, or it must be composed of tiniest atoms, as in the case of a cup. If it's a real thing in the world, if it's a category, would it have atoms?

[Speaker 2]
No.

[Speaker 1]
Even if it's mental or physical, it doesn't matter, okay? Dōchuan chok kyi choshe mepay. Dōchuan chok kyi choshe mepay.

Then he says, so, so far he said that things and cups are not real things in the world. Right? Okay?

Because they're categories. And categories are not real things in the world, they're archetypes. They're just a mental picture.

And then he said, if something was an actual thing in the world, if it was physical, it would have to be made up of tiniest atoms. If it was mental, it would have to be made up of tiniest moments in time, as it flows through time. Then he has a third idea, okay?

Dön chen nüpa yema. If something is functional, does it go in the category of categories, or does it go in the category of actual things in the world?

[Speaker 2]
Real things, certainly.

[Speaker 1]
Something can do something. It's not a category. Categories are dakpa.

Categories are unchanging, okay? You can take stuff out of the category called cups, but the category doesn't change. It's still cups.

If you destroyed all the tea cups in the world, cups would still exist. And dön chen choshe. Dön chen nüpa la yang rangtsang yinpay ma kyab la Something can be functioning, not be an actual thing in the world.

Dön chen nüpa la yang rangtsang yinpay ma kyab la If something performs a function, it doesn't have to be an actual thing in the world. But, if in an ultimate sense something performs a function, then it has to be an actual thing in the world. That's his idea.

I'll say it again. It can perform a function and not be an actual thing in the world. But, I mean, could you say categories let members stay in them?

Or something like that, okay? But, if it's functioning ultimately, then it has to be a thing in the world, okay? Dön chen nüpa la yang rangtsang yinpay ma kyab la So he's got a lot of...

By the way, Serto is okay, Adam.

[Speaker 2]
Okay.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, it's past tense D on the end of R, okay? It's not very good, but it's possible, yeah. I mean, we'll have to check some other cards.

It's possible. Okay, so...

[Speaker 2]
I didn't see it anywhere else, which is why.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, no, it's unusual, yeah. It could be wrong, but I don't think so. Okay, let's see your translation.

Something may be able to perform a function, but that doesn't mean there's not anything that... And anything that is ultimately able to perform. Yeah, that's good.

Okay, let's go to the next section. And do you want to read it, Adam? Yeah, of course.

[Speaker 2]
I can try. By the way, the whole expression, is an adjective describing Kanchi.

[Speaker 1]
It's an adjectival phrase. Yeah, so it's appropriate. It's fine.

Okay. Some people say, and by the way, those people have lots of nagyal. Pride, yeah.

In fact, they are kang or keng with their nagyal. They have arrogance about it. They're full of, kang, keng means...

They are full of pride. And they lomba. They have a lomba that they are kepa.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, they have a delusion. They think they're masters when they're not.

[Speaker 1]
There's a Tantric vow that uses the word lomba. Anybody can tell me? LOM SEMS Don't have the delusion of being a yogi when you're not.

Kepa LOM. RANG GIS KEPA LOM. Yeah, too.

NEL BYOR BAR LOM. Yeah, NEL BYOR BAR LOM. You think you're a great yogi and then you...

If you have this particular delusion, you break your Tantric vows. So, GANG CIG SNANG NAS SNOB PO YIN NA RANG SEMS YIN PA'I KHYAB If something is doing something, it has to be RANG SEMS or CIG SEMS?

[Speaker 2]
Actually doing something?

[Speaker 1]
Yeah. No, he doesn't want to say actually. He just says if something performs a function, it must be...

What do you think he's going to say? Thing in the world? Or he's going to say an archetype?

Okay, yeah. He says that. That's not so terrible, I think.

KHYAB PA YIN LA RANG SEMS YIN NA But if something is a thing in the world... Okay, now listen carefully. If something is a thing in the world, it's contradictory to say it could be a category and have its own members.

Okay? Like this cup. The cup that's holding my tea.

It cannot have its own members. Because if it had its own members, it would be an archetype. It would be a category.

It would be an idea. And then there would be many things inside of that idea, okay? So he says RANG SEMS YIN NA If something is something in the real world, it therefore cannot have its own SELWA.

It can't have its members, its own... It can't have its members. Because if it had its members, it would be a category.

And categories are unchanging. They lose members, then they gain members, but the category doesn't change. Okay, like you could destroy...

There's all the cars in Sedona right now. If you smash one, you know, this afternoon, that doesn't change that there's a thing called all the cars in Sedona. They're still there.

See what I mean? Doesn't change. So he says RANG SEMS YIN NA If something is a thing in the world, it cannot be a category.

That would be contradictory, okay? And DNGOS PO YIN NA And if the thing is a functional thing, it has to be reducible to parts that can no longer be reduced. That's not so bad.

The cup has to be made of atoms which are the smallest atoms. The thought has to be made of moments of consciousness which are the smallest moments of consciousness. That makes it a real thing in the world.

Okay, it couldn't be a real cup in the world if it didn't have atoms. And those atoms, when we think about them, we should take it down to the smallest atom. Because anything bigger than the smallest atom could be a category.

Because it would have pieces. Got it? Okay.

So when we talk about things that are real things, they better be made of smallest atoms or smallest moments of awareness. Because if they have more than that, it's almost conceptual. Because you're grouping them together.

You're grouping atoms together. And then you're looking at a certain number of atoms together. And you're putting a name on them and then that's a category.

It's not a crazy idea. His ideas are not crazy. Why he calls him an idiot who's so prideful, I don't know.

He probably had a fight with somebody who thought that. Okay. 367, Adam.

Oh, let me check your translation. Arrogance, impracticalness, delusion, madness. Both some kind of self.

This working thing is an actual thing. Good. If something is an actual thing, then it's a number.

It's just somebody. It's good. No, the second sentence, if something is an actual thing, it must be a group which subsumes members.

Okay. Oh, no, it would be contradictory to say it was. Yeah, that sentence says if something is an actual thing, it would be contradictory to say it was a category.

[Speaker 2]
Oh, yeah. Sorry.

[Speaker 1]
That's all.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, it is a member which is subsumed by its group.

[Speaker 1]
No, it says if it's an actual thing in the world, it's contradictory for it to have members.

[Speaker 2]
Galois. And you're talking about the Galois here. Yeah.

[Speaker 1]
If something is a real thing in the world.

[Speaker 2]
Oh, yeah. Okay, I see. I see.

So, yeah, basically, if something's a wrong thing, they're mutually exclusive. I mean, you can't say wrong thing is cheat sin and cheat sin is wrong thing.

[Speaker 1]
They are contradictory to each other because a real thing in the world cannot be a cheat sin. What's that?

[Speaker 2]
An actual thing in the world. Like a coffee cup can't be the mental image of a coffee cup.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, and it cannot be the category of all cups.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, yeah.

[Speaker 1]
Also an imaginary thing. Okay, that's an archetype. Okay.

Why are they spending so much time on this? The higher school is kind of saying that when something is an archetype, it's a real thing. When something is a mental image, it's a real thing.

So completely opposite ideas. This lower school is more like science. So the lower school is saying the pen is real because it has atoms in it.

And the higher school is saying the pen is real because it's only coming from my seeds. And it has no other existence. And go take the atoms and shove them in your...

You know, I don't care about your atoms. Okay, it exists if you perceive it. If your seeds are forcing you to perceive it, it's real.

Okay, and then that's totally unacceptable to the school that Adam's working in. They want the thing to be real. They want the pen to be real out there from its own side because it has real atoms.

And that's exactly science. So it's not a stupid or crazy argument. And human nature is to support the lower school.

Everybody in this room, what you feel in your heart is lower school. That's why you're so comfortable with iPhones. Okay.

And then he says, yeah, if something does something, it must be made of atoms that are real. And they can't be atoms that have subatoms in them. Because then that would be kind of a category.

And that would be a mental construct. So we got to get down to the atoms themselves. They are no longer a creation of your mind.

They're there for real. Once you got two atoms together, you can talk about creations of the mind. But if you get down to a single atom, you know, that's not there because I imagine it's there.

It's there from its own side. Once you get two atoms glued together, you know, you could call it fat or, you know, you could think about it different ways. But if you reduce everything down to smallest things, and mentally, if you reduce it down to tiniest moments of awareness, 165th of a second, that's real.

That's real in the world. Everything else is a creation. Okay.

367, Adam. You translated it well, by the way. You translated it well.

[Speaker 2]
Thank you.

[Speaker 1]
Therefore, things like groupings and coffee cups are not substantial objects. And if they exist substantially, then that would be problematic. I guess he's saying coffee cups, therefore, if you perceive them as groups of atoms, as a substance made of groups of atoms, as an element, for example, that they cannot exist that way.

And neither can... And if they did exist that way, there would be problems. And he's going to clarify in his next paragraph.

[Speaker 2]
Let's see. Jittar Yonah. Oh, by the way.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah. You should be uncomfortable with what I just said. Okay, I'll say it again.

Things and cups are not substantial. They are... Categories.

If they were substantial, there would be a problem. Okay, so just hold that in your mind. In my opinion, if something was made of atoms that were solid, then it would be substantial.

And if a thought were made of moments of consciousness that were solid, you know, lasted for a nice millisecond, then that collection of thoughts over a minute or over two minutes, that would be a thing in the world. That's okay. He says no.

He says no, okay? They cannot be substances. They cannot have real existence.

He just said they had atoms. He just said they had moments of consciousness. He should say, therefore, they are substantial.

But he says, therefore, they are not substantial. Now, where's he going? Okay?

He's a crazy man, right? He was introduced as the crazy man. Okay?

All right, next section.

[Speaker 2]
I'm sorry, again, I just noticed I didn't finish that last line. Sorry, I don't know what happened. I don't know why I just went on to the next section.

Yeah, now he's got us where he wants us, right?

[Speaker 1]
He started the discussion with things, a group called Working Things, and then he said, let's talk about another group called Cups. That's how he started this section. He said two groups.

One's called Things, Working Things, and one's called Cups, okay? Now he's going to bring them together, okay? So, he's going to ask us a question.

So, do you think Working Things and Cups are unrelated, or are they related?

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, they're related.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, they're related, because all cups are Working Things. Cups lives under the category Working Things. Okay, you all right?

Okay. Now, Working Things can live under a category or not. But Cups happens to live under Working Things.

Cups is one of the Working Things in the world. In fact, all the cups in the world are some of the Working Things in the world. Are they the only Working Things in the world?

No. Okay. So, then he says, he uses this very difficult word called zeci.

And the way I like to translate it, as you guys know, is to be one, to be the other. Is to be a cup, to be a Working Thing. If you're a cup, are you also a Working Thing?

[Speaker 2]
Yes.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah. So, then we say zeci. They're called substantially the same.

Okay? To be a cup is to be a Working Thing. Now, does it go the other way around?

Is it true that to be a Working Thing is to be a cup? No. Musum.

Yeah, good. Then he says, let me just ask a question. He's trying to mess us up.

He says, is it true that these two are substantially related? Are they substantially related to each other? Well, in one way, you have to say yes.

Because to be a cup is to be a Working Thing. And that's called substantial. It's substantially true.

So, do they share some kind of substance? Is to be a cup to be a Working Thing? Yes.

Yeah, so they must share some kind of stuff. Okay? If to be one is to be the other, they must have something in common.

How's that? Okay? All right.

ZE CHE GAM THA DE Then the other guy says, if you say they are not related substantially in any way, then cups are not Working Things. If you say that the group of stuff called cups doesn't have anything substantial in common with a group called Working Things, then cups can't be a Working Thing. If they have nothing in common, then cups can't be Working Things.

They can't belong to that group. They must have something in common. So he says, do they have something in common or not?

And you say no. And he says, you're wrong. Because obviously they do.

If you're a cup, you're a Working Thing. Then, GCIG NA, Adam, 369.

[Speaker 2]
GCIG NA, BUM RDZIN NGON GSUM GYI BUM PA MTHONG BA NA NGOS PO YANG MTHONG BAR THAL DE NYID ZE CHE YIN PA'I PHYIR Now, this is very difficult.

[Speaker 1]
We've got to hang in there. Is being a cup substantially related to being a Working Thing?

[Speaker 2]
Yes.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah. So they share some kind of essence, substance, right? So do you agree that to be a cup is to be a Working Thing?

[Speaker 2]
Yes.

[Speaker 1]
You agree that cups therefore have some kind of substantial relationship to Working Things? Yeah, I agree. So are you saying that if you perceive a cup, you also perceive Working Things?

[Speaker 2]
Yes. Why did you just say Working Thing without a Working Thing?

[Speaker 1]
You can say a Working Thing. When you see a cup directly with your eyes, do you see a Working Thing?

[Speaker 2]
Sure.

[Speaker 1]
Okay. YANG MTHONG BAR THAL DE NYID ZE GCIG He says that makes sense because they have a substantial connection. To be one is substantially to be the other.

Then if you say, look, and by the way, if to be a cup is to be something else, then every time you see a cup, do you see there's something else?

[Speaker 2]
Yeah.

[Speaker 1]
Every time you recognize a cup, do you also think Working Things? Yeah.

[Speaker 2]
Wait a minute. Now you pulled a fast one.

[Speaker 1]
No, because you see them at the same time.

[Speaker 2]
That doesn't mean that you think Working Things, but you are seeing a thing that we would agree is a Working Thing.

[Speaker 1]
No, that's not his question. When you see a cup, do you see a Working Thing?

[Speaker 2]
You do.

[Speaker 1]
When you recognize something as a cup, do you recognize it as a Working Thing?

[Speaker 2]
I don't know about that.

[Speaker 1]
Well, I'll tell you where he's going to go, okay? And you don't want to go there. When you see a cup, do you see impermanence?

Because to be a cup is to be impermanent. And that's a huge logic question. By the way, when you say Buddhist logic, you're really talking about Buddhist perceptual theory.

When you see a cup, because every cup is a member of the category called impermanent things, do you also see its impermanence at the same time? I mean, basically, you have to distinguish impermanence as a concept from an impermanent thing, right? Well, I'll give you a clue, okay?

When you look at a cup, are you looking at its impermanence also? Yeah. Just yes or no?

[Speaker 2]
No, not necessarily.

[Speaker 1]
I mean... Listen, listen. I'll ask two questions.

When you look at a cup, are you looking at the cup's impermanence also? Second question. When you look at a cup, do you recognize that it's impermanent at the same time?

[Speaker 2]
Does not have to be the same.

[Speaker 1]
Yes. Second one is easy. Yeah, not necessarily.

How about the first one? When you look at a cup, are you looking at a changing thing? Yes.

[Speaker 2]
But if you were perceiving its impermanence in that fashion, you would be perceiving its subtle impermanence, right?

[Speaker 1]
Oh, either one.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah. I just said it. I didn't specify which one.

If you looked at gross impermanence and you had a cup in your hand that was broken, I guess you could say that you were.

[Speaker 1]
Well, let's just put it this way. If it's a cup, is it impermanent?

[Speaker 2]
Yes.

[Speaker 1]
When you look at a cup, are you looking at its imper... at something... Are you looking at impermanence?

You are.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah.

[Speaker 1]
Now, when you look at a cup and you recognize it as a cup, do you necessarily recognize that it's impermanent? Yeah, when you put it that way, because you're looking at a cup which is part of the greater set of impermanence. Yeah, okay.

So anyway, Zhechi Yinpeicheng, he says, when you look at a cup, you must be looking at a thing. Because to be a cup is to be a thing. How's that?

When you look at a cup, you must be looking at a thing. Because to be a cup is to be a thing. Okay?

You okay with it? Let's see where he's going. Okay, next one, Adam.

That's difficult. If you say, I can look at a cup and not look at things, I can look at a cup and not necessarily be seeing things. If you say it that way, mun tsul druk juk ma yinpa gyurl.

Then it must not be a direct perception. I can look at a cup and not see a thing. Okay, then it's not a direct perception.

Then you're not having a direct perception. You can look at a cup and not look at things.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, oh, okay. Yeah. So, I mean, once again, the quality of impermanence, or changiness, is a quality and a concept.

So... That's a cheat set. Yeah, and if you're looking at a cup, you're seeing the qualities, but that one is necessarily, that's conceptual?

Well, no, you can...

[Speaker 1]
I mean, my wife broke a cup yesterday in the sink. You can watch the cup go down and hit the bottom of the sink, and you're watching impermanence directly, right? Right.

So, let's go on to the next one, okay? 371.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah. Chip or tell?

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, now, listen carefully. You hanging in there? Is to be a cup to be something that does something?

Yeah, to be a cup is to be something that does something, right? So, if the cup is destroyed at three o'clock, is its functionality destroyed at three o'clock?

[Speaker 3]
Yeah, yeah.

[Speaker 1]
When the cup is finished in the factory as a cup, then at that moment, it starts to be able to hold coffee. And then that lasts until the time you break it. And then its functionality also finishes.

So, can we say, between working things and cups, that they start at the same time and they end at the same time? Yeah, that sounds reasonable. If to be a cup is to be a working thing, then when you create a cup, and when you smash a cup, working thing will last that long.

[Speaker 2]
The working thing will last that long.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, okay?

[Speaker 2]
Yeah.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah. Then we're like, yeah, that's okay. Because they are dze chig.

Dze chig means to be a cup is to be a working thing. If to be a cup is to be a working thing, then the duration of the cup and the duration of working thing is equal.

[Speaker 2]
Sure.

[Speaker 1]
Because to be one is to be the other. As long as it only necessitates that one-way relationship. Yeah, yeah.

I didn't say both ways. I never said both ways. Okay, 372, Adam.

Yeah. Now, kawa means... By the way, the reason they're talking about cups is what, Adam?

Why is that a classic example in an ancient Buddhist logic text?

[Speaker 2]
Because, well, a lot of the commentaries were written in times where there wasn't indoor plumbing. And so people were going to collect water tap.

[Speaker 1]
And you have trouble thinking of it, but if you've been to India and watched the ladies in line for two hours to get a pot of water, they didn't have water. You had to go to the stream and get the water or go to the well and get the water. And if you go to India, you'd see lines of 100 ladies in the morning.

And they're there to get the family's water for the day. And they carry like 10 gallons home on their head. And that's the water for the day for everything, for washing, for cooking, for everything.

Okay. So he says, and another common thing in an Asian house in the ancient times was tawa. Yeah, this particular roof is held up by a structural steel beam.

But until steel was invented, the longest thing you had was, you know, a 10-foot piece of tree. And if you wanted to have a room like this that's 20 feet across, you'd have to have two 10-foot pieces of tree. And you would need a pillar, which is the stupid thing downstairs, because we've got pillars right in the middle of the room.

And you can't see the speaker when they're speaking because they had two short structural pieces of steel. But anyway, every ancient Asian house of any size had pillars to hold up both steps. So then he says, so let me ask you another question.

What's the relationship between pillars and things? Now, the relationship between cups and things I understand. To be a cup is to be a thing.

When the cup comes into existence, thing comes into existence. When the cup is smashed at that same millisecond, thing stops. What about pillars?

If it's a pillar, is it a thing? If you finish the pillar and put it up, at that moment, a thing called a pillar is working, right? And the moment the house falls down, the pillar is not a real pillar anymore.

And then a working thing is also not a working thing anymore. So can we say to be a pillar is to be a working thing?

[Speaker 2]
It is.

[Speaker 1]
Can we say that the moment a pillar comes into existence and does its thing, a working thing also comes into existence and does its thing? Can we say that when the pillar stops doing its thing, a working thing is no longer doing its thing?

[Speaker 2]
That working thing.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah. Therefore, he says in 373, Therefore, all cups and pillars start and end in the same moment. Oh, man.

All cups and all pillars start at the same o'clock on your watch, and they all stop at the same time. Because to be the cup is to be the thing, and because to be the pillar is to be the thing, when the pillar is destroyed, the thing is destroyed. If the thing is destroyed, cups can't be a thing anymore.

To be a pillar is to be a thing. When the pillar ends, the thing ends.

[Speaker 2]
I'm sorry, did you say, when the pillar ends, does the thing end? Or did you say, does the thing end? I'm slurring it.

I know you are. When the pillar ends, does it stop being a working thing?

[Speaker 1]
No, he doesn't want to say it that way. He wants to say, when the pillar stops, in that context, does the working thing stop? Yes.

Then all the cups will disappear when the pillar falls down. Because it's a two-way relationship.

[Speaker 2]
Yes.

[Speaker 1]
Then he says here, king gachik, king gachik. The moment it starts and the moment it ends, for all pillars and all cups is the same. Why does he say for all here?

Where's all? Because things stop. Because things started and things stopped.

Even if he doesn't say all, in the sentence, to say, kaboom, king gachik. It was a cup, it was a thing. You just said it in the same absurd argument.

I'm trying to get you to think about categories and things.

[Speaker 2]
Yes, because kaboom itself is categorical. I mean, you're putting two objects together.

[Speaker 1]
That's a good point. Oh, by the way, he's not talking about that. There's a joke in logic called a cup pillar, or a pillar cup.

And then kids in the monastery debate it, and they say, yeah, there's a big cup, it's big as a pillar, and it's holding up the ceiling. And you're like, no, no, no. This means cups and pillars must start and stop at the same time.

Why? Because things started and stopped at the same time, and they're both things. You just said that.

So you don't agree? To be a cup is not to be a thing?

[Speaker 2]
She cheered.

[Speaker 1]
Oh, so to be a cup is to be a thing.

[Speaker 2]
It is.

[Speaker 1]
And when the cup goes out of existence, that thing goes out of existence.

[Speaker 2]
That thing does. The things don't.

[Speaker 1]
Oh, things don't go out of existence.

[Speaker 2]
Not the categories.

[Speaker 1]
So to be the cup is not to be things.

[Speaker 2]
No, to be the cup is not to be things. It's true.

[Speaker 1]
Oh, to be a cup is not to be things.

[Speaker 2]
To be a cup is not to be a thing. It's a thing. A thing, it's a thing.

[Speaker 1]
We just talked about cups and things. We started the whole day about cups and things. I never said thing.

I said things and cups.

[Speaker 2]
Many times tried that, yes. Also you said things.

[Speaker 1]
All right. Let's go to 374. When you start losing, you change the subject.

374.

[Speaker 2]
Oh, and by the way, to be a pillar is to be a cup. Oh, boy.

[Speaker 1]
Why do you say that? It's obvious. To be a pillar is to be a thing.

To be a cup is to be a thing. So therefore, to be a pillar is to be a cup, because they're both things. So there's no such thing as sets and subsets.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah.

[Speaker 1]
Well, anyway, I'm just following his... We did call him a fool at the beginning. Kabbalom Tzechi Yinpata.

To be a pillar must be to be a cup. Why? Because to be a cup is to be a thing, and because to be a pillar is to be a thing, therefore, to be a cup is to be a pillar.

Kabbalom Tzechi.

[Speaker 2]
My kingdom for a definite article.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, but there's no a or da in many languages. In Chinese, do you have a or da?

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, but there happens to be in Tibetan. That's cool.

[Speaker 1]
All right. Adam, can we start your class? Yeah, again.

Yeah, thank you. Thank you. If you had a headache today, you didn't.

[Speaker 2]
Oh, here, I got to stop sharing, don't I? I'll just overrule you.

[Speaker 1]
Okay, here we go. Okay, let's put you guys up here. All right, I think we're in the 370s, right?

[Speaker 2]
374? 375, yes, we're on 375, I think. We finished 374, right?

Yes, sir. Yeah. Okay, go.

Yeah, listen.

[Speaker 1]
Is to be a cup to be a working thing? Yes. Is a cup a working thing?

Yes. So that's not really different, right? I'll say it again.

Is to be a cup to be a working thing? Yeah. Yes.

Is a cup a working thing? Yes. Yeah, that's all.

So in the first place, we call it they share a substance. In the second case, we just call it they share an identity. Okay.

It's just a word thing.

[Speaker 2]
Okay, 376.

[Speaker 1]
Adam, it's time to pick on somebody else. I think Emma walked in, she should have to read first. Who was that?

Emma. Emma, yeah. Can you help us?

Sometimes you walk in the wrong place at the wrong time. Do you want to read? You have to come up here and sit here.

No stress. Yeah, just a million people watching you. You don't have to.

A million.

[Speaker 2]
Nine people.

[Speaker 1]
Nine million. There's many other same people. This is the assistant boss of ALL.

And without them, we don't have any books to translate. And we should all give her a hand. Okay, she's going to read section 376 slowly.

Adam's going to give you suggestions because it's his book. Go very slow and take your time. And be proud of messing up because you learned.

[Speaker 3]
Okay, I'll do that.

[Speaker 2]
Adam, you got to correct me. Sorry, draw?

[Speaker 3]
Da.

[Speaker 2]
Davu.

[Speaker 3]
Davu. Ran. San.

[Speaker 2]
San.

[Speaker 3]
Za.

[Speaker 2]
Ze.

[Speaker 3]
Ze. Geek.

[Speaker 2]
Cheek.

[Speaker 3]
Cheek.

[Speaker 2]
Nam.

[Speaker 3]
Nam.

[Speaker 2]
Ta.

[Speaker 3]
Da.

[Speaker 2]
De. Ta. De.

[Speaker 3]
De. Med. Pay.

Cheek.

[Speaker 2]
May pay cheek.

[Speaker 3]
May pay cheek. De. Ta.

Ran. De. Ta.

Ran. Zen. Non.

Sum. Geek. Geek.

To.

[Speaker 2]
Cheek.

[Speaker 3]
Make. Pay. Fear.

[Speaker 1]
Yay. Go relax. Thank you.

Hard way to walk into a room. All right. So, what's he talking about?

Draw and drawing. Drawing.

[Speaker 2]
Sound and the changingness of sound. The fact that sound is changing.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah. They are both wrong. The sound and the quality of sound that it changes are actual things in the world.

They are not.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

So. They're not cups and tables.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah. And when you say something is zay cheek, in this case, they are intimately connected.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah.

[Speaker 1]
By the way, he's not saying, he's kind of messing you up on zay cheek here, right? Yeah. Up to here.

[Speaker 2]
It's substantial.

[Speaker 1]
Up to here, zay cheek meant to be a cup is to be a working thing. Okay. Up to here, we said it like that.

Now, he's trying to establish is to be sound to be the impermanence of sound.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah. No. Is he saying if you are sound, then you are the impermanence of?

Exactly.

[Speaker 1]
Is being sound, is to be sound, to be the changingness of sound? No. Yeah.

To be sound is to have changingness, but to be sound is not to be the changingness of sound. Okay? Got it?

So, he's messing around with the relationship here. He calls them substantially the same, which is okay, but he changed it on us. He changed the meaning on us.

Substantially the same, in Buddhism, has two different meanings. First of all, to be a cup is to be a working thing. We call that substantially the same.

But, to be a cup and to be the impermanence of a cup are substantially joined. See, that's a different feeling. It's not a category anymore.

The changingness of the cup is not a category that the cup belongs to. Does the cup belong to changing things? Yeah.

But does the changingness of the cup, does the cup belong to the changingness of the cup? Well, kind of in a different way, because it's a characteristic of the cup. That's a different thing.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah.

[Speaker 1]
The first question I asked you was category and member. The second question I asked you was a thing and its characteristic, that kind of stuck together. Okay, got it?

That's time, boss. Yeah, okay, got it. Unfortunately, the words in Tibetan are the same.

So he's playing on that. He's messing with us. Again, is the cup impermanent?

Yes. Does the cup belong to a group called impermanent things? Yes.

Does the cup have a quality of impermanence?

[Speaker 2]
Yes.

[Speaker 1]
Does the cup belong to that quality of impermanence? No. That's not a category.

That's a quality of the cup. Okay.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, well, I think one of the distinguishing characteristics of being a Chitsin is that you have to have more than one member. Yeah. So that would make sense on that level, I think.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, you cannot say a category that only has one member in it.

[Speaker 2]
And you could also read Dravimitakpa as a sound which is changing.

[Speaker 1]
Well, no, you would obviously translate it as the impermanence of that sound, yeah.

[Speaker 2]
I hope so, but not if I want to.

[Speaker 1]
I want to go one more piece here, and then we'll stop. Thank you. LHAG BZIN MNGON GSUM GYIS GCIG TU MED PA'I PHYIR This is a huge debate in Buddhism, okay?

When you see a cup, do you see its impermanence? Not necessarily. Now, I'm going to give you three degrees, okay?

When you look at a cup, are you looking at its impermanence also?

[Speaker 2]
They're inextricably linked. I mean, my heart wants to say yes.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, that's okay. When you look at a cup, are you looking at its impermanence also? Yes.

When you see a cup, do you see its impermanence also? I mean, Anne, when you think of a cup, do you understand it's changing millisecond by millisecond?

[Speaker 2]
Well, when you hear a sound, are you aware of the fact that sound is changing? And I don't think that's necessarily the case all the time, unless you are making that a very specific object of meditation. But you got to think about it.

The same could apply to cups. The sound and the fact that they're changing.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, anyway, that's the big debate here. When you look at a cup, are you looking at its impermanence? Yes.

When you're looking at an impermanent cup, yes. When you see a cup, do you understand its impermanence? Not necessarily.

And that's a huge debate in Buddhism. Okay. Because the implication is you can look at the impermanence of things all around you and never recognize it.

What else did we mention? And that describes our situation, and we all think we're going to live forever.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah.

[Speaker 1]
Thank you.

[Speaker 2]
Welcome, guys. Thank you. Thank you so much, Keshla.

That was really, really fun. You did a good job today.

[Speaker 1]
That's a good text. Hopefully we'll go on to something more. No, I'm just kidding.

[Speaker 2]
When you're looking at a toothbrush, are you seeing the fact that your toddler put it in their ear?

[Speaker 1]
Depends how much earwax is on a toothbrush. Everybody knows that answer. All right.

See you guys in five minutes, Uncle Nick? Yes, sir. Okay, see you then.

Thank you. Thank you for class. That was awesome.

Thank you. Text is fun. Thanks, Adam.

Thanks for all the pictures of Ava. They really make my day. They really make my day.

[Speaker 2]
Can I show her off, Adam?

[Speaker 1]
Is that legal?

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, of course, Ken. Yeah. I love.

Actually, I was looking at pictures right before class. I love looking at pictures of her. Oh, look at her.

[Speaker 1]
That's a good-looking kid.

[Speaker 2]
I'm pretty biased, but yeah, she is. All my grandkids are genetically good-looking. That's a combination of you and Katie.

It's really something. It is. Yeah, it's pretty amazing.

It's definitely the coolest thing that's ever happened to me.

[Speaker 1]
I thought I was the coolest. Okay, see you guys. Have a good break.

See you in five minutes, you guys. Bye.