Углублённый курс ACI 04 — Искусство толкования, часть 1 (1998, Билакуппе, Индия), занятие 20

[Говорящий 1]
I am going to talk about Dhuwan's Shifu, who is the founder of the Dhuwan school. He was born in Tibet. He was born in Tibet and was named Shifu Shefjia.

He was born in Tibet. He was born in Tibet and was named Shifu Shefjia. He was born in Tibet and was named Shifu Shefjia.

and they wanted to take us in. This is how the Sanstas were separated. So they were separated.

In the city, people from the administration took the Sanstas to agree to a settlement and became the Sanstas. The Sanstas moved to reality and the Sanstas started to act in different ways but all this was just because the Sanstas You don't have to make any nude notes. This is just a recap of where we were from yesterday evening.

Generally speaking, we're having a war between the minor-weight school and the middle-weight school. There's a fight going on. And the fight has started off from the middle-weight school saying, you know, nothing exists in truth, nothing exists truly, nothing exists by definition, nothing exists ultimately.

And then they're saying that about all three categories that the minor-weight school accepts. They're saying that about dependent things, they're saying that about constructs, and they're saying that about totality or emptiness. They're saying that with regard to all three groups that the minor-weight school asserts.

So, when we get to page 48, about the six lines from the bottom, the question arises, well then, why does the debate range around specifically Shenlong? Why is the debate concentrating on things that change, on things that are dependent? And, again, on the very last line of page 48, the answer is that Khenpo's meaning, great thinkers, realize that this is where the battle will be won or lost.

That what we have to concentrate on are changing things, because those are the basis for the establishing of all the other colonies of the minor-weight school. So, that's why we are concentrating on Shenlong as the main focus of the debate. So, the question is, why does the debate concentrate on things that are dependent?

I guess I was asking you to think about a certain issue, and then you have to come up with an answer, it sounds like. He's saying, by the way, he did also mention that we are talking today in the context of the abbreviations by his brother, I forgot his name. So, he says, you guys think about it, and you give me an answer.

We have a case here where the consequence group of the middle-weight school has made a blanket statement to cover all three attributes, or all three groups. They said that nothing exists by definition, nothing exists truly, nothing exists ultimately. And they're talking about all three categories.

Dependent things, they're talking about labeled things, or normal things, and then they're talking about constructs, and then they're talking about emptiness as well. So, in your opinion, you know, what would make more sense for the mind-only school, when they mount their attack on the middle-weight school, what would you expect in your own mind to them to mount their attack on? If you were just talking to somebody and saying, you know, the middle-weight school has just denied that any of the three categories exist by definition, and then you're going to tell somebody, now the mind-only school is attacking them, what do you think a person would naturally think the mind-only school was going to attack?

I mean, just anybody would think that? Shouldn't the mind-only school properly criticize the middle-weight view of the other two as well? The other two categories as well?

[Говорящий 2]
I would think that since the mind-only school bases its other two categories on the definition of Khen-long, and from Khen-long gets their other two categories, gets their Kunda-sang, gets their emptiness, they would have to come at it.

[Говорящий 1]
He's talking like just a normal person came up and said, you know, what was the... I mean, you're saying that because of yesterday's class, but if you just heard a presentation where somebody said, the middle-weight school is saying that none of the three categories exist by definition, now what do you think a mind-only school is going to say?

[Говорящий 2]
All of the three categories exist by definition. Because they're around us.

[Говорящий 1]
He repeats that the Madhyamika, Prasiddhika have attacked. They've said all three, one by one, they've said this one doesn't exist by definition, this one doesn't exist by definition, this one doesn't exist by definition. They've made a blanket statement specifically covering all three.

[Говорящий 2]
So, all of these views, the one that I was talking about.

[Говорящий 1]
But, that was my main question, I said, if you're going to talk, you know, what is it that just Katuk in Tibetan means, you know, directly that the mind-only school has to debate about? It's just a direct, sudden response from the middle-weight school, won't they talk about all three? Okay, okay, okay, now I'm going to ask you another question.

I admit that, you know, among their other statements, the middle-weight school has said that dependent things don't exist by definition, and I admit that the mind-only school would have to attack that. So, you know, but simultaneously the middle-weight school has also said that emptiness and totality itself doesn't exist by definition. Wouldn't that warrant, like, some kind of whimper of response from the mind-only school?

Shouldn't they at least complain about that a little bit?

[Говорящий 2]
So is it emptiness defined by the mind-only school?

[Говорящий 1]
No, he's talking now about, uh, yeah, yes. I don't think so. No, Jung Dook-hee is Shi'r Jyotadeek.

Jung Dook-hee is Shi'r Jyotadeek. Oh, the Koran! Uh, no, he says, he says he understands that, you know, Shen Huang, uh, changing things are the basis on which you establish the emptiness of the subjectivity, but he wants just emptiness in and of itself.

Wouldn't they want to attack that?

[Говорящий 2]
From one point of view, emptiness sort of feels like it's a fact. Someone might say, well, okay, and the things, uh, are not, don't exist by definition, but emptiness exists by definition. He asks.

[Говорящий 1]
Uh, Lee Kashi-san on the mission, you don't think of this, uh, uh, question, Shen Huang, Shen Huangs do exist by definition, and you don't? They might think that.

[Говорящий 2]
No, they, like a mind-only would say, okay, maybe I'll concede to you that Shen Huangs don't exist by definition. Not that they, okay, but, but emptiness still does exist by definition because it's a fact and nothing would change.

[Говорящий 1]
This is a fact that could more likely exist by definition. This is a fact that could more likely exist by definition. I mean, Shen Huang doesn't, doesn't touch on it.

Uh, so we'll go backwards a little bit, we'll backtrack a little bit. Uh, when, uh, when the, uh, Manimika school says that emptiness itself, or totality, doesn't exist by definition, is that okay with the mind-only schools? Do they have a problem with that or not?

[Говорящий 2]
Uh huh.

[Говорящий 1]
When, when, I'll repeat it, when the Middle Way school says that emptiness itself doesn't exist by definition, does the mind-only school have a problem with that? I'll repeat it. So based on that, what you disagreed to, wouldn't it make logic, wouldn't it be logical that the mind-only school would want to attack the Middle Way school when the Middle Way school said emptiness doesn't exist by definition?

[Говорящий 2]
It should be easy.

[Говорящий 1]
So, don't they have to be positing two, don't they have to be fighting the Middle Way on two points now?

[Говорящий 2]
If, if, if Shen Wang exists by definition, then the emptiness will be Shen Wang.

[Говорящий 1]
Uh, that's true. I mean, that's, that's generally true. But still, the, the Middle Way school has taken the time and the care to specifically signal out these two different things.

Shen Wang's existent things and emptiness itself, and say of each one separately that they don't exist by definition, doesn't this warrant two separate attacks, counter-attacks by the mind-only school?

[Говорящий 2]
That's why I said Shen Wang doesn't exist by definition. They haven't, they haven't separated the emptiness and the Shen Wang.

[Говорящий 1]
It's true what you say. It is true that if they could establish that changing things existed by definition, then automatically, in a sense, they'd be establishing that the emptiness which pertained to them existed by definition. But, I repeat, given the fact that the Middle Way school has taken the time to signal out both of these different attributes as groups, and say that they don't exist by definition, doesn't it warrant at least a mention by the mind-only school that, you know, by the way, you're also wrong about emptiness.

It doesn't exist. It's not, it doesn't exist by definition. Shouldn't they at least make some kind of peep about it?

Yes. You're going to answer this. You're going to answer this.

Oh, I'll tell you what. So, to get this back to where we were last evening actually, they do, they really should attack on two points, right? They should, they really should.

Obviously, they don't attack on the third point, because they do believe that the construct doesn't exist by definition. So, they're not going to attack on that point. But, on the other two points, shouldn't they, shouldn't they make some kind of attack?

And then, Jetsun Kappa himself says at the bottom of page 48, you know, they should have, you know, in a real sense, they should have said something about it, but they didn't. Now, why is that? And that's why Jetsun Kappa got on saying that thing about Shen Wang being the linchpin of their philosophy, you know, and that being the most crucial thing and the most important thing, and that's where Jetsun Kappa got into starting to talk about that, because he too was wondering why they didn't attack on two points.

Now, what about that third attribute, which is construct? When the Middle Way school says they don't exist by definition, is this something that the Middle Way school should fight with them or not? Before you go jumping and saying that the Mind-Only school accepts that construct, don't forget that among those constructs there are different flavors or different versions of those constructs.

Some of the constructs are like, oh, those unchanging things like empty space and stuff, you know, that's a construct. About that, perhaps they could say it doesn't exist by definition. We have to talk about that.

We have to talk about what would they mean when they said it didn't exist by definition. But, don't forget that the main construct we can talk about here is this non-existent construct, the construct which is actually a thing which doesn't exist, which is called the gatta, which is what emptiness is empty of. And don't forget that in the Mind-Only school that refers to the fact that something like a water pitcher is not the thing which is given the name water pitcher by definition.

If someone came along and posited a water pitcher which could be given the name water pitcher by definition, which deserves to be what is called water pitcher by definition, that doesn't exist. That is the ultimate thing of which emptiness is supported. That thing doesn't exist.

And don't forget that's the kundal we're talking about here. That's the main construct that we're talking about here. And that doesn't exist.

That thing doesn't exist. So, you get into trouble if you start saying that doesn't exist by definition, or doesn't exist by definition, or something like that. Be careful about just leaping in and saying, oh, all constructs don't exist by definition.

The main one being spoken about here is in the category of constructs which refers to something that doesn't even exist. Yeah, good. Generally I don't have a problem with you saying that, actually.

Okay? Constructs. My understanding is that constructs don't exist by definition.

Now, OK, let's say I don't have a problem with you saying that constructs, that the Mandolin school says that constructs only exist by definition. But, and does the Middle Way school also say that? The same phrase, leaves the same wording, yes they do, they say constructs including, and along with everything else in the world, don't exist by definition.

But when you take the Middle Way school saying constructs only exist by definition, when you take the Mandolin school saying constructs only exist by definition, are these in sync? Do they match each other? But, but you know, just as a gut reaction, you know, if a minor-league school guy is sitting there and listening to a Middle Way school guy, you know, and the Middle Way school guy says, we don't, we believe that no constructs in the universe exist by definition, they wouldn't like leave to an attack at that moment, right?

They'd say like, yes, that's pretty good to me, until they got into what it meant, you know, they wouldn't like leave to attack the minor, the Middle Way school. But don't forget how Je Tsongkhapa has expressed himself here, which is a little tricky, okay? At the bottom of page 48, Je Tsongkhapa has been saying, you know, when you think about it, the Mandolin school had a problem with the Middle Way school saying that dependent things didn't exist by definition, and that's a little strange, because they didn't seem to have a problem with both, you see?

He's saying, now, why don't they go on the attack on both points, you know, why don't they go on the attack about a Middle Way school saying that totality or emptiness doesn't exist by definition? Why is it that they didn't go on the attack on both? Yeah, it's interesting to note that they should have even attacked the third one, right, as Chilton was pointing out, okay?

So he said, you know, generally speaking, if the Mandolin school were sensitive to what the Middle Way school really means when they say constructs don't exist by definition, then they should have had a problem with that, too, and they should have said something about ... they should have made an objection there, too, because what the Middle Way school means when they say that constructs don't exist by definition is that when you go looking for the construct that is given the name construct, independent of the name construct, you can't find anything. You will never find anything.

If you go looking for the thing that gets the name construct, you will never find anything. You know, you can go down to level after level after level, and you won't find anything that really exists. Now, if the Mandolin school were sensitive to the fact that that's what the Middle Way school means when they say constructs don't exist by definition, then I guess that's sort of siding with Chilton.

You know, they should have ... then maybe they should have attacked that as well. You know, there should be a question why they didn't attack that either.

So, really, even though this particular question is a little bit different than the question that I asked earlier, I think it's a good question. So, really, even though this particular chunk of text on the bottom of page 48, I've explained yesterday, and, you know, just from the wording here, there's no more to be said about that. You know, you understand what the wording means.

But if you go into this with an analytical state of mind, and you examine this whole exchange, this last exchange, there are all those issues here, you know, and they are not evident, but they are here, and we talked about them. Now, there's one more issue here to talk about, or we have to amplify on that last point here, which is that the Minority School, in essence, the debater from the Minority School side is saying, you know, I could have come and debated you today about that last thing you said, too, that constructs don't exist by definition. Because I understand that that's not what you ...

I understand that when you say constructs don't exist by definition, you mean something quite different than what I say when I say constructs don't exist by definition. What you, middle-weight people, mean when you say constructs don't exist by definition is that when you look for the thing that was named that particular construct, you can't find that thing. You know, no matter how much you search for that thing, you can't find it.

That's what you, middle-weight people, mean when you say constructs don't exist by definition. I understand that. I'm the mind-only guy, right?

I understand that's what you mean. I know that's what you mean. But today, I choose to concentrate on Shenron with you.

You know, I choose ... you know, I could have debated you even about that. Because I understand that you don't mean the same thing that I mean when you say that.

But, you know, let's, between us, in this particular round, let's concentrate on changing things. Because that's where the fight should take place. Because that's where the decisions will be made.

We'll start on page forty- Now we're ready to go on to new stuff. Page forty-nine, line two. Okay.

Now here's more stuff from these reviews.

[Говорящий 2]
Yeah, right.

[Говорящий 1]
We're on to page forty-eight, line two, you know. This is on the abbreviations. Geshe-la says, you know, the point has been covered before.

Again, Jetsun Kappa is taking out a specific chunk from the original text by Master Sangha. And then he's going to be explaining it later. But, again, he says that the same point is being made as was made before, in the previous section.

We have an unusual expression here, which is, Tsunzaki-ngo-nidu-rumba-shemba. Which means, to have a, almost like a fancified belief in the essence of the attribution. Something like that.

To have some kind of fanciful belief in the essence of the attribution. And this is said to apply to both dependent things, shenrongs, and also apply to the emptiness of those things, which is yoga, the totality of those things. So there's some kind of fanciful belief you have about them.

What is the nature of that fanciful belief that relates to their constructedness? It is the following. If you take, for example, an example of a shenrong, of a dependent thing, and you go back to the plain old tashi, we go back to tashi, and the mind is looking, this is a state of mind which is focusing on tashi, focusing on the fact that tashi is the object which is given the name tashi.

Tashi as the object of what receives the name tashi. The fact that tashi is what's called tashi. Does that exist by definition or not?

It does not exist by definition, but this state of mind believes it does exist by definition. So it's holding tashi to be truly existent. That's what it means in this school, to be the tendency to hold tashi to be truly existent.

So look at tashi as being the object of the name tashi, by definition. And that is rondo. That's seeing something there where there is nothing there.

It's attributing existence by definition to the fact that tashi is what's called tashi. And that doesn't exist by definition, but this is a rondo for an overrating state of mind that believes that there does exist that existence by definition where there is no existence by definition. And this same description can be applied to emptiness.

If you focus on tashi again, and you think about the emptiness of tashi, if you think about tashi as the basis of the emptiness of tashi, and the emptiness of tashi being what we call the emptiness of tashi, by definition, the fact that the emptiness of tashi is what's given the name emptiness of tashi, does that exist by definition or not? This state of mind believes that that does exist by definition. Again, now with relation to the emptiness of tashi, it's a state of mind which is seeing something there where there is nothing there, which is called rondo.

So it's again another tendency to see things as being truly existent when they are not. It's the rondo version of that. It's the version which is seeing something there where there really is nothing there.

So this same state of mind is doing the same thing, whether we're talking about dependent things, or whether we're talking about the emptiness which pertains to those dependent things, this is a state of mind that's seeing that the fact that they are called what they are, the fact that they are what receives the name that they are given, they believe it to exist by definition. In both cases it's the same. This state of mind is the same.

Both with changing things and with the emptiness that pertains to the changing things. So, again, it's just about the same argument that we had before. And this is easy.

Easy. Easy. You got it?

You got it from the other day, right? No problem, right? We've met a lot of tashi, haven't we?

That's why you start giggling when the guy stood up and gave you a tantra. Hi, I'm tashi. The next one is in line 5, page 49.

And here, discounting meaning you deny the existence of something which actually is there. And here, to deny the ngo-nyi. Ngo-nyi here meaning self-nature, having a nature of its own, right?

Both dependent things and the emptiness which pertains to those very dependent things, they have a quality of existing by their very nature, meaning, in this school, by definition, or truly. So, any state of mind in which you focused on dependent things, or you focused upon their totality or their emptiness, and any state of mind that looked at those two things and said, about those things which really do have their own nature, if that state of mind said they don't have their own nature, that would be discounting their real nature. That would be discounting something.

That would be saying something doesn't exist where something really does exist. And in the mind-only school, that would be saying, existence by definition, which really does pertain to those two things, which doesn't pertain to those two things. This is a little tricky, but it's really beautiful.

OK, when you look at Dashi again, so basically what's going to happen here is you're going to get the same formula where Arya Sarin is going to say, if you can, from the mind-only point of view, eliminate this extreme and eliminate this extreme, then you arrive at the middle and you establish what we mean by emptiness. So the way in which Geshe-la said it is really beautiful, I'll try to capture it, is that the fact, this is what a mind-only school person would say, the fact that Dashi, Dashi as what is called Dashi, the fact that Dashi is what is given the name Dashi, that fact doesn't exist by definition, according to the mind-only school. That very non-existence by definition is, in this school, Dashi's emptiness.

The fact that it's not true about Dashi, that the fact that he is what is called Dashi could exist by definition, the fact that that's not true is Dashi's emptiness. And that emptiness which you thereby derive does exist by definition. OK, that's kind of cool.

We'll say it again. The fact that Dashi is what is given the name Dashi doesn't exist by definition is Dashi's emptiness. And that emptiness which you thereby derive is something which does exist by definition.

Now saying it in exactly that way automatically eliminates those two overrating and discounting states of mind that we just talked about, because those two states of mind hold the opposite in each case. Those two states of mind think that, in the first case, the fact that Dashi is what is given the name Dashi exists by definition. Reverse, right?

And that state of mind also thinks that the emptiness which Dashi has doesn't exist by definition. Right? So then, those two states of mind are eliminated by that correct mind-only description that I went through first, and that description eliminates or avoids the two extremes, and then, says Master Sangha, you get in the middle, after all is said and done, nice, perfect, emptiness-affirming mind-only description.

Now, to put it into very, very simple words, OK? To boil it down to the most simple common denominator, mind-only school is coming up and saying, totality, meaning emptiness, OK? Now I'm going to stop saying meaning emptiness, OK?

Totality is something which, if you come along and say it does not exist by definition, you are wrong.

[Говорящий 2]
That's all.

[Говорящий 1]
Mind-only school is just trying to say that. Totality is such that, if you came along and said it didn't exist by definition, you would be wrong. Then the wording of the text is, I think it's line 8 from the bottom of page 49, it says, And so, these last two natures, these last two very natures, last in Tibetan can mean first and last, it can mean the two on the end, but anyway, it's referring to dependent things and their emptiness, OK, their totality.

And it says here, anyone who came along and said that those things don't exist by definition would be guilty of doing discounting, of the discounting of money. That's the point of those two natures. So, if you come along and say it doesn't exist by definition, you are wrong.

Now, what is he talking about when they explain these two points? He's talking about the description of overrating and discounting as it appears in the bodhisattva level, and the description of overrating and discounting states of mind as it appears in the abbreviation, and then the corresponding treatment on how to stop or avoid those states of mind and how to avoid those distreats. So, in the way that the bodhisattva level presents overrating and how to stop it, the way the bodhisattva level presents discounting and how to stop it, and in the way that the abbreviated presentation addresses those same issues, it's pretty much the same.

So, in the way that the bodhisattva level presents discounting and how to avoid those states of mind and how to avoid those distreats, the way that the bodhisattva level presents discounting and how to avoid those states of mind and how to avoid those distreats, and in the way that the bodhisattva level presents discounting and how to avoid those states of mind and how to avoid those distreats, the way that the bodhisattva level presents discounting and how to avoid those states of mind and how to avoid those distreats, and in the way that the bodhisattva level presents discounting and how to avoid those states of mind and how to avoid those distreats, the way that the bodhisattva level presents discounting and how to avoid those states of mind and how to avoid those distreats, and in the way that the bodhisattva level presents discounting and how to avoid those states of mind and how to avoid those distreats, the way that the bodhisattva level presents discounting and how to avoid those states of mind and how to avoid those distreats, and in the way that the bodhisattva level presents discounting and how to avoid those states of mind and how to avoid those distreats, the way that the bodhisattva level presents discounting and how people memorize it in this monastery, people, they conceptualize the whole book as one big object. And then, and then, if you're like, get to a point like that with this particular book, then it should occur to you, you know, certain issues should come up in your mind, like, you know, when I memorized the first part, it was using this kind of description, exists ultimately.

And then when I got down later, it started using different descriptions, existing by definition. I think the book might be trying to, maybe the book is changing slightly, maybe the book is, maybe the author of the book is starting to introduce some internal inconsistencies, you know. He, first he starts out in the first part of his book using these kind of words, later on he starts using these kind of words.

I think there might be some inconsistency here. Far from being inconsistent, you're supposed to think, well, you know what, you know what, they boil down to the same thing. And then Jessica Copeland comes and says, yeah, you know what, they boil down to the same thing.

So that's why they're making the point like that. Sensitive students who really rock this whole book should start to wonder why, why different phrases are being used for the same idea. And then they should come to a conclusion at this particular point, which is why you should not spend time on it, that, that they boil down to the same thing.

If you don't think about these things carefully and make up your own mind about them, you know, with your own thinking process, then when someone came up to you and said, you know, uh, why did Jessica Copeland use one kind of phrase early on in the book and later on he used another phrase later on in the book, you would be put in the position of saying, I don't know, go ask Jessica Copeland. You'd be in that point. He doesn't want you to be in that position.

And then Jessica Copeland is going to go back to the actual wording of the abbreviation and start to, you know, go through the wording of the quotation and help you out with different concepts. At some point in that text, in the wording of it, it says constructs don't exist. And the state of mind of overrating looks at constructs that don't exist and thinks that they do exist.

How do you explain that in the mind-only school, right? From the mind-only school's point of view, it cannot be saying that state of mind looks at constructs that don't exist and thinks that they do exist. It couldn't be saying that because they don't think that.

So it must mean, again, that state of mind looks at constructs that don't exist by definition and believes that they do exist by definition or ultimately. And that's what it means. Now Jessica Copeland isn't satisfied with just saying that.

He says, and I'll prove to you that it can't be saying that constructs don't exist because I'll show you a quotation in the abbreviation where it says specifically that constructs don't exist. Remember that in the actual wording of the abbreviation, all it says is they don't exist. It doesn't say that they don't exist ultimately.

This is kind of difficult, okay? The actual wording is page 49, fourth line at the bottom. It says, starts out by saying mumbatoppa.

Mumbatoppa means generally the process of making a construction. Here, Geshe-la says, read it as the constructions themselves. Okay, constructs themselves.

It says, which are focused on or which are labeled or which are applied by, it says here, names and expressions. Names and expressions. Here, the word names means verbalization.

In other words, when you call a vase a vase, that's a verbalization, okay? So the idea that you have when you call a vase a vase, the mental image, in a sense, that you have when you call a vase a vase, the construct that arises when a vase is called a vase, through the use of the verbalization vase, okay? And then the second half of that is the construct which arises through thinking of a vase as a vase, which is sort of like a mental naming process, okay, and a mental labeling process.

So whether it's the fact that you're applying verbalizations or verbalizations to an object and thereby creating some kind of construct, or whether it's that you're thinking of an object in a certain way, thinking of an object as what it is, and thereby creating another kind of construct, okay? So now you have the abbreviation of Arya Sangha saying, hey look, think about those constructs that you make either verbally or those constructs that you make mentally through your constructing state of mind, okay? Now, I have a question for you.

Do those exist or do they not exist? Okay, the question here is, think about those things and tell me, do they exist or do they not exist? That's the question.

It's a question posed by the abbreviation itself. Now we're going to get an answer. I'll hand it to you in a second.

Okay. And then the abbreviation of Arya Sangha answers its own question, okay, in the following words, starting from 49, second line from the bottom. It says, nominally speaking, they do.

Ultimately speaking, they don't, which means they do, okay? It's this whole thing, you know, nominally speaking, yes, those constructs do exist. Do they exist ultimately?

No, we never said that, but nominally speaking, they do exist. Now, it's interesting, because this is the first time we're thinking it means mind-only, okay? But they also make the distinction, right?

So, nominally speaking, yeah, those two kinds of constructs do exist. Ultimately speaking, no, they don't exist. And that's their answer.

So that proves what? The mind-only scroll, and specifically this particular book, the abbreviation, does believe that those things do exist, so they couldn't make what they said when they said they don't exist. So, what does it mean at the mind-only scroll when they say, yeah, they do exist nominally, but they don't exist ultimately?

What does it mean for them when they say that? So, go back to Krishna, go back to everything we've been through, go back pretty far, reach back, way back there, and pull out what they mean. What a mind-only scroll would mean when they say, oh, those constructs do exist nominally, but they don't exist ultimately.

What they mean when they say those constructs do exist nominally is that they are something which the mind has constructed, okay? They are the result of a construction, you know? The mind, constructing state of mind has created them or constructed them, so in that sense, they do exist nominally, okay?

They are something that has been imagined or thought of, okay? And in that sense, they do exist in this scroll nominally, but they don't exist ultimately. Now, what do they mean when they say it doesn't exist ultimately?

You guys remember from way back when, not existing ultimately means they do not exist from their own side through any unique way of being their own, okay? That's, in this scroll, what it means not to exist ultimately. So in this scroll, that's what they mean when they say, do exist nominally, don't exist ultimately.

He's starting to guess what all the English is. I think he's got the ball already. But I think about what you're probably saying when you say, way back there.

I'll give you an illustration based on my current understanding. I'm not sure if it's another I'll give you an example on this same word, bash. If you have a guy who's a master driver of a car, right?

Like a really, really good car driver. Is it enough that they just know how to shoot down a road straight in forward steer, you know? Keep going straight.

Is that enough to call the guy a master driver? No. Expert driver?

No. To be a really expert driver, it seems to be a thing, especially in India. You know, when you get into a really tight situation on the road, you better know how to back up just right.

You have to be an expert backer-upper as well. You've got to be able to look over your shoulder and drive straight backwards pretty fast. There are times when you need to do that.

And I think he's comparing that to a good scripturalist. You better be able to go back and find the things you need right away and apply them to where you're going. I don't have to tie up the example for you because you know what I'm talking about.

If you go through a scripture like a guy who's just barreling down a road in forward gear, right? And you never look backwards and you never consider what came before. And you're just always gobbling up the new information and going through it in that order and just speeding through it like that.

And you get further and further away from the points that came before and you never look over your shoulder and you never consider what went before. And you never consider the new stuff in light of what came before. Then there'll come a point in the new stuff when you get totally confused.

Because you've got to be keeping in mind all the information that came from before. You have to keep looking over your shoulder. Down into the depths of the forward stuff, you're going to be finding stuff, material, that if you don't have a heightened awareness of what came before, you won't be able to handle that and you'll get all gobbledygook in your mind.

There's a lot wrapped up in the meaning of the quotation from the abbreviation at the end of page 49. The whole point of bringing up that quotation was to emphasize that the mind-only school doesn't mean it literally when they say constructs don't exist. Obviously, they didn't mean that literally.

Because they went through this whole long story why they do exist, if only nominally. So, the point of that first quotation, again, is to emphasize that they cannot have meant it literally when they said that in their own book, in the abbreviation, that constructs don't exist. They must have meant don't exist by definition.

Now, when you get up to page 50, line 1, Jethro Tullock is going to quote another piece from the abbreviation that has the same intent. This piece is a little bit more difficult. The wording is more difficult.

But the point of it is that on line 2, when they talk about numbership, numbership generally means consciousness. So, in this case, it means the state of mind which is focusing on a certain object. And then it says mikvah.

Mikvah means the object or the yule on which this consciousness is focusing. What is the mikvah? What is the object on which this consciousness is focusing?

This is a state of mind which is focusing on kundaks themselves. It's the constructing state of mind which is focusing. Remember that third party between the object and the state of mind?

There was a conceptualization there. It was looking upon that conceptualization. And then it says...

Then there's a dot, dot, dot. There's an... I forget the name.

Anyway, Elysian, page 3. I'm sorry, line 3 at the end. There's a dot, dot, dot into that meaning.

Okay, all that in the abbreviation, starting with those words, meaning what? That construct which is the object of consciousness, dot, dot, dot, up to where it starts talking about... Oh, line 4, okay, page 50.

Up to where it starts talking about, oh, well, those things do exist in a constructed way, in a mental construct way, even though they don't exist in an ultimate way, they do exist in a constructed way. So there's another example, of course, just in Kapha, where constructs are specifically stated in the abbreviation itself to exist. So when the abbreviation earlier talked about their not existing, it must have meant not existing by definition.

And it's not an overrating state of mind to look at constructs which do exist and say they don't exist. I'm sorry, to look at constructs that don't exist and say they do exist or something like that. That's not the point here.

The point is that you're looking at constructs that don't exist ultimately and saying they do exist ultimately, and then you're attributing something's existence where there is no existence. So, remember the whole point here was in a description, I think, of what it is to overrate something. It was, don't look at something that doesn't exist and say it does exist.

The point being, don't look at things that don't exist by definition and say that they do exist by definition. That's the point here. And the point of describing in the abbreviation the state of mind which overrates something is not to say, oh, those things...

It's not the state of mind that looks at something that doesn't exist at all and thinks that it does exist. It's rather a state of mind that says, this thing that doesn't exist by definition does exist by definition. On page 50, line 1 and 2, where we talked about the consciousness, which focuses on a certain object, and that object is Kuntaks, right?

The actual wording of the Tibetan here is really, really arcane. You know, it's really obscure. And Geshe-la says, we'd better come back to this later.

You know, we'd better break down the wording of the Tibetan here because the wording here is very, very weird. So he says, we'll come back to that, and we'll break that down, and we'll see why. Simply stated, it refers to constructs.

Now, how you get constructs out of two and a half lines of really weird Tibetan, he says, I'll come back to that later. OK, so make your own mark there. We'll come back to that later.

Jethro Topper, on line 5, page 50, begins to talk about, he says, look, I'll boil it down for you what they're trying to say. Obviously, they're not saying that constructs of such as they don't exist. They're not saying that.

They must be saying something else. They must be saying that constructs don't exist, ultimately. But you can even talk about it in a more subtle way.

I have to admit one thing, when you think about it, for example, if you take the fact that a thing is what it's called, the fact that the thing is the basis of what we see as the name that it's given, the fact that the thing is what's called its name, the fact that that doesn't exist by definition is true. If we said that it did exist by definition, the fact that such a thing did exist by definition is non-existent, right? That is the ultimate thing that emptiness denies.

That's the gotcha. That's what emptiness is empty of. Why?

The fact that something is what is called it naturally, by definition. That doesn't exist. That is the ultimate thing that emptiness denies.

That is what emptiness is empty of. That's what we deny when we speak of emptiness. Now that particular construct doesn't exist.

Okay? Got that. And then when we talk about self-existence of a person, it's the same thing, you know?

The idea of some kind of self-existence pertaining to a person, a person that could be self-existent, that also is something that doesn't exist. So you can say there are these two self-natures, the self-nature of objects and the self-nature of people, or persons. We have to admit these are both constructs, and we have to admit that both of those things don't exist at all.

But that ain't what the mind-only school is talking about in the abbreviations, when they say if you take the construct that's not existing, constructs that don't exist, it's not talking about that. It's not, there are constructs that don't exist. And they could have been talking about constructs, those constructs which don't exist, but that's not the point here.

They're saying if you focus on those constructs that don't exist, ultimately, and you think that they do exist, ultimately, then you are guilty of over-rating, then you are guilty of the state of mind that sees something there when there is nothing there. But don't mix things up here, so to speak. Don't think that the mind-only school, when they say the constructs don't exist, are talking about those constructs which really don't exist.

They're talking about those constructs which don't exist, ultimately. They're saying the constructs don't exist, ultimately. Now, after all is said and done, you know, even ba-ba-ba-ba-ba, we've said everything, can we say that you can divide constructs into those constructs which really do exist and those which don't exist?

Did they yell at you on it? You give them maybe... But if you come up in a general sense and take them as a group and ask somebody, do constructs exist?

You have to say, yes, they exist. Yes. And how is it that they exist?

You're right when you say, yeah, you have to say they exist. Now, but in what sense do they exist? Or by what manner do they exist?

They exist as a construct of the mind. And they do not exist from their own side to some unique way of being of their own. And that's all.

Remember that that's what they mean here when they say, oh, yeah, constructs exist. They exist nominally, as a construct of the mind. Now we've reached a new phrasing in the Tibetan which we have not even touched in this whole book yet.

And this is a... I'm going to need some help with the English, I think. This is the division of things between existing...

Let's give it a new, different word, like labeled, as something labeled, and existing as something substantial. How's that? I don't like it.

It's a little fabricated. I don't know. Labeled.

Existing to... OK. Exist as labeled and exist substantial.

There's a new division here. A new distinction made. I don't want to use construct because then you'll get confused with the other one.

It exists as a labeled thing or it exists as a substantial thing. OK. I don't want to use construct because then you'll get confused with the other one.

It exists as a labeled thing or it exists as a substantial thing. I don't want to use construct because then you'll get confused with the other one. It exists as a labeled thing or it exists as a substantial thing.

I don't want to use construct because then you'll get confused with the other one. It exists as a labeled thing or it exists as a substantial thing. I don't want to use construct because then you'll get confused with the other one.

It exists as a labeled thing or it exists as a substantial thing. I don't want to use construct because then you'll get confused with the other one. It exists as a labeled thing or it exists as a substantial thing.

I don't want to use construct because then you'll get confused with the other one. It exists as a labeled thing or it exists as a substantial thing. I don't want to use construct because then you'll get confused with the other one.

It exists as a labeled thing or it exists as a substantial thing. I don't want to use construct because then you'll get confused with the other one. It exists as a labeled thing or it exists as a substantial thing.

I don't want to use construct because then you'll get confused with the other one. It exists as a labeled thing or it exists as a substantial thing. …

and those things that weexist substantially are described in exactly the oppose of terms and those things which exist substantially, are described in exactly the opposite terms And that's how you can get to the idea of what it means for something to exist substantially. So what it means is, those objects in the universe, for which, to think of them, you don't have to first think of something else. You don't have to first think of some other object, such as their part, in order to have a mental picture, or in order to conceptualize them.

You can conceptualize them all at once, by themselves, without having to first go through some other process of conceptualizing the moment before certain pieces of them, or something like that. Just think of something that can be conceptualized in your mind, wholly, immediately, without going through any process of perceiving other things first, and then getting it. Those are what we call existing substantialities.

Things that exist substantially. All those constructs, right? Things that belong to the minorly category of constructs.

And here, by the way, I'm talking about those which do exist. I'm not talking about the constructs of those, that are non-existent things. But those constructs which are existing things, right?

They exist to live. Those things exist to live. They are such that we call insomnia, or existing things.

They are that category of things. And then when the text goes on, starting around the fifth, sixth lines from the top, page 50, it's talking about this. Now, don't forget that we're talking about constructs of the type that do exist.

Constructs of the type that are existing things. When you describe those, you are blocking two things about them, and you're establishing two things about them. What are you blocking?

You're blocking the idea that they could exist substantially, or that they could exist ultimately. So you are denying that they could exist substantially, or that they could exist ultimately. And when you deny those two things, you thereby affirm that there are two other things.

What? That they exist through labels, and that they exist nominally. Only nominally.

So that they exist through labels, or exist nominally. Those are the correlations here. That's what the text is saying here when it talks about Tanyu Yuga.

But that's right in the middle of page 50. Now, Geshe-lagop is taking off on discussing three positions that other people have expressed that they have the problem with. So he says, therefore, those people who go around saying that the mind-only school says that constructs don't have either truth or neither reality applies to constructs.

Those people go around saying neither reality applies to constructs. Now, what two realities are they talking about? They're talking about ultimate reality and deceptive reality.

And those who go around saying that neither one applies to constructs are wrong. Now, you can't go around saying... By the way, we would say, you can't go around saying that it's neither true of constructs that they exist ultimately, and neither is it true that they exist nominally.

Some people go around saying that the mind-only school said that... Geshe-lagop is saying, he's about to attack them, right? Now, some people go around saying that, you know, constructs...

neither truth applies to constructs. They are neither something that exists ultimately, nor are they something that exists nominally. Then these same people go around saying about...

They could back it up with Geshe-lagop. And then they go around saying of dependent things or changing things that they do exist nominally, but they don't exist ultimately, and that the mind-only school thinks that. They got that one wrong, too.

And then they go on saying about emptiness or totality, that it does exist ultimately, that that one has to be correct. So they got these three ideas. I'll try to repeat them.

They go around saying that the mind-only school says that constructs don't exist nominally, and they do exist ultimately. They got that reference, right? And then they go around saying about dependent things, that they don't exist ultimately, and they do exist nominally, which is reverse.

And then they go around saying about emptiness or totality, that it does exist ultimately, and there they got it right. .... And who is it that Geshe-lagopre is accusing us of saying this, right?

Of these three positions. That's in page fifty line eight. He says, gongden dzokchen means in some great commentaries to the sutra in which the Buddha explained the intended sutras, right?

Commentary in which the Buddha explained the intended sutras. In some great commentaries, so Geshe-la says, this is referring then to the original Sanskrit commentaries in the Tengyur on that sutra. And in those commentaries, these three positions have been explained.

So Geshe-la on page 59.4 from the bottom he says, this is not the intent of the sutra on the intent. Okay, he's kind of making a pun. This is not the intent of the sutra on the intent, is it?

Because in effect what they're saying in the first case is that constructs don't even exist. You see, because they're denying them with regards to both of the realities. They're saying they don't exist as something ultimate, and neither do they exist anomalously.

So in effect what they're saying is that the mind-only school is saying that these things don't even exist, that constructs don't exist. They got that wrong. And then secondly, when you go along and say that the mind-only school says that dependent things don't exist ultimately, but do exist normally, then you've got a problem.

This is not the intent of the sutra on the intent. These two are not the intent of the sutra on the intent. Siddhartha Kapa is starting a process by which he will start to point out inconsistencies in the great commentaries in the Tengyur on the sutra on the intent of the sutra.

He will start now to address, or throughout his text he's going to be saying, there's this inconsistency or this kind of contradiction that's brought up within the great commentaries in the Tengyur on that sutra. For example, he says, here's an inconsistency that they talk about. Those commentaries on that sutra which states the intent of the sutra, they say that the mind-only school says that there do exist objects which exist outside of ourselves.

And I want to explore that word in English. I think we have to work on that. I'm not totally comfortable with that, but provisionally let's say that that's what they're saying, that there do exist objects outside of ourselves.

That there are things which exist as external objects. Whereas Arya Asanga, in his various commentaries, in his whole exposition, in his whole presentation on the mind-only school, denies that the mind-only school agrees that there do exist things as external objects. So there's a big contradiction there.

Matsya Asanga is the innovator who's brought the mind-only school's system into our world and explained it in our world. And throughout his exposition on the mind-only school's position, he says, they don't accept that anything could exist externally, outside of ourselves. Whereas these great commentaries to the sutra on the intent of the sutra keep saying that they do believe in such objects.

So there's one big inconsistency. I like that. We'll get to later what they mean when they say something exists as an external object or not.

I think it's a little harder than it seems. I don't think it's quite as what it seems. I think it's very similar.

What it means for something to be an external object, we'll get into later. We'll just take it right now as the way it does it. The other thing they say is that everything that exists is an external object.

That's what we have to deal with tomorrow. You're going to be and you're not going to be, and you're not going to be, and you're not going to be. So this is what you have to deal with.

Because when you think of all things as external objects, He starts his attack on Page 50, 4th line of the book, and then he starts his attack on Page 50, 4th line of the book, and then he starts his attack on Page 50, 4th line of the book, and then he starts his attack on Page 50, 4th line of the book, and then he starts his attack on Page 50, 4th line of the book, and then he starts his attack on Page 50, 4th line of the book, and then he starts his attack on Page 50, 4th line of the book, and then he starts his attack on Page 50, 4th line of the book, and then he starts his attack on Page 50, 4th line of the book, and then he starts his attack on Page 50, 4th line of the book, and then he starts his attack on Page 50, 4th line of the book, and then he starts his attack on Page 50, 4th line of the book, and then he starts his attack on Page 50, 4th line of the book, and then he starts his attack on Page 50, 4th line of the book, and then he starts his attack on Page 50, 4th line of the book, and then he starts his attack on Page 50, 4th line of the book, and then he starts his attack on Page 50, 4th line of the book, and then he starts his attack on Page 50, 4th line of the book, and then he starts his attack on Page 50, 4th line of the book, and then he starts his attack on Page 50, 4th line of the book, and then But Arya-sangha, when he starts explaining that same sutra, and Arya-sangha is not just explaining the sutra, he's taking pieces of the sutra out of the sutra and saying, okay, here's where the sutra says this, here's where the sutra says that.

He actually quotes the sutra to establish a position that says that there are no objects that exist external to oneself. So there must be a problem here, there has to be a contradiction here. They are taking that sutra to mean that external objects do exist.

He's taking that same sutra, actually utilizing the wording of the sutra, with a long presentation in a book called Tektu. I don't know if that's in Sanskrit. Yama Summertime.

It's called the compendium. Let's call it the compendium. He's taking that same book, in his book called the compendium, he actually takes specific passages from that sutra to show that the mind-only school doesn't believe that things can exist external to oneself.

It seems like it's kind of a good point at which to explain what they mean when they say external to oneself. What is a water pot? It's a water pot.

I'm sorry, just kidding. It's a water pot. It's a water pot.

Listen carefully, because we know you two guys were... I told you guys you still like to do this. Just kidding.

Okay. Four classical schools of ancient India, right? We got the Abhidharma school, which is called the detailist.

Then we have the Madhyamaka school, which is called the sutrist. Then we have the mind-only school, and then we have the middle-aged school, right? Now, let's examine these four to see who it is that believes in external objects, and who it is that doesn't believe in external objects.

To put it simply, the first two do believe in external objects. The detailist and the sutrist both believe in the existence of external objects. Then where do you go up to the school system when you hit the mind-only school?

They say, we don't believe in external objects. They say, nothing exists as an external object. Then when you get to the Madhyamika Prasangika, the consequence group within the middle-aged school, they again start saying, yes, external objects do exist.

So these two and the top half of this one believe that external objects do exist. Then what about the lower half of this Madhyamika school? That's called the independent school, or the Prasangika, right?

Not to be confused with South Africa, which is the second school. Inside of there, there are two clans. There are two further divisions of the independent group.

There are those which kind of hang with the sutrists, and there are those who hang with the mind-only school. They're called Nanda-shipa, which means act similar to a sutrist. And then Nanda-shipa, which means act similar to a yogin, meaning that's another way of describing the mind-only school.

Mind-only school has two names. One of them is Chittamatra, like mind-only, and the other is Yogacara, those who act yoga. But what that means is a whole other story.

So anyway, in the lower half of the Madhyamika school, there are two flavors. There are two sub-schools, sub-groups, okay? In the group called independent group within the mind-only school, there are two sub-groups.

Those two sub-groups are called those who side more with the sutrists, and those who side more with the mind-only school. So naturally, those who side more with the sutrists say there do exist external objects. Those who side more with the mind-only school say there don't exist external objects.

So, how many groups you got saying that external objects don't exist? You got the mind-only whole school, and you got the mind-only tendency sub-group within the group called the independent of the middle-weight school. Those two groups say that no external objects exist.

Now, the last point to be made before we go on is that what the lower two schools say when they mean, I'm sorry, what they mean when they say external objects do exist, and what the Madhyamaka Prabhupada school group means when they say external objects do exist completely differently. The Madhyamaka Prabhupada school group says that external objects do exist, and external objects do not exist. The Madhyamaka Prabhupada school group says that external objects do exist, and external objects do not exist.

The Madhyamaka Prabhupada school group says that external objects do exist, and external objects do not exist. The Madhyamaka Prabhupada school group says that external objects do exist, and external objects do not exist. The Madhyamaka Prabhupada school group says that external objects do exist, and external objects do not exist.

Now, we'll start from the easiest point, OK? We'll start from the easier point to start, OK? So consider the Madhyamaka Prabhupada school group among the middle-aged group.

What do they mean when they say external objects do exist? They're talking about, for example, physical matter, OK? You can divide things into, you know, your sense powers, which are taken in...

They are physical matter, and they are your sense organs, OK? They are taken in by your facility, say. They are taken in by your mind-stream.

They are subsumed by your consciousness, OK? That's how it's said in the Abhidharma, and that's the wording they use. They are subsumed by your mental stream.

They are subsumed by your consciousness. Then there are what we would call external objects. External visual objects, for example, like trees, a wall, different objects outside of yourself that are external.

But there are also internal visual objects, OK, that are subsumed by your consciousness, like you can see your arm, for example, OK? So those are subsumed by your awareness. Your arm is something that you can see, which is subsumed by your awareness.

A tree is something that you can see, which is not subsumed by your awareness. And that's the distinction in the Prasangika between internal and external, OK? And it means that you can apply that to the other senses as well.

Sounds that are existing, you know, the sound of a river, the sound of a door closing, other sounds like that, those are external to yourself. They are not subsumed by your consciousness. And the same with smell, taste, and tactile objects, OK?

There are those which are external, which are not subsumed by your consciousness, and there are those which are internal, which are subsumed by your consciousness. So that's, to put it... The Madhyamaka Prasangika idea of what it is to exist externally and internally is very simple.

It doesn't take it... It's not like some deep philosophical concept, OK? Just like that.

It's something very basic. Is it or is it not, you know, something subsumed by your senses? And if it's not, then it's external, and if it is, it's internal.

That's all. OK. Anyway, be careful when we talk about in the Madhyamaka Prasangika school about the distinction between external and internal.

I don't mean to say that everything that's not subsumed by your consciousness is automatically what they would call an external object. So, for example, there are unchanging objects, for example, empty space, you know. That is not subsumed by your consciousness, you know.

That's not part of your... That's not something that's part of your... what we call you, you know.

It is external to your consciousness. But I'm not saying that because it's not subsumed by your consciousness, it's automatically what the Madhyamaka Prasangika school is describing as external. When they say external, they're talking about changing things.

They're talking about functional things. And more specifically, they're talking about physical matter. They're talking about all kinds of physical matter, whether it be something you see, taste, hear, smell, feel.

They're talking about physical stuff that's outside of you. They're talking about changing things. They're not talking about just anything that's not subsumed by your consciousness.

Kageshi, Yeah, I just clarified something, you know. When they say external, they're referring to the physical matter in a general sense. Because remember the word suk in Tibetan can refer to visual objects alone, or the physical matter as a whole group.

Yeah, yeah, I'm talking about physical matter as a group. That which is not subsumed by your consciousness, is described in the Madhyamaka Prasangika school as external. Okay, and the Madhyamaka Prasangika?

[Говорящий 2]
Could that be stated as external at all? Or would it be more generalized?

[Говорящий 1]
It is external. It's not what they mean when they are talking about whether or not objects exist. It looks to me like you're trying to make every external thing into what they are talking about when they say, think of me, think of me.

Is there a distinction between the two? To say it distinctly, the lower two schools' idea of what it means for something to exist external to ourselves is very simple. And they are exactly the same.

Their idea is exactly the same. They say if a thing is a composite of impartible, of indivisible atoms, then that's what makes it an external thing. Once something is a composite, for example this house, once it's a composite of indivisible atoms, then it's what we call something that exists external to us.

But when we speak of something, even if someone says that the physical body is an object, that's not what we're talking about. So we simply say if something is a composite of indivisible atoms, then it's what we call something that exists external to us. But if it's not, then it's something that doesn't exist.

I have brought it with me all the way from Nha Trang to Nam Phra Dinh. All of us in this room live in the Pacific and we want to bring it in to the world. We didn't know before when the son of Buddha would have been born.

But today, I am sending it to the world, and I want to bring it in to the world. I am going to send it to the world. However, I cannot bring it to the world by myself.

All the way from Nam Phra Dinh. This is a message to the world, I am going to send it to the world. What do they mean when they say a composite of partless atoms, or something like that?

They look at a construct like this house. This house has been built up out of cement, bricks, stones, and different objects like that. But if you took one of those bricks and you broke it down, just one of those bricks that makes up this house is a collection itself of many tiny particles.

And if you took those little particles and you broke them down further, then there'd be even smaller particles. You'd take those particles down, break them down further, until finally you get to very, very, very fine particles. I think it's what you guys are talking about when those Western scientists are looking at something and they find this very small thing.

They also are asserting in these first two schools that there's something like an atom, that there's something like an atom. And based on these infinitesimally small, very, very small particles, all other physical matter is a construct, little atom. Now, in the mind-only school as well, they accept the concept of an atom, of a tiny building block of all things, of an ultimate, you know, of the mommy, granddaddy building block of all things.

They believe that there is such a thing, but there's a difference in the way the mind-only school views those particles and the way in which the first two schools view those particles. The first two schools say, you can get down to a particle that has no size. Partless means that.

Individual means that. It has no size. And you take these little particles that actually have no size, and you can build everything else out of atoms.

And then the mind-only school says, no, we don't believe in that kind of thing. We believe in atoms, but we don't believe that there's atoms that don't have a size. Again, we're talking about that granddaddy of all building blocks.

You know, it's kind of hard to think about it. You can take a house, you've got a whole house. You know, I was just trying to make it easier for you.

I took one brick, okay, one little cloth of stuff, you know. And we're looking at that and we're saying, okay, it's not so hard to think that that's made of little particles, and those little particles are other little particles, and those little particles are other little particles. And then, ultimately, when you get down to the bottom, bottom, bottom, bottom, granddaddy of all particles, in the first two school systems, this is something that doesn't have no size.

You know what that is? The only thing that exists that's an object external to itself is that it's a hunk of stuff that's made of lots of these little particles that don't have any size. That's all.

That's juggling. That's juggling. Then you get to the subgroup called the ones who are tending towards the sutras, among the group called the independents, among the school called the middleists, okay.

Those guys have an idea of what it means to exist, or something to exist external to ourselves, which is a little bit similar to the idea of the first two groups. That seems to be a mind guide, right? Saying, it has some similarities to the idea of what it is to exist external to ourselves as presented in the scriptures.

This is kind of difficult for me, but in the lower two schools, they are saying that for something to exist external to us means that it is a chunk of stuff which is composed of particles, which in the Tibetan means chame, which means particles, right? And I've been trying to study something with no size, a particle with no size. And then the difference between those two and the subgroup in the independent group within the Madhyamika school, the difference is that these Madhyamikas clarify it a bit by saying chokcham.

Chokcham may mean, cannot locate directions on this particle. The particle is so small that it would be impossible to locate any direction. You couldn't look at it and say, this is top, this is bottom, this is north, this is south, okay?

So you could say unidentifiable signs, a particle without identifiable signs, rather than a particle without any signs at all. I think that's a decision, because they say, look, you can't posit a particle that doesn't have any signs at all. I mean, that's kind of, that's crazy.

You know, how can you make stuff out of particles that didn't have any signs? What you have to say, rather, is that those hosts of stuff that are composed of particles that don't have any identifiable signs, or signs that could be identified as up, down, north, south, they're so small that you couldn't identify, oh, this is the top, this is the bottom. What?

Huh? So we take, we're both talking about atomic particles, right? Now, give me the difference between partless and not having, literally in Tibetan it's partless and directionless.

[Говорящий 2]
What's the difference?

[Говорящий 1]
Okay. It's more radical than that, it's more radical than that, more radical than that, okay? The belief, when they say partless, when they say sideless, in the two lower schools, you know, the way I translated your answer, and I hope I did it justice, but, you know, the first two schools say that it's so small as to not have a North and a South, you know, partless and decadent.

Not having sides means not having a North, South, East, North, South, and then the higher school is more subtle, is more reasonable in a way, and they say no identifiable bottom and top, and no identifiable South and North, and stuff like that. He says it's more radical than that. Don't think of the concept in the lower two schools as being restricted to direction, directionality, or something like that.

He says it's more radical than that. It's referring to partless in the sense that in your mind, mentally, you can no longer even conceive of it as being divisible. It gets so small, mentally, that as you try to imagine splitting it, splitting it, splitting it, splitting it, you get to a point where you just couldn't imagine splitting it further.

That's what partless means to them. Partless means to them inconceivable part. You know, partless in the sense of no longer being able to deduce it further mentally.

Then you've reached, you know, conceptually the tiniest part, that even mentally you can no longer think of it as having two parts. Also, if you get into thinking of it in spatial terms, simply spatial terms, you're going to be into another problem, which is that when they say indivisible, they're also talking indivisible time-wise, by milliseconds, millimillimillimilliseconds, that this is a particle about which you could not say first millisecond, second millisecond, third millisecond. It gets so fine and divided mentally so far down, so far down, that you could no longer even conceive of it as happening in a progression of time.

It would not have a first second to it and a second second to it and a third second to it. It's indivisible also in that sense. Not just spatially, but temporally indivisible time-wise.

So, to get in trouble, if you call it side, as I call it, you have to kind of call it part. We're going to stick to part. The word part can have a lot of different meanings.

Part can have global meanings. You could say something has a part in India but doesn't have a part in the United States, or doesn't have a part in the United States but doesn't have a part in India. The word part is pretty big.

The word part can have a lot of different meanings. It can have global implications. We have a part of this in the United States but we don't have a part in India.

Something like that. It can be global also. The word part is very tricky.

The idea to conceptualize smallest particles. When you're a student of Buddhism and you're thinking about what it means in the first two schools for something to be part of, it helps. It's useful for you to think temporally also.

Because it brings you to a greater appreciation of really how radical this idea is of something that is part. Now, remember that in the lower two schools they're describing something as existing as an external object, right? External object.

When it is composed of these partless atoms. When it is composed of partless atoms. Now, the mind-only school comes along to them and says, this is really dumb.

You guys see that? How could you take something that is partless and build up all these physical things from that? How can you get hunks of stuff composed of something that is partless?

That's totally impossible.