Адам Андраде — Книга 2: Логика. Рассеивая тьму, занятие 28

[Speaker 2]
Good morning.

[Speaker 3]
Morning, Nick. Good morning. Thank you.

[Speaker 1]
First we got Adam today. You ready Mr. Adam. People are probably still showing up.

Yeah, give me just one second for a glass of orange juice I'll be back in, like, 30 seconds. Sounds great.

[Speaker 3]
Hope you see better.

[Speaker 1]
Let me see here. I'm going to post a link in the chat, again, useful very very useful of links. Morning boss.

[Speaker 3]
Nick you done.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah. Oh, I just want to send this link that this, this spreadsheet has links to all the videos, and we'll keep updating it so if you if you can't make it to some classes, and you want to catch up. Just keep that spreadsheet handy.

And you can click on any class you like to see for the whole term. Does that include past terms me include past terms. Oh, does it.

I think so yeah they're on different sheets, it does. If you look at the bottom, it's separated by term. It has a couple past terms and if you want to go back to before that sheet.

Go to the YouTube channel. Tibetan language channel. Let's see.

Just want to make a note of that myself.

[Speaker 3]
Guess she Michael your audio is a little bit soft. Okay, hang on.

[Speaker 2]
Probably just needs more coffee.

[Speaker 1]
I do. Yeah. Yeah.

I think I'm just talking softly. How's that.

[Speaker 3]
No, it's, it's pretty soft compared to Nick, or anybody else.

[Speaker 1]
Hmm. Okay, I'll move this closer. Let me make sure I'm on the right microphone.

Oh, you're right. How's that much better. Thank you.

Okay, that's the Yeti.

[Speaker 2]
That's good.

[Speaker 1]
All right. We are in Mr Adams tags. Adam you want to say anything about your text or.

Okay. So the text we're working on is called same a day done. So it's kind of a collection of.

It's a collection of, I guess, highlights from master army here to use seven works, seven main works. He's got an eight, which was an auto commentary. And right now, we're, we're still trying to figure out.

Yeah, right now we're confused. Yeah. Yeah, we're, we're.

I think we're going to spend a lot of time on looking at the difference between direct and indirect perceptions. And that's currently where we are. I mean, I could be more specific, but I'll leave it there.

Okay. All right, here we go. I'm going to switch over to my share the screen thing.

And let me get this big cursor.

[Speaker 3]
Okay. And move you guys over.

[Speaker 1]
Get rid of this thing. Okay, good. Good morning, everybody.

And I know the Americans are sleepy. I'm sorry about that. Me too.

So here's a progress report. We didn't make much progress last time because we had a lot of discussions. So, you know, we only covered two folio faces.

I think we could speed up to about six. So we're going to try to do that. And I think the material gets a little easier now.

I don't know why you guys but there seems to have been a custom to have some really difficult arguments at the beginning of these texts and then start the actual commentary. And I don't know why they did that, because it was very frustrating when I was studying the Abhidharma Kosha, because the author I was studying, he had a lot of debates at the beginning of the book that required you to know the book. Otherwise you couldn't understand the debates.

And we're in the same space here. I don't know why, maybe it's to attract other scholars so they get interested, who know about it. But it's like discussing calculus while you're still in geometry or something.

And it doesn't make sense pedagogically, but anyway, we have to deal with it. So we're going to be in this book till 2026. So we've got three years to go.

And no whining about it, Adam. You're a young man. And by the time you finish, Ava will be telling you more what to do.

[Speaker 2]
I'll be whining more about that, I think, yeah.

[Speaker 1]
Okay, so here we go. Mr. Nick, you want to check, Adam, or can you? You got it.

Yeah, so what's jaypaksema, Adam? It's an indirect, accurate perception. Yeah, so it's like when you figure something out instead of seeing it directly.

And then when you close your eyes and figure out where's the cup on my desk, because I said it there a few minutes ago, I have a cup in my mind, and that's just an image of a cup in my mind. And we call that a? Yeah, so it's an archetype or a mental picture of the cup.

Gel means what? Shell or gel? Considered.

Yeah, when I close my eyes and I think about the cup that I set on the table a few minutes ago, is that cup in your mind, is that connected to an actual cup or not? You could say yeah. I think you could say yeah.

So he says, this is the other guy, right, the guy who's always debating against us. He says, are you considering that mental cup as it is connected to the actual cup, or does it have no connection to an actual cup in reality? Which one is it?

What do you guys think before we get there?

[Speaker 2]
Seems like you could do either.

[Speaker 1]
And you kept saying a couple of terms ago that there is an intimate connection between the two. Yeah. We'll go with that.

Yeah, but I do agree with Ben that there are purely theoretical things that you can consider. But Ben, we're going to learn something about that. Okay.

And our answer is, please read, Adam. Yeah, and our answer is, khyapa means always. It's always.

When you consider the cup as a mental image, it's always shi dang drel. Yeah, there's a relation to the basis. Yeah, it's always connected to an actual cup, always.

That's our answer, right? Because if something is a thing which is considered by thinking, by logic, right? Close your eyes and think of it.

If something is an object of logic, it's always perceived through a reason. Okay. Through a reason.

Khyapa, okay? So, that's interesting. If I perceive something, if I close my eyes and see the cup in my mind with logic, it's because I gave myself a reason why the cup is still there.

So, in one way, we're kind of saying that the reason itself is the connection. Yeah, and we're implying that the reason must imply the actual cup, somehow. Like I saw it before I closed my eyes.

You see what I mean? Because I saw it before I closed my eyes. You see what I mean?

So, there's something to do with the reason that involves the actual cup, but the conclusion is the mental cup, okay? But that mental cup is always connected to an actual cup because it's only perceived through a reason.

[Speaker 3]
Yeah.

[Speaker 1]
Somehow, okay? I'm not sure I agree yet, and I can always feel Mr. Kramer when he doesn't quite agree with something. I have this sixth sense.

Okay, keep going, Adam. Oh, I have a proposal for you guys. Nick, I don't know.

Last term, because your guys' reading is boringly correct now, we allowed the audience to try to read, and then Adam could correct them. Is that good for you guys? It is.

So, Adam, I have a proposal that you choose somebody from the audience, and then you correct them. Okay. Nick has a question.

Oh, no, again, did you want to remind, to let people know that your computer might... Oh, my computer blows up once in a while. If I leave, Adam, you just kind of sing a song or show pictures of Ava, and I'll be back within two minutes, okay?

My computer has a thing. So, just to double-check here, if it says co-host next to the name in the participants list or interpreter, they're probably occupied, right? Yeah, yeah.

Okay, let's go with Alex Riveston. Oh, that's a trouble.

[Speaker 2]
Fine choice.

[Speaker 1]
Okay, good morning.

[Speaker 2]
Good morning.

[Speaker 1]
Please go slow, you guys, so Adam can criticize you nicely.

[Speaker 2]
Okay.

[Speaker 1]
You know, that NG is a little difficult sometimes. Okay.

[Speaker 2]
Try that NG one more time. Yeah.

[Speaker 1]
That was really good, man. Yeah, and the CHO CHEN, I guess it's kind of traditional to stretch that one out. So, you'd say like CHI TZIN CHO CHEN.

CHO CHEN. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay, good.

Therefore, this is how it is. DE NA DI LTAR. Therefore, here's how it is.

Let's consider CHI TZIN. What's that mean, Adam? Let's consider archetypes, mental images.

Yeah, let's think about the cup as a mental image, okay? Isn't it true, Tao, that that cup as a mental image is directly perceived by figuring it out, right? By logic, closing your eyes in logic.

Right? So, the mental image of the cup is perceived during an act of logic. When I don't look at the cup on my desk right now and Adam says, Did you have a cup there a minute ago, Geshe-la?

Is the cup still there? And I can close my eyes and say, Yeah, I think the cup's still there. I didn't hear it drop or anything.

When I figure out the cup is still there, the cup that I'm seeing in my mind is the mental cup, not the real cup, okay? Right? That's all.

When you use J-Box Hammer, when you use logic, the cup that you perceive is always the archetype cup, the mental image cup, not the real cup, okay? Not the outside cup, okay? The eye sees the outside cup, but the logic sees the theoretical cup.

Good? So, this is their reply? No, this is our justification for saying that you must be seeing the actual cup when you use...

You must have seen the actual cup when you use logic, okay? Okay, so the tele is going down. Yeah.

No, it's going up, because we believe it, okay? Okay, all right. Yeah, you do.

You do too, okay? Why? Because bunpay drakten de...

Because when you use logic, what you're saying is, the thing that the word cup applies to is being seen as a mental image, okay? It's very difficult here, okay? Bunpay drakten means what the name cup refers to.

Bunpay drakten means what the name cup refers to, okay? And you are seeing that cup as a chitsen, as a mental image, when you use logic. When you use logic, you are seeing the actual cup as a mental image of a cup, because logic you can do with your eyes closed, okay?

And he doesn't say... What he's saying is, he's making it difficult for us. He doesn't say the actual cup is being seen in an act of logic as the mental image of the cup.

He doesn't say that. He says, what the name cup refers to is being seen as a mental cup in an act of logic. And then the idea is that what the name cup refers to is the outside cup.

Because name cup is the mental image of cup. And this is a deep seeing. The name cup and the mental image of cup in an act of logic are very, very similar.

The name cup... In the beginning was the word, right? The name cup is very similar to the mental image of cup.

But what the name cup refers to is a plain old cup. So he's pushing us here. He says, look, the thing that the name cup refers to, which is this outside cup on my desk, in an act of logic is perceived as an archetype, as a mental cup.

So the real cup, in an act of logic, is perceived as a mental cup. But he doesn't say real cup. He says, what the thing that the name cup refers to.

Cool? By the way, we're almost done with his showing off that he can confuse people, and he's about to start the real book. So have hope.

Okay, Adam, you choose a victim. Let's see here.

[Speaker 3]
Let's go again. Aishan? Oh, she's interpreting.

She's translating.

[Speaker 1]
Let's go with Anatole. Whoa. You're going to get a Vietnamese Spanish accent on this.

[Speaker 2]
Okay.

[Speaker 3]
Nice.

[Speaker 1]
Nice. Good. So if I saw the cup when we started the class, then I was focusing on Adam, and I wasn't looking at the cup anymore, and then you said, Geshe-la, is there a cup on your desk?

I say, I can close my eyes and say, yeah, because it was there when we started class, and I didn't hear it fall off or anything. Okay, so, bumpay dra dun means the thing that I'm talking about when I say the cup that was there before class, right? Dra dun means what I'm referring to when I say the word the cup before class, which is the real cup, the outside cup.

When I mentally close my eyes and prove to myself that it's still there, then that rang sen, that actual cup on the outside that I saw before class, has now shifted to a mental cup, to a chi tsen. Khyer du means chi tsen du, as a mental image of a cup. So, especially, he says here, dak yang dak.

What's that mean, Adam? Dak yang dak.

[Speaker 2]
This is a correct reason.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, and that's important to say here. Why? I could have all kinds of mental images in my head that are incorrect.

I could say the cup became white or something, without any proof, with no logic. I could just make up stuff. That would still be a chi tsen.

That would still be a mental image, but it would be a false mental image. So, when you stipulate that this object has been perceived through correct logic, a good reason, then that mental image is real. And it has a reference, it has a real cup it refers to.

Who's next, Adam? Who are we going to... Going down the list, what about Bertha?

[Speaker 3]
Great, thank you.

[Speaker 1]
We saw all your grandkids, they're very beautiful.

[Speaker 3]
Thank you, thank you. Drup ja. Drup ja?

[Speaker 1]
Yeah.

[Speaker 3]
Pala. Tra yang dak gi dru ya yin pa ma kya. Is it yin pe?

Yin pe, that's right. Yin pe ma kya.

[Speaker 1]
Yin pe ma kya. Yeah, that was really good. Yeah, that's really good.

You're dangerously good. Now, he throws a... By the way, he's got...

he's just thinking on another level. He says, drup ja dang mi tsum. You cannot say, by the way, that all this stuff about what the name refers to, which is the real cup, and the mental image of the cup, the chi tsen that you see when you use logic, that discussion does not hold true with the drup ja, with what you're trying to prove.

Drup ja, always think one plus two. When we say drup ja, always think one plus two. In a logical statement, here we go.

Let's take... I don't know. Let's take the cup that was there when we started class.

There's number one. Number two. If that cup is still there, number three.

Because I didn't hear it fall down or anything. It must still be there. So my assertion, which is drup ja, what I'm trying to prove, my assertion, is that the cup that I put there before class is still there.

That's my assertion. What's my reason is that I put it there, I didn't hear it fall down, it must still be there. So he says, by the way, this whole thing I just mentioned about what the cup is to, and the mental image, is not true.

It's not equivalent with what you're trying to prove. What you're trying to prove, what I said about the real one and the mental image of it, or the real one being the object of the name and the mental image of it, now we're talking about the fact that the cup is still there. The fact that this cup is still there.

All this stuff doesn't refer to that fact. Why? Why?

shi chikyi ten du ta yang dak du drub ja yinpa la Just because something is a correct... Just because if something is the assertion which is proven with a good reason, okay? When we say good reason...

It has. You're about to say it. Go ahead.

It looks like it is what's applied to the basis that they are the same thing. Yeah, and don't forget this thing. This is a very deep thing.

According to Buddhist logic, all existing things, yin me kang rin yin na, ta yinpe kyap All things, whether they exist or not, can serve as a reason. I don't hate you because I have no reason to hate you. That something is not there, but it's still a reason.

Even something which doesn't exist can be a reason. And something that doesn't exist can be a good reason. But it cannot be a good reason in a particular context.

In Buddhist logic, whether or not what you say to your wife is logical or not depends on the context. It's context dependent. So when you say dak yang dak in Buddhism, a good reason, you must say de dub kyi ta yang dak, de dub kyi ta in the context of what you're trying to prove.

There's no such thing in Buddhism as a good reason divorced from a context. Otherwise, all reasons are good, if there's no context. Even non-existing things can be a good reason if there's no context.

Got it? Go ahead. I was just going to ask you how to treat the shi chik gi tang do.

It's on top as one with the... Oh no, this means relevant to one case, with regard to one case. Okay, that's what you were saying, in this context.

In the context of one case. In the context of a particular case.

[Speaker 2]
In the tang du?

[Speaker 1]
Tang du means relating to a certain circumstance. Here it just means relating to. It doesn't mean on top.

Yeah, so shi chik gi tang du means in one context, in a particular context. It's not necessarily the case that that thing which is a correct statement in one context is, quote, a correct statement in all contexts. I'll give you an example.

Let's consider the cup that was on my desk before we started class. It's still there because it's a full moon. Right.

Am I still trying to prove something? Yes, you are. Do I still have a duk jah?

Yes, you do. The cup is still there. Is it a ta yan dak gi duk jah?

It's no way. No, it's not an idea which is established through a correct reason. It's an idea which is not established through an irrelevant reason.

But it's still what I'm trying to prove. It's still duk jah. I'm still trying to prove the cup is still there.

I just don't have a good reason anymore. What I'm trying to prove is the same. Let's take the cup that was there before class.

It's still there because I didn't hear it fall down. The thing I'm trying to prove, duk jah, is that the cup is still there. And my reason is a dak yang dak.

It's a good reason. But I could make the same statement with a bad reason. I could say, let's consider the cup before we started class.

It's still there because it's a full moon outside. The duk jah is the same. What I'm trying to prove is the same.

But now that duk jah is not a duk jah of a correct reason. That's what he says in the reason here. He says, dak yang dak gi duk jah yinpey ma kyap.

Just because something is true in one context, doesn't mean it's necessarily true in every other context. That's all. That's all.

Okay, cool. That's tricky. Here we go.

Who's up next, Adam? Let's see. We go back down here.

[Speaker 3]
Uta, can you help us, Uta? Thank you. Chichikdi tengdu jepatsa tseme.

[Speaker 1]
Okay, you go, Uta. Shell?

[Speaker 3]
Shell ya yin na. Jepatsa tseme. Tseme.

Shell jah. Yin pa kyap pey chiyaro.

[Speaker 1]
Nice. You want to stretch it out just a little bit? It says yin pe.

Yin pe. Okay, good. So, shi chik gi ten du adem means in a particular context, or with regard to a particular object, like a cup, like an outside cup.

With regard to a particular context, if something is the thing which we perceive using correct logic, if something is a thing which we perceive using correct logic in a particular context, then it's always something which we perceive with indirect perception, with logic. So, that thing which we perceive, in this case a cup, being still there, if we perceive it in one correct circumstance, then we can say that cup has been perceived by logic. When you prove that a cup is still on the table, Adam, when you prove that a cup is still on the table, are we talking about proving the real outside cup, or are we perceiving a mental cup?

When we prove that it's still there. We're perceiving a mental cup. Good, yeah, good.

So, when you talk about cup as an object of logic, as something you prove with logic, it's always the mental version. It's the archetype. Got it?

That's tricky. What logic establishes is the presence of an archetype, not of a cup. But because the cup is tied to the archetype, we can say the outside cup is there, if they are tied together.

That's cool, right? Direct perception in this school is always the outside cup, the real cup. Direct sense perception.

But when you use logic, the cup you are seeing is in your mind. And that's still a real cup. Because that cup has a connection to the outside cup.

Cool. Geshe-la, I have a quick question about jipak, jipak sama. For translation time, when I'm sitting down, I've been using deductive accurate perception.

I like it. I like it. I just want to make sure you want to stick with that.

I'll ask you a question. Could you say accurate deductive perception? I mean, I guess if you wanted to.

No, it's not the same. It's not the same. You do have to use this clumsy deductive accurate perception, because it's the opposite of a direct accurate perception.

You see what I mean? Oh, right. Okay.

[Speaker 3]
Yeah, yeah.

[Speaker 1]
You want it to be parallel. Yeah, yeah, exactly. You cannot say accurate deductive perception.

You see what I mean? You have to say a deductive form of accurate perception. Just to make sure I see what you're saying.

I'm not missing something philosophically. If we were going to say accurate deductive perception, we'd have to also say accurate direct perception. Yeah, exactly.

Exactly. And that's not what it's about. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[Speaker 2]
If we establish that the outer object is necessarily connected to the archetype, then even establishing the archetype logically, would that not also logically establish the outer object, and then amount to a logical perception of the actual thing?

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, and we're going there. We're going there. In other words, Einstein could see a black hole before he saw a black hole.

[Speaker 2]
Maybe an actual black hole and not just the archetypal one.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, because he saw the archetype. So in a way, Einstein saw the actual black hole. That's a great point.

I think we're going there. So by the way, they don't tell you, Adam, but we're starting a critique here, which is frustrating, because you get halfway through it and then you realize it's somebody else talking. And it's three lines long.

It's two lines long. So please choose your next victim. Let's see here.

Cherry? Is Cherry here? Can she help us?

If you guys don't want to do it, just pretend that you don't know your mic's not on. Chloe?

[Speaker 3]
Hey, Chloe. Hey. Go.

Go. Go. Go.

Go. Go. Go.

Go. Go. Go.

Go. Go. Go.

Go. Go. Go.

Go.

[Speaker 1]
Wow, really good. Really, really good. You guys are good.

Here we go. To start with, Adam, what's the most famous logical statement ever done in Buddhism? drach chen mi tak de chepay chir Translate.

Consider sound. It's changing because it's created. Good.

Let's consider sound. It's a changing thing because it's created. Who was the opponent in that debate?

I think it was the... My mom said this, right? No, it was the...

Yeah, no. It was a Hindu group that... Some eternalist school, probably.

Probably. And they... What did they say?

Yeah, they said sound of the Vedas was eternal, was permanent, was unchanging. Yeah, unchanging. For example, in their famous examples, the sound OM is unchanging, forever unchanging, okay?

And then we said, let's take the sound of OM, drach chen mi tak. Of course it's changing because it was produced, you know? Which is a depressing fact of life.

Anything which is born must die. Or anything which is born changes from moment to moment, okay? Now, you guys just perceived impermanence, okay?

You just perceived... When Adam and I had that conversation, you guys perceived changing, changingness, okay? When Adam and I talked about is the sound OM something that changes, you perceived the concept of changing sound, okay?

You saw it through logic, okay? We said the sound of OM is changing, and we proved it because we said because it was made. Somebody made it.

Somebody made the sound. Any sound that's made has to change because the causes and conditions going into the sound lose their power as time goes by. And it's the same with your body, for example, okay?

So we say, you guys just perceived mitapa. You guys just perceived changing, the fact of changing. Let's consider that changing, okay?

kyu mi takpa nga ne seme nge sin nge sin as a... The word sin is the ED in Tibetan. It's the past tense, okay?

I... I concluded it's the past tensorizer, okay? It makes the verb past tense, okay?

Sin makes the verb past tense, like E and D in English, you know? I concluded like that, okay? So nge here is a verb, which means what, Adam?

Do I ngepa the thing? I was going to say ascertain, but I like to use conclude, and I like conclude a little bit. No, maybe, but I...

I ascertained an object, or I saw an object, Saw it, period, okay? Now, how did I see it? Sema, okay?

Through a correct perception, I saw the fact of mi takpa. In this case, perhaps logical perception, I saw the fact of changing-ness, because we discussed the changing-ness of the sound, the sound being om, okay? So during that discussion between Adam and me about om, all of us perceived the fact of changing, okay?

Changing-ness, okay? Got it? Now, nge sin means we did it at...

What time is it now? Right now it's 6.42 in Arizona. We saw that changing-ness at 6.41, okay?

That perception is gone now. When we were discussing whether or not om was changing, we discussed that like two minutes ago, okay? So nge sin means let's say that you saw two minutes ago that the sound of om is a changing thing, okay?

And let's say ma je, you didn't forget it. It was so close. It was two minutes ago.

I mean, only a few mixed nuts can forget something that happened two minutes ago. I mean, it does happen. But, just kidding.

Let's say ma je par means and you still didn't forget that we had that conversation two minutes ago. ma je par yupe. So in that debater's mind, gulway gyu, okay?

In the other guy's mind, after you proved to him that om is a changing thing, does he still have in his mind the idea that sound is changing, yes or no? Yes. Yeah, he still remembers.

I mean, it's not like we went on to the next book or something, okay? He still has that in his mind. So now we got two perceptions of changing.

The first one happened at 6.41 and it was a result of proper logic. And then the second one happened at 6.44 and it was a result of remembering. Okay?

Not of proper logic. Just remembering. So ma je par, if he didn't forget that sound is changing, in his mind, is he perceiving impermanence or changing, is he perceiving changing in this now with logic or not?

With logic, yeah. Yes or no? Yes.

Yes. In the memory, during the memory. No.

Yeah, I guess he's having a direct perception of the memory of... Yeah, yeah, okay? So at 6.41 we proved it with logic. At 6.44 we checked with the guy, do you remember that we proved that sound was changing? He says, yeah, I remember that. But at that 6.42 we didn't prove it to him again. Okay? And the status of the changing that he's perceiving has shifted. That's right, yeah.

In the last section there was the point that said it just happened that once you have that logical perception one time, then it's kind of valid for all. Well, that's a tricky... That's what we're about to not prove.

Yeah, yeah, Ben's got it. But let's say at 6.42 he was sticking to logic. At 6.44 he got lazy and said, yeah, I remember that. Okay? I remember it was changing. Okay?

Okay. Now, is that second perception a jaypaksema or not? Didn't we just say that it wasn't?

It is not. I think it's not. But let's see where we're going.

But who's speaking right now? It's the other guy. It's the other guy.

What he's saying is, oh, so according to you, when you remember that the cup was there, that must be jaypaksema. That must be deduction. And we say, we didn't say that.

And he says, yeah, you did, because you said it relates to the actual sound. That relates to the actual sound. You're still perceiving the same object.

He says, when you remember two minutes later that sound was changing, you're still focusing on the same sound. When you use logic to see that sound is changing, and then a minute later you use memory to see that sound is changing, in both cases you are still making your perception with regard to sound. The same sound.

The same sound. What kind of sound? Adam, if I say, take sound, it's changing because it was produced by somebody, the sound I'm talking about, is that a particular sound in the world, or is it a mental image of a sound?

It's a mental image of a sound. Good, good. And when I say, Adam, do you remember that sound is changing?

And that sound, is that the actual sound, or is that the mental image? When you remember. Well, it's still.

Yeah, it's still just a mental image. It's still just a mental image. You close your eyes and you say, yeah, I remember Geshe-la, we proved it at 6.41. So whether you're talking about memory, or whether you're talking about logic, the object you're talking about is a mental image and not the real thing. Can we say that? Sure. Yeah, so far, so good.

So far, we don't have any problems. Now, that guy's not done with us. He's cooking us.

All right. Give me another reader, Adam. Somebody here.

[Speaker 3]
What about Christina Kaska? Okay. Okay, so Adam, here we go.

[Speaker 1]
This is difficult. At 6.41, we proved that sound was a changing thing. At 6.49, you can still remember what we proved. In each case, the sound we're talking about is just a mental picture of the word Aum, actually. It's not the actual Aum. It's not the sound when somebody's reciting mantras or something.

It's just an idea. It's just a picture. If the Aum that you perceive with the logic is a valid mental picture of Aum, and if the Aum that you perceive with memory is a valid mental picture of Aum, then there's...

then the Aum has become... How do you say? Then the original logic could just as well have been a memory.

[Speaker 3]
Can you say it again?

[Speaker 1]
I'll say it again. If the Aum you see with your logic at 6.41 is a real valid mental picture of Aum, and if the Aum that you see with your memory and not with logic six minutes later or something is a valid mental image of Aum, if the mental image of Aum in each case is valid and equivalent, then the memory could just as well have been a deduction, and the deduction could have just as well been a memory. And the memory was a deduction because the status of the object is the same.

Yeah, there's no difference in the quality between the two. No, there's no difference in the object. Therefore, therefore, the memory was a deduction, and the deduction was a memory.

And what's wrong with that in this school? The memories are not valid. Yeah, in this school memories are not valid perceptions, in this school.

The thing has gone. The object has gone. Is it still a mental image of sound?

Yes, but it's gone. Something like that. In this school, a memory is not a valid deduction.

It's not a valid perception. Wow, we know that, right? Memories can get really screwed up.

Your memory of your last girlfriend or something, I mean, that changes every day. That object changes every day. So, cheshe, by the way, you guys may not remember this word, but it's a fancy word for recollection.

So, cheshe, in this school, is a recollection atsema, Adam? Okay. It is not.

It is not. Cheshe, a recollection, is not a valid perception. It's too vague, because the object you're looking at is past.

It's already gone by. It's too shifting to be. But in the higher schools, can a memory be an accurate perception?

[Speaker 2]
It can.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, it can. You can have a valid memory. But in this school, the object of a memory is not a valid object.

It's not a real object. It's not even the mental image of an object. The correct mental image.

Good? So, Jay Park, the original perception of the impermanence of sound would have had to have been a memory, because the status of the object in each case is equivalent. Then he says something, then it gets really funny.

He says, so one of those two accurate perceptions, either the first one where you figured out that OM was changing, or the second one where you remembered that you figured out that sound was changing, one of them is superfluous. Yeah. If they are both valid, one of them is useless.

Okay? One of them is good. The original logical perception that sound is changing, and the memory that you logically perceived that sound was changing.

Okay? Since the objects are equivalent, they are both mental images of changing sound, then why have two perceptions? Why repeat the same perception twice?

One of them has to be dunme. One of them has to be meaningless. By the way, does that apply?

By the way, what we're saying is if the memory is as valid as the original perception, then you could just live in memories your whole life and they'd all be valid. They don't like that. This second school of Buddhism, they say, memories cannot have the force of the original perceptions.

Okay? Memories do not have the validity of the original perception. If they did, then it'd be superfluous to have a second valid perception.

And that's their reason for holding memories to be invalid. Well, that's a very interesting question, Adam, and I think you're very close. Maybe this is the argument they use to say that cheshe is not sema.

Okay? Recollection is not sema. By the way, if you think about it, a recollection doesn't have a word in Tibetan.

You can't say tenpa, because that means the capacity to recollect. So I think cheshe is a necessary word in this school. You've got to learn that word.

It's a reflection, a later reflection on a truth that you learned earlier. And in this school, it's not as valid. Geshe-la, cheshe also refers to things that you've perceived with direct perception?

That's a good point. I believe so, Nick. Yeah, that's a good question.

I remember that I set the... It's a cheshe when I remember that I set the cup down on the desk today. That's also a cheshe.

Okay. Then the perception that we had at 642 would not be cheshe. Is that what you...

Well, no. He's saying the perception I had at 600 when I set the cup down on the table. That perception was a direct...

Yeah, yeah, yeah. We're over time. And at 642, I figured out that I had that perception.

And then at 649, I remembered that I figured out that I was wrong. And that third one, in their school, is not as valid. All right.

Adam's going to translate that next paragraph. And I want to see your hairline recede as much as mine, trying to get through that paragraph. Okay.

I'll spend some time with it, definitely. It's not going to be easy. This is cool stuff, right?

Yeah, definitely. Can we have a wrap-up, please? Yeah.

Adam, you want to take a shot? I'll go back as far as I can. Yeah, so I think...

Please correct me.

[Speaker 2]
You have to use memory, Adam.

[Speaker 1]
I used direct perception of what we said five minutes ago. Ten minutes ago. Yeah, so we're talking about sound as it applies to previous objects and reference, and whether or not mental images can...

Well, hold on. Let me restart here. Yeah, so I guess if we just went back to the current argument, we're trying to prove whether or not memories or recollections are valid or not.

And we said that there are two different instances of both. So when Geshe-la said that he put his coffee cup down on the table at 6 o'clock, that was the direct perception. Then at 6.41, we used a logical reason to go through and prove that it was probably still there because the cup never hit the floor, and we didn't hear any kind of evidence suggesting that it wasn't there. And then we talked about maybe a minute or two later, if we had a recollection of the logical statement that was proving its existence, that that would also be a... Hold on. It's still a little unclear.

[Speaker 2]
So...

[Speaker 1]
We're still going to reach a conclusion based on whether or not that's direct or indirect. I want to say direct or indirect, but I don't know if that's really the correct terms or not. And I'll take you a little further.

When I set the cup down on the table at 6 o'clock, that was a real outside cup that I confirmed with a sense perception. When I closed my eyes at 6.42 and saw the cup still on the desk with my logic, that cup shifted from a real outside cup to an archetype, to a mental image of a cup. When I remembered that I proved the cup or set the cup down, then the cup shifted in this school to some kind of of shifty mental image, like not perfect mental image.

But I'll throw something at you guys. Which of these three is the real cup according to the highest school?

[Speaker 3]
No such thing.

[Speaker 1]
Do they all hold equal kind of ontological like... Well, according to Adam's first book, that second one comes pretty close, because it's just a mental image coming out of a seed. It's just a luminous mental image coming out of a seed.

The cup, the outside cup, is also just a result of a luminous mental image, an archetype coming out of a karmic seed. The highest school of Buddhism is very close to saying that the theoretical cup is the real cup. Okay.

And then you can make cups at will. If that's true, you can make cups at will. And then you don't have to die and sansaras wipe down, and all kinds of good stuff.

All right. We have a Q&A coming up now with Mr. Sugeng Shi. So if anything was left unclear or you don't remember properly, hopefully Sugeng will clear it all up for you.

And then after that, we have an online yoga class with Uta. So please stick around for that. I like Uta's classes because they are...

You get exercise, but she doesn't kill you needlessly. So Gensho, something to think about for the next eight hours. You gave us three examples of how the higher school would differ from the second school in relation to how to view the cups.

You said number two, they were on the verge of saying, but you didn't actually say that they believed that. So I'm just wondering which one holds supremacy within that trio. I would still say the second one, but it's not exactly the same as the cup which the Madhyamika is talking about.

It's just the mental image that comes out before it hits the pieces. Okay? Before it hits the pieces.

You got to think about that. I will.

[Speaker 2]
There's no real cup, but there's no realer cup than that.

[Speaker 1]
And by the way, that's the only thing that makes it possible to not die or not become enlightened. That's the only thing that makes it possible. Ben, do you have a second?

Oh, sure.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah. Do you want to catch me in the room of that other meeting that I need to see you at?

[Speaker 1]
Yes.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, I've got a second. I've got a quick second. Do we have a break, Nick?

[Speaker 1]
We have like two minutes.

[Speaker 2]
Okay. I've got two minutes, Adam.

[Speaker 1]
Sugeng, at your leisure for when you need to start. Thank you, Geshe-la. See you guys tonight.

Thank you, Geshe-la. Good job, Adam. Good job, everybody reading.

It's very impressive. Bye. Bye.

Bye. Did you send a new link to another meeting? Yes.

Yeah, yeah, yeah. I'll go look. Just check my email.

Okay. If you like WhatsApp or what do you prefer, Adam? I think I'm missing something here because I was just going to ask Ben a quick question.

I was just going to like maybe there's something out there. You just said that the second, the object that's coming from a mental image is the realist kind of the closest approximation to a reality that we have. If we have a real cup, then that number...

[Speaker 2]
What are the three again? Help me get it right.

[Speaker 1]
You help me get it right.

[Speaker 2]
So the second...

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, totally. This is why I was trying to ask for further clarification when I asked Geshe-la that and we kind of stuck with that number two. Yeah, so you've got a memory which was number three.

A memory was the third. The mental image that is kind of being superimposed over the actual object is number two. And I'll have to refresh the first one.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, if we say the actual object like the real object out there, the actual physical cup, the zhang cen, right, the changing actual item in the world that acts as an inspiration for the mental image that we later remember. We do accept this middle one in the middle way school. We don't accept the first one in the middle way school.

[Speaker 1]
The first one was the existence of an actual object independent of our own and independent of our own interaction with it. So an external world that kind of exists freestanding of our own perceptions.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah. A real actual object out there changing in and of itself, right.

[Speaker 1]
Okay, so I've got I've got that. But what I heard you say was the the cup, because this is why I was asking about number two for clarification, which is okay. So you had said that if we put a cup on the table that that cup that is on the table that is being superimposed with some sort of a mental image.

That is the closest thing that we have to read to real mental images. It's not but it's not real.

[Speaker 2]
Right.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, because I'm just wondering based on this is this is the crux of why I was like this is exactly what I wanted to ask you. So I just want to make sure that like I'm understanding what you're saying. Are we saying that there is no reality?

There is how do we define in that context? You know what I mean?

[Speaker 2]
We Yeah, right. I mean we have to be careful with the word reality because reality, of course, can be a synonym for self existing and right. There is a reality.

There are two realities, right? There's deceptive reality and there's ultimate reality. So what I'm saying is that the deceptive reality exists the idea of a cup on the table exists and the ultimate reality exists, which is that there is no other reality that the idea of a cup in our mind and that's why we can put coffee in it and drink it.

[Speaker 1]
Thanks. Yeah, I mean, because I've always heard say guess guess let's say, you know, if you don't think the car outside and if you don't think if you don't if you if you if you don't kind of get into this nihilistic view that nothing's real, you know, walk out into traffic and watch the non-existent car break non-existent legs, right?

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, it is a type of reality.

[Speaker 1]
There has to be some like some interaction and we can't say that nothing's real but but that's you're saying that there's a deceptive nature.

[Speaker 2]
I'm just making sure you're like, yeah, but real is also a synonym for self-existent. And so in the middle way school, we say nothing is real. And that's why that's the only reason that love must return love and unfortunately pain must return pain.

[Speaker 1]
Yeah, I don't yeah, I don't disagree at all. I mean, I just think you know, it's it's just one of those things where I kind of have this I guess in my head. I was getting a little like we can't say that nothing is real, but I think that's one of the synonyms though for self-existence.

I guess one the context of like semantics then and terms and usage. There's an everyday reality that we experience. We're like experience and reality could be also tied up in accurate perception too because we know that things exist if they're kind of perceived by an actor for something.

[Speaker 2]
So yeah, I mean, I wonder what the Tibetan word is right that we're right because we can get ourselves caught in the English etymology when we're you know, but what's the Tibetan word? I wonder that we're translating here as real. And is it specifically would it be included in the list of synonyms in the middle way for what we deny?

[Speaker 1]
I'll find I guess we'll figure it out.

[Speaker 2]
Yeah, I bet we will. I bet we will. We better run.

We got to go. I'm sorry again. Thank you.

Thank you. I'm sorry.

[Speaker 1]
We took your time for a second. I was enjoying your conversation and I wish you could continue further.

[Speaker 2]
I enjoy you too. Okay. Thanks.

We'll see you soon, buddy.

[Speaker 1]
All right. So thank you. Okay.

Marina over to you for a while. We can't hear you.

[Speaker 2]
Thanks again.

[Speaker 3]
You're welcome. See you. I don't know.

I can't hear Marina.