Адам Андраде — Книга 2: Логика. Рассеивая тьму, занятие 29

[Speaker 1]
One more minute.

[Speaker 3]
Okay.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah. Again. That's how you know I'm here.

Okay, I'm gonna cut my microphone so you can you know, spice it up here, put a new background on it. I like the homework, Adam.

[Speaker 2]
Oh, thanks. We'll see. I think the last one got a little wordy.

[Speaker 1]
If there's anyone that we didn't confuse in the last class, we could cover them in this class.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah. All right. So, oh my god.

[Speaker 1]
I liked your dance, by the way. You and Ava. Ava's a good dancer.

[Speaker 2]
She's, yeah, she's getting down. She went to, yeah, she had her dance class a little earlier today, too. She's gonna, they're gonna be doing Peter Pan, so she said she's either gonna be Tinkerbell or, who was that, Tinkerbell or, so I'll find out more later.

Well, it's okay. Okay, so first question. If we set a coffee cup on a coffee table and then we leave the room.

Okay, if we set the coffee cup on a coffee table, then we leave the room. At that point, is the thing that the name, quote, coffee cup refers to, a wrong sun or a cheat sun?

[Speaker 3]
Are we talking about the, to the person who left the room?

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, I mean, generally speaking, like, yeah, just try to keep it as simple as possible. Cheat sun, right? I think it's still a wrong sun in your school.

All right, yeah, and I think we're, we're still, we're, we're, we keep, you know, we keep opening up different, we keep going down different rabbit, rabbit trails, too, kind of trying to flesh that out. So I think we're, we might come to a conclusion where we find out that Ben is correct here, so.

[Speaker 1]
I say it's neither one.

[Speaker 2]
That's gonna be a problem. Okay, yeah, so in this instance, let's see. It says it's maple.

It doesn't exist, does it? So the term, oh yeah, the term coffee cup would be referring to a cheat sun because the quote coffee cup is referencing the logical deduction that the coffee cup must still be on the coffee table.

[Speaker 1]
That's good. The question was, Adam, does this position determine whether it's a cheat sun or wrong sun in the sense of like, because we see it still being there?

[Speaker 2]
Is that what? Um, well, I mean, yeah, I would, I would, I think so. I think that's like the main distinction that we were getting into is, like, if we basically, you know, if, yeah, if we take the coffee table, we put it on the coffee table and then we leave the room, we're kind of referencing some memory or some deduction that, that it must still be where we left it, you know?

Maybe I'm not understanding the question there. No, that was my question. I'm just wondering.

I don't, I don't know, but that was my question.

[Speaker 1]
Thank you.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, it was kind of, that was the whole crux of the, the, the, the class last time. It was kind of, yeah, that's like the, the basis. And then we kind of, we, we use that to, to start talking about the memories of that deduction.

[Speaker 3]
Right. Okay. Yeah.

So you're asking, can we have a like deductive accurate perception of an actual changing thing in this school?

[Speaker 2]
Maybe. I'm not, yeah. That's cool.

If you think that I'm asking, that's a little bit more sophisticated. I was, yeah, I was trying to, yeah, I was, I was really just trying to be as surface level as possible because this is, it is kind of, so. But I have a question.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah. About your first question.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah.

[Speaker 1]
There's two ways you could see the coffee cup that's in the room after you left the room. Right. One is you could remember it was there or two, you could deduce that it's still there because you didn't see anybody come out of the one door with your coffee cup and nobody jumped out.

In the second case, it's a cheat time, but in the first case where it's just a memory, I, in this school, that memory is not a template. It's not accurate.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah. And if, if we hold off going into this further, we're going to pick this up.

[Speaker 1]
Okay.

[Speaker 2]
We're going to pick this up. Yeah. All right.

Okay. So let's say we're going to use the, the following syllogism to kind of look at a droop jaw, which I haven't heard referenced that often. We, we, we usually hear about soul soon.

One in three, three, two, not two, not three. But the droop jaw was something that's a little different. So I thought it would kind of give us a chance to get familiar with that.

So instead of the coffee cup, I left my coffee table. It must still be where I left it because I have no evidence to believe otherwise. Hmm.

So what's the, what's the, what's the droop jaw of this syllogism?

[Speaker 3]
It will still be where I left it.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah. I guess I said, okay, I'll just, I'll just go ahead and say it. Yeah.

So you said, you said when you said whenever you hear droop jaw, you, you think one and two, right? Yeah, I do. Yeah.

[Speaker 1]
So it means it means in, in, in Western logic, they call it your assertion, the assertion.

[Speaker 2]
So, but it's combining the subject with the, with the assertion.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah. The second one is the quality being asserted. Yeah.

[Speaker 2]
Okay. Well maybe I got this one wrong then. So I guess we'll see once I, once that's a plant.

So is the reason given a talk on Dr. Joe?

[Speaker 1]
No, cause it could have been moved.

[Speaker 2]
I mean, yeah, I guess so. I mean, with the context from what, from, from, from what Gashel was kind of saying in class, he was, he was holding a coffee cup and he put it down on the coffee table and he said, you know, I, I, I have no evidence. There's no sound.

Nobody's been here, you know, right. There's a small, like kind of infinitesimally kind of small probability that something may, like, it might just pop out, you know, but it's so incredibly improbable that something like that would happen. So we have no evidence to believe.

Otherwise we could say that maybe there was a two headed purple elephant rampaging in the room, knocking it off of the table, but, you know, or, or Ava or Ava. Yeah. Yeah.

So I, I said it was a, it was a correct, it was a correct reason because just from what Gashel was using in class, and that's kind of what I was using to build this, I guess, you know, if I would have spent more time, I could have drawn something. Like I thought about including or not including the word, believe here, especially right. Based on belief and Nietzsche and how we can't be entirely reliant on something and proving something without the shadow of a doubt doesn't really require belief.

What's going on? By the way, let me slow down a little bit. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, speech.

[Speaker 1]
Let me say one thing, though. Everything given as a reason is a duck, young duck. And everything that exists and everything that doesn't exist is a good reason, but not in a context.

You have to say in a certain context.

[Speaker 2]
Okay. Yeah. And we'll get, we'll get to that in our vocab.

Yep. All right. So let's see if I can remember, can remember what I wrote here.

So the job, this syllogism can be stated as follows. And this is where I might need you to look at it again. So the coffee cup I left in my coffee table, which would be one must still be where I left it.

And so would that be a correct way of stating? Like, the drip job? Or would it simply?

[Speaker 1]
It's a little complicated, but in general, you're okay. But but there's different ways to say it in Tibetan. But it's okay.

Yeah, generally, there is a job. The cuff must be where I left it. And generally, it's a talk.

Yeah, I'm back for that. Yeah, that's true. Well, maybe just although we wouldn't use the expression so much.

Everything's a dog. I'm back in group chat. That's the problem.

Okay.

[Speaker 2]
Okay.

[Speaker 1]
It's just, you have to say in this logical statement, you have to add those words.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah.

[Speaker 1]
Okay.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah.

[Speaker 1]
That's all technically.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah. Well, I guess to everybody, generally, sorry, again, sorry. Okay, you okay?

No, I just gonna say to everybody wants to maybe just disregard this one, then. I'll come back. No, it's okay.

[Speaker 1]
It's okay. In general, it's a good one.

[Speaker 2]
All right. So with respect to the viewpoint of the second school, it's not trying to guess our memories and recollections, accurate perceptions, what reasoning was given to support their position?

[Speaker 1]
Um, right.

[Speaker 3]
There was not, it's not, it's too vague. Yeah, memories are very fuzzy.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah. But they're making a claim, but they actually use some logical outflowing of that to say why, why they thought that was the case. They said it was vague, or that it was like, I think I used the word in the answer, like, it was like a degraded form of the original.

[Speaker 1]
Oh, okay. Okay. That's good.

That's good.

[Speaker 2]
I guess we'll just, we'll kind of go through this one together. Yeah. So the second school holds that recollections are not an accurate form of perception, because memories do not have the same efficacy of the original perception.

In other words, memories are not a form of accurate perception, because they are degraded forms of the original thing.

[Speaker 1]
Okay, good.

[Speaker 2]
And so I thought about going back to the last syllogism that we had there, look at it, but I don't know if that was a good choice or not. So let's bring this into focus by utilizing the lens of the syllogism given in the previous statement. When we proved to ourselves that the coffee cup we left on our coffee table must still be where we left it, because we have no evidence to believe otherwise, we do so via a deductive, accurate perception.

However, if at some later point, we would recall where the where we last left our coffee cup, this would in turn be a memory or a recollection. So it's not an actual deduction. And the coffee cup must still be left on the coffee table, which the second school would say is no longer an accurate perception, because it's a memory.

Furthermore, the Sautrantico proponents say that there is no difference in quality between the objects giving in those two instances, because they're both cheat signs.

[Speaker 1]
Which two instances Oh, deductive, accurate perception. Yeah, no, I, I have to quit. Yeah, okay.

I guess you could say that. Okay. Whether that she said exists or not, is it is another thing?

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, yeah. And I think that's kind of that's a, I think that's a large part of Dharmakirti's viewpoint is distinguishing whether or not mental images are the, the reality of mental images. So, yeah, so therefore, it'd be there in Upala, this was the reasoning that they use.

And I don't know how convincing it is. This is just what, what we were given in the text. It would be meaningless to have more than one perception because that a deduction could, could have been the recollection and the recollection could have been the deduction.

And they're essentially they're, they're the same in quality. Like, they're, they're both taking, taking, taking the same place in this non space of the mind. Just as valid.

Yeah. And so it's kind of, it's meaningless to have one or the other. And guess what said specifically that another kind of logical outflowing of that would be that you could in this, this, that this is, well, hold on.

[Speaker 1]
Adam, Adam, can you try to talk a little slower? Our translators are going to quit. Yeah.

Is that a memory? I hope not. No.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah. If, if I recall, Geshe-la had said that if this were from their point of view, if, if, hold on, let me think. Let me think if I can rephrase this.

And once a logical outflow of this would be that we could simply live in memories and that we could, we essentially wouldn't have to be engaged in direct perceptions.

[Speaker 1]
Okay.

[Speaker 2]
Anyways, I thought it was cool because I asked Geshe-la in class too, if this was the reason that this second school uses to say that memories are not valid forms of accurate perception. And Geshe-la said, I don't know. I thought that was interesting.

That's why I included this question because it seems to be a pretty pivotal topic, you know, a point of distinction between the schools. So take, take with it. Yeah.

[Speaker 3]
Adam, in my notes, I had a conditional that if it were true that there was no difference between the two, then it would be useless to have them both.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah. Thank you. Okay.

Okay.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah.

[Speaker 1]
Tim said to measure or to weigh or to consider is good.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah. I've seen evaluate other places too.

[Speaker 1]
Um, related to a basis. Yeah.

[Speaker 2]
It's connected to an actual thing too.

[Speaker 1]
Okay.

[Speaker 2]
And she, she can do. And you could, you could use if, I mean, if you're having trouble with this one, Geshe-la said, um, that in, uh, that all, all reasons are, all reasons are however, he used a qualifier in a particular sense. Yeah, totally.

In a particular context. So this is what I have here. And yes, you got to, uh, I think the last, the last, the last sentence I was having a hard time.

[Speaker 1]
Um, yeah, I guess we'll, we'll, we'll, yeah, I guess we'll get there, but, uh, Yeah. What is the day? Is it, we're talking about Jamba or Cheshire or.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah. I think it's referring back to those two, um, those two, those two instances, the, the, um, the, uh, not in chief, um, the original and the latter perceptions.

[Speaker 1]
Okay. So when you first figure out that sound is changing, right. And then you remember it.

Is that it? It was, I don't remember the context. See if I can pull it on.

Oh, sorry. Let's see here. Oh, okay.

Now I got it. Let's see here. Yeah.

He's talking about, uh, this is a car cheek, right? And he says, uh, let's consider impermanence. Uh, let's say you saw, you understood it at three o'clock today.

Okay. And then at four o'clock you were thinking about it and, and you said, yeah, I think that was correct. Okay.

Okay. Okay. Okay.

Then he says, that, okay, now I can come back here. The original perception that sound is changing and then later on remembering what you realized, these are the two perceptions we're talking about. Number one, I have understood that sound is a changing thing.

Number two, an hour later, I remember that I understood that sound is a changing thing. Okay. Uh, let me tap a joke.

Do they both, do they both, are they both looking at impermanence, a changing? Are they both looking at changing? Are they both looking at changing?

[Speaker 3]
Yeah. Yeah. They both gel at least.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah. But gel, be careful, Ben, because gel implies sema.

[Speaker 3]
Oh no.

[Speaker 1]
Because shel jah, yupa, shi drup, shi dren chik, sema druppa, dren chik. Okay? Okay.

So when you say you gel at something, it has to exist. Okay? Okay.

Okay. Because shel jah is a synonym for existence. Shejah is an existence, is a synonym for existence.

She may dot on do, or she'll reach, or... de mitapa gelwar, what's the subject of the sentence, Adam? What's the de, what does consider mitapa?

[Speaker 2]
What, what does consider mitapa?

[Speaker 1]
What, what state of mind is considering changing? We're talking about two states of mind, right? One is where you figured out that sound is changing, right?

[Speaker 2]
Yeah. So we're talking about one deduction and the one that did so through recollection, right? I mean, is that still the same thing?

Yeah.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah. Correct deduction, we have to say. Okay.

Yeah. So one of them saw that sound is a changing thing through logic, and one of them saw that sound is a changing thing through remembering what they saw before. Okay?

Is the first one pramana? When you, when you logically figure out that sound must be changing, is that a pramana? Yeah.

If the logic is good, then you have perceived sound with pramana. Then if an hour later, if you remember that you saw that, if you remember that you figured that out, and again you're perceiving that sound is changing, is that a pramana? In this school, no.

It has to be fresh. They would call it the whole thing a memory, that not that you're looking at a memory. Yeah.

Okay. Because they say memories are not valid. Because they are not in, in, what do you call it?

Infallible. As we know. Good logic is infallible.

Memories are not. How's that? They could be correct, but they're not trustworthy.

Okay. If they're not trustworthy, then they're not valid perception, that's for sure. No such thing.

Okay. Anyway, so I'll ask you this. If I sit in the house and I figure out logically that sound must be changing, because it's, because it's a creation of causes and conditions, and it's like a pool ball hit with a stick, and the energy is transferred from the stick to the ball, and because the energy in the stick is limited, the energy in the ball must be limited.

Okay, that's all. Things have to be changing because the things that trigger them are changing. Yeah.

If the things that put, set something into motion are faster and slower, then the thing itself must be faster and slower, that was set into motion. That's all. If something is a creation of causes and conditions, it must be changing, because causes and conditions are changing.

Their energy is bigger or less, you know, depending on how hard you hit the stick or whatever. Okay. Anyway, so let's say you figure out that sound is a changing thing, all right, and then an hour later you remember what you figured out, and you think to yourself, I remember that I figured out that sound is changing.

Okay. According to this school, the second perception is not a moner. It's not infallible.

It's not infallible. It's subject to the vicissitudes of time. Right?

So anyway, de mitapa jawa dupa yinla. I'm going to reverse myself, Ben Kramer, and just say jawa here as it thinks. Okay.

So does the memory think that sound is changing? Yeah. Right?

Is it necessarily correct? No, because it's a memory. Then the thing here is, if you say that the memory is always correct, right?

Okay. If you say that you figure out at three o'clock that sound is changing, and then four o'clock you remember that you figured out that sound was changing, is the memory perceiving the same sound as the logic was? And now they say, yeah, you could say that.

You could say that. Well, then the status of the original logic should be also recollection. Then you can call the original logic recollection, because they're both equally valid.

And you could call the second thing logic. Okay? They're both perceptions which are infallible.

Okay? So why have a second one? Why not just say one?

That's his point. Okay? That's his point.

If they are equally valid, why separate them? Say again? He says, yeah, we say just because they have the same reference doesn't mean that they're both infallible.

Just because they both are perceiving changing doesn't mean that they're both infallible. Okay? All right.

,LTEL BA SOGS KYI KHYEN MED DE, ,TSE MA SNGA PHYIR GNYIS KAS, ,MI LTAG PA GSHEL TZAM DU BSKYED PA MED, The first sema and the latter sema, the first perception and the second perception, are the same in that they are, are the same only insofar as what they are perceiving. The first perception and the second perception are the same only insofar as what they perceive. Okay?

Say, GEL SOGS, but there's a big difference in how they are perceiving it. Are they perceiving the same thing? Yes.

Are they the same in the sense of what they're perceiving? Yes. Are they perceiving it in the same way?

We say no. One is airtight logic and one is shaky memory. ,SNGA MED PHYIR TE, ,SNGA MED DAG DANG BRAL BAR MA ZHAL CING, ,PHYIR MED DAG DANG BRAL BAR ZHAL BA'I PHYIR, ,RU, And then he says, because the first one is using a word and the second one is not.

The first one is depending on the use of a term and the second one is not depending on the use of a term. Yeah, we got to go back to the original. Can we do that?

Adam, can I go back to the text?

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, can I ask? Maybe we'll get into it, but I just wanted to...

[Speaker 1]
I'm not completely sure if this section is about the memory. I gotta see the context.

[Speaker 2]
Okay, I did. Sorry, go ahead. I'll sit down.

[Speaker 1]
No, you go ahead.

[Speaker 2]
Okay, so last term I noticed that you were using perception. It seemed like maybe I missed my recollection. But yeah, you were using shell interchange.

You were using perception interchangeably with consideration or considered. And I noticed that that could actually, it could be helpful in this last sentence here to translate it as perception rather than consideration, given the fact that it just seems clunky and it doesn't quite come through. Because I'm saying, because there's no consideration associated with the original as sound.

Is that, I don't know if I'm clear or not. Maybe I'm not being too clear. Yeah, so is it...

I guess I noticed in the first book, we would definitely use terms differently, different English terms for the same Tibetan term in the dura, because at different points, like sheja for instance, right? And I'm just wondering here if, even within the section where we're talking about shelja a lot, if we can float back and forth between consider and perceive.

[Speaker 1]
It depends on the context, yeah. It depends on the context. When you say that sheja and shelja are synonyms, when you say that all knowable things and all jellable things is the same, in that case jell must be translated as consider.

Something you're considering and something you know is the synonym in Buddhism. Something you can think about with an accurate perception and something you can know with an accurate perception is the same thing, and it means existence. These are synonyms for existence.

But there are cases, even in your dura, where jell means to consider in the sense of weigh a question or think about a question from different viewpoints or stuff like that. So it depends on the context.

[Speaker 2]
Okay, I'll give the screen back to you again.

[Speaker 1]
Okay, let's get back to this. Okay, so I'm going to go back to the context and work ahead again, okay? And let me read it, okay?

Ono Amitabha Chöchen, let's consider changing, the fact of something changing, okay? Let's say that you are a person who has used an accurate perception to perceive something changing. For example, the fact that sound is changing, okay?

So, is changingness something that you can perceive with an accurate perception or not?

[Speaker 2]
It is.

[Speaker 1]
Good. And then when you later, if you hold on to that idea that sound was changing, are you still perceiving the same changingness that you perceived when you were doing it logically?

[Speaker 2]
In this school, we would say no.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, and I agree. I would say no, okay? So are you saying that when a person figures out that sound is a changing thing, and later they remember that sound is a changing thing, is the second perception a pramana?

No. Is it a pramana that sound is changing? No.

When you remember that sound is changing, even if you earlier saw correctly that it was changing, are you figuring out that sound is changing with accurate perception?

[Speaker 2]
That's something that I was thinking about. And to me, I would say that you're almost doing the same deduction again. I mean...

I'll say it again. Okay.

[Speaker 1]
I'll say it again. So you figure out that sound is a changing thing. Later, you remember that sound is a changing thing.

Is the second perception figuring out that sound is a changing thing?

[Speaker 2]
No, it's just a recollection, is what the text is saying.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, good. Okay, good. So here it says, ma jeypar yod pey guruway gyur, in the mind of a debater who still remembers that he figured it out, okay?

When they understand that sound is changing, do they do it with... are they doing it in the second point in time with accurate deduction? No, it's just a memory.

Is it correct?

[Speaker 2]
No.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah. Is sound changing correct? The memory is correct.

It's not a valid perception, in this school. In the higher school, it would be a valid perception. Okay.

But it's not a jaypak. It's not a deduction. It's just a memory.

It's not sitting down and thinking about the reasons and figuring it out in the second case, okay? Yeah. I don't think they would call it direct because it's just...

it's false. It's not a perception. It's like getting drunk and seeing elephants, okay?

Now, is he still having a perception based on sound? Yes. He's still...

that's the thing here. The other guy says, do you agree that he's still having a perception based on sound when he remembers? And what would you say?

Yeah. Then the other guy says, if you do agree, then the original logic must have been a recollection. And...

In that case, if it's still if it's still an active perception based on sound, okay, then it must be a valid perception. If it's a valid perception, then it's superfluous. You don't need both of them.

Okay. jaypak de che she gyur ching. Then you could have jaypak...

then you could have valid logic that was just recollection, okay? gyur ching. tsenpa khar nung chik dun med gyur.

Then either one of those would be extra. You wouldn't need it anymore, okay? If remembering was a kind of valid perception, you don't need the original valid perception to create the memory.

I don't understand that. Okay. Yeah, right, right.

Yeah, and that guy says shen na. That's my opinion. dem yi tak tu jelwa dukpa yin la.

Now our answer is, yeah, I agree that the memory is considering... I agree that the memory is considering changing-ness. Okay.

chelwa sok dukpa yin la. No, it has to be. I agree that the logic is considering changing-ness, but that doesn't mean it has to be a memory.

Okay. kyen me te, tsenpa nga chi nyi kye, mi tapa shel tsam du kyepa med. Let's go ahead and just keep going, okay?

Maybe we'll figure it out. I say both of the semas are the same in that they are considering changing-ness, okay? kyepa med.

kyepa med means they are the same. The memory and the original logic are the same, but only in the sense that they are thinking about whether something is changing or not. In that sense they're the same, okay?

They are considering jelwa, whether sound is changing or not, but that's the only thing they're similar. They're both wondering whether sound is changing or not. We say that in that sense they're the same, okay?

je tsul la kyepa, but how they consider it is a big difference. The first one is considering changing with logic, and the second one is considering changing with remembering, and so I agree they're both thinking about changing, but how they're doing it is different. How they are weighing changing-ness is completely different, okay?

na me, the original logic, ja dang jelwa ma shel, is not doing its consideration using words, and the second one is.

[Speaker 2]
So ja would not be sound here, it would be words, okay. Go ahead.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, and I'm trying to think of, yeah, I was flirting with the idea that he's referring to sound as rangtsen, the actual cup or something, okay? Sound. The thing you're referring to with the sound, what you call coffee cup is a real coffee cup, and then the idea of coffee cup is unchanging.

The sound is changing. The name coffee cup is changing.

[Speaker 2]
Is it? No, the name isn't, but it's warm. The ja is the sound coffee cup?

It's reference would be warm, isn't it?

[Speaker 1]
Sound is changing, of course.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, but then the nominal term that we're applying is unchanging.

[Speaker 1]
Right, and now suppose you read ja as what you are considering is impermanent or not, okay? Suppose you take ja, sound, isn't that the classic example that we take when we're discussing whether something is changing or not? We say, ja chi chen mitak de chepay cher.

ja chi chen mitak de chepay cher, okay? So when you're using logic, is the mitakpa connected to ja? When you use good logic, is the, when you say let's consider sound, it's a changing thing because it's made.

Does the sound apply to, does the changing apply to sound? Yeah, ja del work here, okay? And then when you think later, I remember that sound is changing.

He said, here, the wrong says, our side says, that's not sound anymore.

[Speaker 2]
Now when this, this ja here being used as word, and now there, there's a term, there's a, there's a, there's a label in my mind, almost the mental image and the term that goes along with it, but then there's also the physical expression of that word. So if I call something a coffee cup, yeah, then that sound would be changing, right? However, the internal thing, I'm just, I'm just trying to make sure that I, I get that.

[Speaker 1]
Us guys in this debate, what we're saying is, when you figure out with good logic that sound is a changing thing, does changing thing apply to an actual sound? Yeah. Yeah.

When you remember that sound is changing, does changing thing apply to an actual sound? And they say, no, there's no sound at that moment, okay? You hear a sound.

[Speaker 3]
Yeah.

[Speaker 1]
You hear a sound and you figure out that it's changing, okay? Later you remember that sound is changing, but that's, that sound is no longer a sound. It's a mental concept.

But it seems like a strange argument because it's a mental concept in the first place, because you're discussing a sound. It's not that you're actually hearing it while you're debating it in the first place. Well, he uses this language here.

It's when you figure out that sound is changing, is that argument connected to an actual sound? Apparently. Yeah.

In both cases it is. Yeah, I would say. In both cases, Sammy says in both cases you are talking about the idea of sound, right?

He says here, uh, he says, what he says here, rang lu, we say when you're figuring out that sound is changing, you, you are talking, you, you are the, the, when you are figuring out that sound is changing, the argument is related to an actual sound. When you're remembering that sound is changing, the memory is not related to an actual sound. How's that?

[Speaker 2]
When you're having the debate, are you saying, uh, you think of sound and you think of changing, and then you decide that it applies to the other?

[Speaker 3]
Whereas when you're remembering that understanding, are you thinking of sound is changing, dharmakarpa, which is, that's an idea, right? That sound is changing is not sound. That's not a sound.

That's not a changing thing. Whereas sound, which you're deciding is a changing thing, is a changing thing, but sound is a changing thing.

[Speaker 1]
The sound in that. Yeah. Let's flip it.

I made a mistake. Let's start over again. I misread it.

Okay. Let's start over again. It says the opposite.

It says the opposite. So now I'm going to fix it. Okay.

And I apologize. When you figure out that sound is changing, uh, you are not, um, having a perception, which is connected to a natural sound. When you figure out that sound is, yeah, he says not, I made a mistake.

Okay. When you figure out that sound is changing, uh, you, that, you are not considering a natural sound. Yeah.

Yeah. That's context. But when you recollect, it is connected with sound.

Your perception is connected with sound. That, I don't know about that. I was just saying that.

It seems equally as weird as saying it either way, uh, to make the distinction. Uh, was he having the debate out loud? Because that would help.

Let me read one more, uh, we have time, right? Uh, we have four minutes or so, three and a half minutes. Let me, let me go into the, let me go into the next sentence, uh, and tell me if it helps.

Okay. Maybe it doesn't. When you perceive impermanence connected to sound with reference to sound.

[Speaker 2]
Okay.

[Speaker 1]
When you see, uh, if, if, if you are not, well, when you perceive that sound is, when you perceive impermanence as it relates to sound, how's that? When you perceive impermanence connected to sound, okay, uh, you can't be perceiving impermanence. One more time.

When you're perceiving impermanence connected to sound, you can't at that moment be perceiving impermanence.

[Speaker 2]
Because relationships are unchanging, I guess.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, I would say that. I'll say it again. When you perceive impermanence connected to sound, you cannot be perceiving impermanence.

When you're perceiving a relationship in this school, you're perceiving something unchanging. So if you're perceiving sound as it relates to sound, you cannot be perceiving impermanence. Because impermanence as it relates to sound is permanent, unchanging.

Okay. That's okay. You guys okay with that?

Yeah. I'll say it again.

[Speaker 2]
Quote, impermanence as it relates to sound.

[Speaker 1]
When you're looking, yeah, when you, when you, when you say sound is changing, okay, sound is a changing thing. When you say sounds are changing, you are perceiving an unchanging thing. It's a fact.

Facts are unchanging in this school, any school. Like, I'll say it again. That's why you're saying you're not, oh sorry.

When you say sound is changing, you are stating sound, that statement is unchanging. Okay. What's the status of the word changing in that statement at that moment?

I would say unchanging. Yeah, it's part of a marriage which is unchanging, so it's unchanging. But what he says here is, what he said so far is, when you figure out that all sounds are changing things, it's not a changing thing.

That's okay, right? And now I'm going to change it a little bit, see if it's still correct. When you perceive that all sounds are changing things, can you be perceiving changing-ness?

And we say no, because it's an unchanging thing. So how could you say that sounds are changing if at that moment you cannot perceive changing? No problem.

Okay, let's leave it there, okay?

[Speaker 2]
You guys, you're out of time. I was, yeah, I was going to say, we didn't start until, we didn't start until 640.

[Speaker 1]
Oh, this guy's trying to get another 10 minutes, I hear. I don't mind.

[Speaker 2]
I mean, I just wanted to, you know, because I'm kind of, I'm on the edge of my seat here. I wouldn't mind getting another.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, okay, let's go a little bit. If you guys have to go somewhere, leave, okay? Me and Adam are going for another nine minutes.

Here we go. rādhā-dhāwī-mīṭhākpa-śhāwī When you perceive changing as a quality of sound, if you cannot at that moment perceive changing-ness, okay, then, kye chik nyi pen ngunpo sungpay kyang, then when your mind is perceiving the second instant of a color blue, when your mind perceives the second millisecond of the color blue, you must not be perceiving blue. Okay, I'll say it again, okay?

rādhā-dhāwī-mīṭhākpa-śhāwī It's the same author, isn't it? As we had last, it's unfair to have two Kiribjes in a row. And it's unfair to have any difficult text in the evening, and mornings too early.

I did actually go back through the schedule and rescheduled a few things. I'm just whining. I couldn't have figured it out in the morning either.

rādhā-dhāwī-mīṭhākpa-śhāwī When you perceive changing-ness with relationship to sound, okay, if at that moment you cannot perceive changing-ness, okay, then when you are perceiving the second millisecond of a color blue, you must not be perceiving blue. It's us, yeah. Then these two cases are the same.

What two cases? Number one, if you are perceiving the second millisecond of the color blue, you cannot be perceiving blue. Why?

Because when you perceive that sound is changing, you cannot be perceiving changing.

[Speaker 3]
So are you saying the second object is literally, quote, second millisecond of an object?

[Speaker 1]
Say it again.

[Speaker 2]
So we've got, right, two objects and two objects. One is sound, right, is an object, quote, sound versus sound is impermanent, right, or sound is changing, right, those are two objects. And then there's blue, right, quote, blue versus the second millisecond of blue, which is also an object, and that's not the same as blue.

[Speaker 1]
Let's try it out this way. This is like trying on different pairs of jeans, sometimes they don't fit. If you perceive that sound is changing in the first instant, and then in the second instant, that can no longer be perceiving that sound is changing, because in the second instant it becomes memory.

How's that? I'll say it again. If in the first instant you perceive correctly that sound is changing, and according to you in the second instant it's no longer valid because then it's a memory, okay, well then, anytime you perceive the second millisecond of blue, you must not be perceiving blue.

[Speaker 2]
Well, in the same way that we were saying that there is no difference in quality between the recollection and the original deductive accurate perception, you could say that there is no difference in quality between the second moment, the perception of the second moment of blue and the first moment of blue. In essence, it's just the same. It's like you're perceiving that first moment again.

Let me say the whole thing, okay?

[Speaker 1]
Let me say his whole point, you ready? And then we'll come back to it, okay? Okay, let's say that you are perceiving...

If you are perceiving that... If you are... If when you perceive that...

If when you perceive some... When you perceive changingness with relationship to... With relation to sound, okay?

Let's say you perceive that sound is unchanging. It's changing, okay? Then if you are not perceiving at that moment unchanging, okay?

In other words, if in this... Let's try on this pants. Moment one, you figure out that sound is changing.

Moment two, you're still remembering the sound is changing, okay? And according to you, the second moment is a recollection and not a deduction. So you're moving from a deduction to a recollection.

According to you, the sound and the changing that you perceive in the first moment is no longer valid by the second moment, because the second moment's perception is no longer a valid perception, because it's a memory. I'll say it again. You finally figure out that sound is changing in the first moment.

In the second moment, you remember what you figured out. Since the second moment is a memory and no longer a valid perception, the object that it thinks it sees is invalid. I'll say it again.

Moment in the first hour, you figure out correctly that sound is changing. In that case, the sound and the changing are valid, because you saw them with a valid perception, right? Now, an hour later, you remember that sound is changing.

That perception in this school is no longer valid, and what it sees no longer exists, because the perception is invalid. Okay? Got it?

Which means... Wait, wait, wait. Which means that in the second instant, changing and sound don't exist anymore.

Good? Got it? Why?

Because they're not... That perception is a fantasy. That perception is just a fantasy.

Okay? Now, then we say, okay, well, then do you ever look at blue? Yes.

When you look at blue, I guess in the second instant, it's not seeing blue anymore, because it's just a memory. It's just, in a sense, a recollection of the first moment of seeing blue. Now, let me finish.

Then, ngenpo kye che nyipa dzinpe mikshe, ngen dzin mikshe mayinpar gyurl. In that case, then the visual perception of blue in the second instant is no longer a visual perception.

[Speaker 2]
I don't get it, because it seems to me that that second instance would be just as fresh as the first. No, because it's a second instant. Well, then you could just arbitrarily relabel it first.

Let's stop there, okay?

[Speaker 1]
I'm going home. I taught Stanley and Allison 10 years after Adam, okay? Going home.

Stopped here in 19, 23? Yes, sir. Okay.

So, Adam, I suggest the next two sentences, the next two sentences, the next two sentences... Don't talk till we finish class, okay? Right?

Okay. Next two sentences, okay?

[Speaker 2]
Okay. Good? Yeah.

Thank you for the extra time.

[Speaker 1]
We're trying. Wait, I got to play you a song, which is illegal, right? Don't do it.

[Speaker 2]
Quick, stop the recording.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah. Just stop the recording and everything's okay. Don't I get 10 seconds or something?

[Speaker 3]
We can have even more.