Углублённый курс ACI 04 — Искусство толкования, часть 1 (1998, Билакуппе, Индия), занятие 7

[Говорящий 2]
I'm very content. That's really interesting.

[Говорящий 1]
So, remember we have reached the section where we're trying to identify what those three groupings are. Which are called, in Maharinayi school, the three attributes or something like that. But I think if we call them groupings it might be easier.

So, we got to this section, and before we've had three similes or three metaphors for these three groupings. We've had three different kinds of illustrations to demonstrate what they were but we didn't really have any definitions, we didn't have any really presentation of classical examples of the three. So the next section of the text is devoted to presenting classical examples of each of the three different groupings.

So that's what we'll go on to next.

[Говорящий 2]
And that's trying to bridge from yesterday to the presentation of each of the three different groupings of the three different groups of the three different groups of the three different groups of the three different groups of the This is a little hard for me, but anyway, we're going to talk first about constructs and what the meaning of a construct is.

[Говорящий 1]
We haven't gotten into yet the question of whether or not concepts are useful, whether or not concepts are good or bad. We haven't evaluated the content of constructs. So first we'll be going into the group called constructs.

And then there are three different characterizations of constructs from the sutra where the Buddha explained what he really had in mind. And those are given on page 22, beginning from about the 8th line from the bottom. And then there are three characterizations of constructs given.

One is called nambar tope chu yu. And I'm not going to even attempt to... I'll just translate what the words are and then we'll get into the meaning of it.

Which means that object towards which imagination does its thing. That object towards which imagination functions. Then the second one is the place, the characteristic which is the place of imagination.

And then the signs of something which is a factor. Now those don't mean anything to me so far. They're just three expressions, but those are used to describe constructs.

And then Geshe-la says, remember that constructs are directed towards... Sherwa... Constructs are directed towards things which grow from their causes, things which are dependent.

So even though constructs are not dependent things, they are directed towards dependent things. So there's a relationship between constructs and dependent things. And I don't quite understand it myself, but what he's saying is that constructs apply, or constructs are used, or constructs are directed towards dependent things.

So hopefully he'll explain it further. And so these three characterizations of constructs are stressing the fact that they apply to, or are directed towards, dependent things.

[Говорящий 2]
Yes.

[Говорящий 1]
So in order that you can understand the idea of these three features of constructs, how they apply to a dependent thing, we'll take an actual example, and it'll be easier to see how these three features of constructs apply to dependent things. So let's take the dependent thing called sukha. Sukha in Tibetan can either mean all physical matter in general, or it can also mean the object of the eye, meaning shapes and colors together.

And Geshe-la introduces this sukha as saying, you know, the one, for example, that goes along with sound, smell, taste. That clarifies that it's the one that refers to what you see with your eyes, shapes and colors. So we're going to take the example of shapes and colors, visual objects, and then we're going to examine how these three features of constructs somehow are directed at, or applied to, the things which we see with our eyes.

[Говорящий 2]
Yes. Mm-hmm.

[Говорящий 1]
Mm-hmm. So this is getting difficult, but it's okay, I think. Visual objects, we say, constructs are directed at visual objects, first of all, in the following way.

When you see some kind of shape or color, let's say you just see some visual object, and then in your mind you think to yourself, this is something, this is a visual object, this is a visual object, and you think to yourself that, then in a sense you are labeling it with a construct, you are labeling it with your imagination or with your conceptual mind, you are labeling it with conception. And then when you do that and you say to yourself, oh, this is a visual object, this thing here is a visual object, in a way you're laying a construct on it, and that's the first characterization of constructs, that you lay them on physical objects, on the very essence or the very nature of physical objects. We're not talking about characteristics of the physical object, we're just saying that state of mind which labels the object, oh, this is a visible object, this is an example of a visible object, and that is the first characterization, that's the first way in which constructs apply to changing things, to label their essence or to label their very nature by saying, oh, this is a visual object.

[Говорящий 2]
Kevaya re, kevaya re, mitakvaya re, deyakvaya re. Then the Sukha, deyakvaya re. Nothing.

[Говорящий 1]
Then the second way in which constructs are applied towards changing things, or things which depend on other things, is that if we don't talk about conceptualizing or thinking about the very essence or the very nature of the thing, this is not the previous one that we spoke about where your mind, your conceptualizations are saying, oh look, this is a visual object. And when your conceptualizations are labeling it and identifying it, oh, this is a visual object. In the second way in which conceptualization relates to changing objects, it's in the case of...

and Geshe-la puts forth this thing on his bed and says, let's take this thing. Take this thing as a visual object. And then your mind is...

suppose your mind is now saying, and you're also saying actually in your speech, oh, you know what? This particular object is something that was created. This particular object is something that grew or started.

This particular object is something which is changing all the time and will eventually be destroyed. And when you say that in your words, you also think it in your mind. So there's a state of mind that looks at the visual object and is thinking about it, certain characteristics or certain features of the visual object.

It's thinking, this visual object was created by something. This visual object grew or started. This visual object is changing all the time.

And that state of mind, conceptualizing the visual object, not in terms of its very nature or its primary identity, but rather in terms of its different features, that conceptual state of mind, that construct by which you understand or which you label it as having different features, is the second way in which concepts or constructs apply to khenwa, things which are dependent. Then if you take this... You carry the same example.

This example of a state of mind in which you are viewing and labeling and conceiving and conceptualizing the different features of an object. And we can go on to other features. You can say, this thing started, this thing was created, this thing is changing, which implies this thing is momentary, changing by the moment.

And even that this thing exists, to think to yourself that this thing is something which exists, is viewing a feature of it, is labeling or conceiving of it with different features. And just as you understand it with a single object, if you consider a single object and then take it that way, you can go on to other objects as well. You don't have to...

You aren't restricted to a visual object. This can apply to any state of mind which labels or conceives or has constructs relating to the features of an object, of a changing object, is what we call the second distinction of constructs which relate to dependent things.

[Говорящий 2]
Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

[Говорящий 1]
We are seven lines from the bottom. It's where the quotation begins from the sutra where the Buddha explains the intent of all his sutras. And we're going down to the last line of page twenty-two.

And it's in that chunk of sutra where Lord Buddha identifies the different features or identifies what it is to be a construct or how constructs move.

[Говорящий 2]
Yes, sir.

[Говорящий 1]
Then the very first... We're going to jump ahead. We'll skip past the actual sutra quotation.

We'll go back later and talk about it word for word. But right now we'll skip ahead and we'll think about what is the actual meaning of those three characterizations of constructs. So, what are the three ways in which constructs are described?

The first one is called nam-pa-to-pa-chu-yu. And Geshe-la says if you think about it, everything in the world relating to changing things, all changing things, when we think about it, just when you think about them, in scripture it's called the object of conceptual thought. So when you think about them and you form a picture of them and you're thinking about them in a certain way and you conceptualize them, that's the first attribute or the first feature of how constructs relate to changing things.

[Говорящий 2]
Nam-pa-to-pa-chu-yu.

[Говорящий 1]
Khe-chu-di-kun-dak-yip-khe-chu-su-gyi-ro-wa. She-wang-gi-khe-chu-gyi-ro-wa.

[Говорящий 2]
Nam-pa-to-pa-chu-yu.

[Говорящий 1]
Then secondly, I'm having trouble translating, but I'll just explain a bit about it. Secondly, changing things have a second quality. Now he's clarifying that these are qualities of changing things which relate to how they are constructed.

These are qualities of changing things that relate to how they are conceptualized by this constructing state of mind. So the second one would be the process of labeling. So the second feature of changing things, which relates to how they are conceptualized by constructs, is that they are labeled, and they are labeled in two ways.

They are the basis of the label. They are the thing which is labeled by a concept. So concepts are a state of mind, constructs are a state of mind, and they are labeling something, something.

So the thing that gets the label, the thing that is labeled, are changing things. And the labeler is a conduct state of mind, which is making a construct or conceptualizing that object. And the second feature of changing things that relates to constructs is how they are labeled.

Labeled in two ways. First of all, labeled by words. So you use a word like, quote, visual object to describe a visual object in your words.

And then along with the label called words comes a label called conceptualizing in a certain way. Oh, this is a visual thing. In your mind you think about it as a visual thing.

So the second feature of changing things that relates to how they are conceptualized or how they relate to constructs is that the constructing state of mind looks upon that particular object, which is called the thing which is labeled, and labels it with two different labels. One verbal almost, a word, and one mental, meaning thinking of it in a certain way. And in Tibetan that's called that object which has the characteristic of conceptualization about it.

Meaning, visual objects are the objects which are supplied, a label, in two ways, by the constructing state of mind. The third feature is easy. No problem with the third feature.

I said, third feature of what? He said, third feature of changing things. I thought we were on to conceptualizations, but we're supposed to be on to conceptualizations.

But anyway, constructs. Anyway, third one is easy. It's the feature, or in Tibetan it's called the indicators, that the thing is a created thing.

The thing is a composed thing, or it has been produced. I should say a produced thing. So the third feature of changing things, or dependent things, is that they are composed...

I'm sorry, I don't like the word composed. Produced. They are produced by the coming together of causes and conditions.

So that's the third feature of changing things. Now that's a true Shakyamuni. That's Shakyamuni's teachings, isn't it?

No.

[Говорящий 2]
He's three years old. He's six years old. Three years old.

He's three years old. He's Shakyamuni's teacher. He's been teaching since he was born.

[Говорящий 1]
Right now, although in general we're talking about constructs, at this moment we're only at the level of discussing changing things or dependent things and three features that they have. So the three features I just spoke about, he says, are relating to changing things. How that relates to constructs, we're going to get into right now.

Generally we're on the subject of constructs, but right now we just had three characteristics of changing things. How that ties into constructs, we're going to get to right now. So we're discussing, and I have to clarify, so the first characteristic here is that looking at changing things as being the object towards which conceptualization functions.

First one. Second one, looking at changing things as being the thing, the thing which conceptualization labels its name in thoughts. And then thirdly, looking at changing things as being things which are characterized by being produced.

So those are the three qualities of changing things. Now he says, how does that relate to conceptualization? We're discussing changing things insofar as they are the object or the basis towards which conceptualization does its thing.

So it's looking at changing things and it's having concepts or making constructs in its mind. So this whole discussion is taking off the three features of changing things that we just described all relate to constructs in the sense that we're talking about changing things as the object or the, what do you call it, the arena in which constructs do their thing, the conceptual state of mind, the arena in which it functions, performs its function.

[Говорящий 2]
Yes. Yes. Yes.

Yes. Yes. Yes.

[Говорящий 1]
Now how does that relate to constructs? How do those three features of changing things relate to constructs? The whole point is that there are three elements here.

There's shenwang, which is changing objects, which are the arena in which the constructing or the conceptual state of mind is doing its thing. And then there's the conceptual state of mind which is acting towards that arena or acting in that arena of changing things. But then there's a third element, isn't there?

When you look at a visual object and you think in your mind, this is something to see, I'm seeing something. And the minute you start thinking that, you form a mental image. It's a lot like the dungy idea we have in the other schools, where there's a dopa-dungy means that construct which the conceptual state of mind makes up or creates after working in the arena of changing things.

So it focuses towards changing things as the arena of its function. And then it's a state of mind which is looking there, and it's a state of mind which is thinking to itself, oh, hey, this is a visual thing. And the minute it starts doing that, there comes a third element in between the two, which is a mental image which it has made up.

It's a construct of a visual thing. So actually it's starting to look at this construct of visual things rather than the arena in which it's doing its thing. And that is construct.

That is the first group. Those stuff, those things, that third element in between the constructing state of mind and the arena in which it acts, in between there are all those constructs or mental images that the mind is making up and ends up focusing on. And those are kundaka.

And that's how constructs relate to changing things, the features of changing things.

[Говорящий 2]
Okay.

[Говорящий 1]
This single point that we just described is going to be the biggest hassle for this whole discussion. That last few sentences that we did, it's going to be the whole problem with the whole following section. We've got to tear that apart, rip it apart.

We have to clean it up, in a sense. What we've done so far is to drive a huge bulldozer into a forest and knock down a few trees. And they made a big mess.

There's not a clear plot of land right now. You've got a bunch of knocked down, smashed up trees. And now we've got to do a cleanup.

We just got the main idea that was just presented, but now there's a lot of cleaning up to do before we have the final product.

[Говорящий 2]
It's one thing to clean up. But there's a lot of things to do before we have the actual product. And you can't just go and say, I've got this particular problem for now, and I'm going to fix it.

It's like, no, it's not that. It's just that the whole thing is a big mess, and there's a lot to do before we can go and fix it.

[Говорящий 1]
We have to do the cleaning up first. more subtle or clean. We could polish it.

Yeah, we could polish this idea with an illustration because right now all you've got is the arena in which the mind is acting, which is changing things, and then it's having some kind of a construct about it, which is very, very similar to the idea of a dhunti, a mental image, but it's not quite what you call a dhunti. So we've got to work it out a little bit. We have to polish this concept.

I brought up mental images, but it's a little bit more than just a simple mental image. So what you've got so far is this arena in which the conceptual state of mind is acting, you have the conceptual state of mind, and then you have something that it's creating, some kind of construct that it's creating. So to demonstrate a construct in a mental image, we have to talk about it.

And then we're going to try to use, in order to polish up these concepts or make them more refined, I was looking for the word refined, in order to refine these ideas, we're going to go to an illustration. We're going to use some kind of illustration in order to refine what we've spoken about so far. And I hope we can refine it.

I'll give you an illustration. So a man and a woman have a child, and the child is, you know, the woman's pregnant for a while, and then she has the baby, and right, you know, the second after the baby comes out, the baby's there. So there's a baby there.

And then maybe a day later or two, we don't go around naming the baby. They don't come out in the hospital, pop out, and immediately you say, oh, this is the baby's name. You know what I mean?

In Tibet, I don't know how it is in America, but they wait a day or two, and all the excitement's over, and then they think about, what are we going to name this child? And then they name the child. And only on the second day or the first or second day afterwards, the father, who's normally the person who names the child, is looking at the child and saying, oh, we'll call this child Dashi.

Okay? So we'll call this child Dashi. And only after that moment does everyone and the parents start conceptualizing or thinking of the child as Dashi.

This is my child Dashi. This is my boy Dashi. Only after that naming process, only after the father has actually labeled the child, oh, this is Dashi, does everyone start having the conceptual state of mind that says, oh, now we have a kid.

Now we have a kid named Dashi. Okay? Now we have a child named Dashi.

And even though they had a child, the moment the baby came out of the womb, the moment the baby was born, they had a child. But now they're kind of thinking more, you know, now I have a child named Dashi. Now I have this boy.

Here's my boy Dashi.

[Говорящий 2]
So it's only after the fact, in a sense, after the labeling has occurred, that they are saying to themselves, oh, now I have a boy named Dashi.

[Говорящий 1]
So what do you guys think, okay? When we talk about the thing that got the name Dashi, the object which was given the name Dashi, did that object which was given the name Dashi exist right after the thing was born? Or did the object which was given the name Dashi exist only upon the naming of the thing as Dashi?

So, when did the object named Dashi exist? Was it right after something was born? Or was it right after they decided to give it the name Dashi?

Okay, he's going to change the question a little bit, or maybe I didn't translate it very well. But anyway, he says, just after the kid is born, and before he's named Dashi, do people stand there and say, oh, Dashi's born. Did I change my name?

[Говорящий 2]
Okay.

[Говорящий 1]
This is tough. So, the object which is named with the name Dashi, although there was an object that existed right after the child was born, you don't call it the object which is named Dashi until the labeling, until he's actually called Dashi. So, only upon calling him Dashi is there a thing that we can say, oh, this is the thing they called Dashi.

And after that time, when there's that thought, oh, my boy is named Dashi, okay? And the idea of Dashi, when does that occur? And what is that like?

And isn't it just sort of a construct existing between the object which is named Dashi and the father who's naming him Dashi? And then there's the idea of a boy named Dashi, okay? So, do you see these kind of three elements?

One is something which is getting the name. There's a child, there's a baby who's being called Dashi. That's the arena.

Then there's the state of mind of the father actually saying, I'm going to name my boy Dashi now. And then there's this sort of a thing in the middle, isn't there? Called the boy named Dashi.

The thing which is the boy named Dashi. It's almost like a construct or an idea that's existing between the baby which got the name Dashi, the father who's naming him Dashi, and then there's this thing in the middle, isn't there? So, you got it?

You got that thing in the middle? So, you got it? You got the idea of this thing in between?

You got this idea of the thing in between? Something which is not the state of mind which is naming it Dashi. Something which is not the baby which got the name Dashi, but something in between.

Something like the baby with the name Dashi applied to it and now this object called the baby named Dashi. So, you got this third thing in the middle. Got that?

Comfortable with that? Got it? You agree that there is a thing between them?

You got to make some kind of...yeah, yeah, yeah. So, if you want to define something in the world that you can call, this is what we call a construct, this is what we call a kundaka, that's it. That's the second one.

That's that one in the middle. So, question, and give an answer, okay? I mean, this is...you got to, you got to wake up. Does this thing in the middle exist? Is it an existent thing or a non-existent thing?

[Говорящий 2]
Yes, yes it is, yes it is.

[Говорящий 1]
So, you can call this a construct which is an existing thing. That seems to be implying something else, okay? This is what we call a construct which is an existing thing.

[Говорящий 2]
Okay. So, again consider the one in the middle, okay?

[Говорящий 1]
Consider the construct called Dashi debo. Just after the child was born, and there was a child there, and before the father had this idea, it was the father who had the first idea, right? The father first, it first occurs to this person.

The father is the first one that it occurs to, to call this baby Tashi, and that's only like a day or two later. So, consider that process, and just before that process, or before, there did come a child out of the womb. There was a child there.

There was some kind of basis there. At that moment, when the child first came out of the womb, was there a construct called Tashi the Child?

[Говорящий 2]
Oh, that's nice.

[Говорящий 1]
So, if you think about it, the construct didn't pop into existence when the kid was born. It's not like something that popped into existence with the bearing of the child. It's not like the child was born, and the second the child was born, the construct pops up.

Now, here's the cool part. That's an indication that that construct is not one of those things which exists from its own side through its own unique nature. Remember we talked about that?

So, that's an indication of what it means when you say that this thing doesn't have a nature of existing from its own side through its own unique way of being. If you want to know what that particular phrase means, you just got it. It's that it didn't pop up simultaneously linked along with the child when the child was born.

That's an indication that it doesn't fit that description of something which is existing from its own side through its own unique way of being.

[Говорящий 2]
Question by the lay people. Oh, this is really beautiful.

[Говорящий 1]
So, the question of whether this thing has come into being or not, the middle one, right? The construct. The question of whether it has come into being or not, the question of whether it exists or not, the thing which imparts to it its existence, the thing which lends it its very existence...

Can we say that it's the state of mind of the father that's lending it or giving it its existence? Or do we say that it has some kind of unique existence of its own coming from its own side? Which one is it?

[Говорящий 2]
Is it the...

[Говорящий 1]
And because it's the father's conceptual state of mind which lends it its existence, that's what it means when we say, very, very famous in Buddhist philosophy, simply a product of the... A construct of the mind, simply a projection, we say in the other classes, simply a product of the mind. And that's what it means when we say something is simply a product of the mind, which is, by the way, always opposed or apposed to the idea of existing from its own side with its own unique nature.

Okay?

[Говорящий 2]
So this is the opposite of that, which is simply a product of the mind, simply a projection of the mind.

[Говорящий 1]
And so we've established, haven't we, that this thing in the middle, the construct, is something which is simply a projection or simply a construct of the mind, simply a construct of the mind, simply a construct of your conceptualization. And we can say, therefore, that it's not like this other thing which has, from its own side, it has its own unique way of being from its own side. And that's what it means in this school when we say that this thing in the middle does not exist by definition, does not exist by definition.

There you go. That's exactly what it means. Got it?

Got it? Say something. Got it?

[Говорящий 2]
Good.

[Говорящий 1]
Be careful not to slip into the Manimika door, okay? And catch the following thing. The mind-only school says that's what it means when we say that this thing in the middle doesn't exist by definition.

There you go. Okay? In the mind-only school, that's what it means when we say that something doesn't exist by definition.

Now you've got that feeling. Totally different from Manimika. Don't go into the Manimika door, don't let yourself slip into Manimika.

In the mind-only school, that's exactly what we, just how we described the middle one, is exactly what we mean when we say that thing doesn't have a nature of existing by definition.

[Говорящий 2]
There you go. Yes. So if you think about it, there is no such thing as the little thing which could exist from its own side with its own unique nature, right?

[Говорящий 1]
No such thing is possible. But if there were such a thing as the thing in the middle which was existing from its own side with its own unique way of being, that would be the ultimate gaccha. That would be the ultimate thing which we deny when we talk of emptiness in the mind-only school.

That's what would be. If such a thing existed, then that would be, such an existence is what we deny when we say emptiness in the mind-only school. So there you've got, that is what we call the self-nature of objects, which is the ultimate object denied when we speak of emptiness in the mind-only school.

Don't slip off into Manimika please.

[Говорящий 2]
Okay. Got it? Yes.

That's all, that's all, that's all, oh boy.

[Говорящий 1]
The theoretical thing of the thing in the middle which existed from its own side with its own unique nature, which would mean a thing in the middle which existed by definition is another kind of kunta, right? It's another kind of construct, the imagination of such a thing, you know, the mental picture of such a thing, which is impossible, right? The mental picture of an impossible thing, of a thing which was a construct and which existed through its own unique way of being from its own side and therefore existed by definition, that in itself is a construct, isn't it?

So now we've got a second kind of kunta, don't we? A second kind of construct, Megika, and that's the kind that doesn't exist, that's a construct which doesn't exist. So there's two kinds of constructs, right?

One which does exist and one which doesn't exist, even with regard to the one in the middle. How do you feel, Garin?

[Говорящий 2]
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

[Говорящий 1]
It's not the same construct, right?

[Говорящий 2]
Nothing, nothing.

[Говорящий 1]
Oh boy. Now we're getting into more detail on how changing things are acting as the arena or the basis in which we have all these ideas. So, the fact that with regard to visual objects or changing things, we cannot say of them that our construct of them is something which comes from its own side and its own unique way of being, or which exists by definition.

The fact that this one doesn't exist with regard to this is the totality of this, meaning the emptiness of this. So, the fact that the self-existent construct doesn't exist with regard that this thing doesn't have a corresponding self-existent construct about it is its emptiness. That in itself, according to the mind-only school, is yongdrup, is what we call totality, is the third group in the mind-only school.

So, the fact that this thing, when you consider it as a thing that came from its... If you say, imagine a number two, a concept which came from its own side, had its own unique way of being, was not just something made up in my mind, which doesn't exist, right? That thing's impossible.

The impossibility of that thing with regard to this thing is this thing's emptiness. That is the yongdrup or the third category of this thing. That's how chenwangs are so useful for getting the other two categories.

That's how they act as the arena for describing the other two groups. So, let's take another example. I got here a stick in my hand, a stick of wood, and can we...

Now, perk up and give me some ideas here, okay? Can we characterize this in three different ways, given the conversation we just had? So, show me these three characteristics of this thing.

Three features now of this thing. Give me three features of this thing. You got them backwards.

Can you give them to me straight? The cat is climbing down a ladder. The cat's never going...

You know, like, the cat's going the wrong way. Wrong order. But it's okay, it's okay.

We don't need you anymore. Don't forget these three. We have these three characteristics.

It's the arena... Let me start out with three characteristics.

[Говорящий 2]
He wants Chok to try.

[Говорящий 1]
Nam-do-bi-chu-yu-yang-yin. Is that in the arena in which conceptualization is functioning? Yeah, so it fits the first feature, what we call the first feature.

So, forget the one in the middle, we're talking about the third one now. We're talking about the third one now, right? We're talking about the third one.

The baby, before it got named Chok. Not the concept, we're talking about the baby. Three features of the baby.

First of all, it is the arena in which conceptualization is acting. Okay, second one is the kundakatini-gin-ne.

[Говорящий 2]
No, maybe we have two labels.

[Говорящий 1]
This is the labeling process. The second feature. You said that the kundakatini-gin-ne is in the middle, right?

[Говорящий 2]
Yes, it's in the middle.

[Говорящий 1]
They're all backscratchers.

[Говорящий 2]
Backscratchers. Again.

[Говорящий 1]
It fits the second feature's description because isn't it that thing which we name with the name bamboo stick or stick of bamboo, and isn't it this thing which we conceptualize as a bamboo, which we label with the thought or with the picture, this is a bamboo shing. So, you know, I'm not too good in English. You want to call it a backscratcher, I don't know what you want to call it.

It is a stick. I'm calling it a stick. I have a word.

Verbally, I am naming it a bamboo stick. Mentally, I'm labeling it as a bamboo stick. And that's how it fits the second feature, in which being the arena or being the object which is labeled.

By concept. Now, the third one is easy. I mean, of course it has a third feature, which is it came from its causes and conditions.

So those are the three features. First one was what? It's the arena in which conceptual mind works.

Secondly, it is that object which receives the label of the mind and the word. And thirdly, it is something which has grown from its causes and conditions. So it fits the three features of a changing thing, of a dependent thing.

Could you do some Jusha? So now, having finished that, we've finished the three features. We've got the stick.

We've got the state of mind which is calling it, Oh, hey, here's a stick. We've got a stick here. We've got a state of mind that's doing that.

But during that process, there's a stick out here. There's a state of mind that's saying, Hey, there's a stick here. Doesn't something, a third thing, start forming in the middle, which is the mental image of a stick?

And your mind is starting to produce some kind of construct, some kind of conceptualization called a stick. And then your mind is starting to focus on this conceptualization. When it says, Oh, stick, stick, stick, stick, stick, you know, and then there begins a conceptualization in the middle.

Doesn't there? You know what I'm asking?

[Говорящий 2]
I don't know.

[Говорящий 1]
Oh boy. Okay. So you've got this stick, don't you?

That's the object in which your conceptualizations are, the arena in which your conceptualizations are working. Then you have the conceptual state of mind. And as you start focusing on it and thinking, Here's a stick, here's a stick, stick, stick, stick, and then you get this thing forming in the middle, which is a concept, a construct of a stick.

And then when you think about that, that construct, isn't it? It's kind of being, it's depending or it's relating to the shenwang, isn't it? Here is a thing which is dependent on its causes, which has been produced by its causes, and here in the middle is a thing called construct, the first of the three groups, right?

So here in the middle is a thing called construct that's starting to form. And if you think about it, there's a construct which really does exist, which is just a kind of a mental construct of the stick. The mental construct you have in your mind of the stick.

But if you think about it carefully, there's another construct which doesn't exist, which is the theoretical impossible one of thinking of this construct as being something which is existing from its own side, through its own unique nature, and not just as a product of my conceptualization. And the lack or the absence or the non-applicability of that to the basis, which is the wood or the shenwang, is its yongdru, is its emptiness, is its what we call totality, which is the third group. You've got all three groups covered in just this one process.

Is it clear in your skull or not? Got it?

[Говорящий 2]
Got it?

[Говорящий 1]
Did everybody get it? Did you get all of it? He's using the word for clear.

Polished? Is it polished? I think, you know, he's referring back.

If you want to right now make yourself some heavy-duty notes so you don't forget what just happened, you'd better do it now. If you've got it mentally okay, you can go home and write it there. I mean, if it's pretty firm in your mind, then when you get home, write it down.

But otherwise, you'd better do it right now.

[Говорящий 2]
Yes.

[Говорящий 1]
We've taken a specific case. We've taken a specific analysis of this case. We took the stick, right?

We took the baby, then we took the stick. And the stick is a specific example for this process that I've described to you. Now take that process.

Now take that reasoning. And you can just apply it to all the other objects in the universe. You can go ahead, every other changing thing, every other functional thing.

You can go ahead and take the same logic, the same thinking, all of the components of the same thinking, and go latch on to any other existing functional objects, changing things, and you can apply it exactly to that as well. Got it? It's okay?

Okay. Adi doesn't got any... If you don't make a noise, I don't know if you got it or not.

So what do you think? Did I say it's to be taken figurative or literally? Literally.

Just kidding. Just kidding. I think he's referring that when he asks you to say something, you seem to be taking it figurative.

[Говорящий 2]
What does it mean? Nothing. Nothing.

[Говорящий 1]
A crucial point here. Very, very crucial point. You know, it's not so much this one, and it's not so much this point.

It's the one in the middle. Very, very crucial. Everything pivots.

Everything turns on the one in the middle. Do you understand? Do you grasp it when I say that there's a version of it which exists, and there's a version of it which doesn't exist?

Got it?

[Говорящий 2]
Okay. Okay. Okay.

[Говорящий 1]
There's a... When you focus on this second one in the middle, and somebody says to you, does this exist by definition according to the mind-only school, you'll keep saying, oh no, no, scripture says, book says, Jataka says, no, doesn't exist by definition. I read it many times.

Yeah, yeah, I got it, I got it. It says, it says, Ranggit-siddhi Nirmala Drupada, doesn't exist by definition. But to really understand what that means, to, in your own mind, to have a very clear picture of what the mind-only school means when they say that one in the middle doesn't exist by definition, is very difficult.

And why it is that there's a new word he's introducing, which is from perceptual theory, which is the thing we think we see. The thing we think we see, okay? That thing we think we see, which is some kind of self-existence to it, or some kind of existence by definition.

To understand why that's not there, to clearly understand why this thing doesn't exist by definition, is extremely difficult. It's not as easy as saying, oh yeah, the book says the one in the middle doesn't exist by definition. That's easy.

But to really clearly grasp why the one in the middle doesn't exist by definition is difficult. But if you get it, if you ever get to a point where you get it clearly, in your mind, intellectually, you understand clearly, why number two in this mind-only school doesn't exist by definition, then, says Geshe-la, you really have grasped the essential point of the mind-only school. That is the essential point of the mind-only school.

If you can understand or explain clearly to somebody why the one in the middle doesn't exist by definition, then you've really grasped the whole essence of the mind-only school. things in the world, which are supposed to be constructs, right? Remember how we described the group in the beginning?

We said constructs is all the unchanging things in the world after you kick out emptiness itself, okay? So you go off with all those unchanging things that we always talk about. We're always standing around talking about unchanging things.

We go thinking about unproduced things, and we're talking about empty space, and then maybe we talk about there's an idea that there's the unchanging thing of the mental image itself, general mental images being unchanging things. We go off and talk about other kinds of unchanging things, okay? But then, with regard to this single bamboo stick, the thing in the middle, the kundaka, the construct, okay?

How do you feel about, like, is there a distinction between all those general unchanging things, like empty space? You know, I'm not talking about emptiness, okay? But empty space, for example, place, empty space.

How do you think, you know, here you've got one little tiny unchanging thing. You've got something, you've got one little tiny example of a construct, the specific example that relates to this specific stick that we're talking about. Is there a distinction between this and all those other ones with regard to their unchangingness?

Is there some kind of key here that distinguishes those from this one? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah,

[Говорящий 2]
yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah

[Говорящий 1]
When he said, is there a distinction between the one in the middle and all those other unchanging things we talk about, he says, I was not talking about whether it was unchanging or not, okay?

I wasn't talking about whether there was any difference in the way they're unchanging or not. That's not what I was getting at. That's not what I wanted to get to.

It was this. When you're trying to establish the totality, right, which means emptiness of this thing, when you're trying to establish the emptiness of this stick, right, and you think of it in terms of the construct being a thing which exists by definition, right? And the fact that the construct doesn't exist by definition, being the emptiness of the stick, well then, does this example of an unchanging thing called the construct of the stick, is that more useful for you in establishing the emptiness, and especially the emptiness of the stick, than thinking about all those other unchanging things like empty space and things like that?

So this clears up an incredible point, you see. It's not so useful for understanding totality or emptiness when you're just thinking about, oh, general kundaks, right? General non-changing things, general like empty space or something like that, which is, you know, the book said a long time ago that unchanging things were examples of constructs, you know, and that constructs were unchanging things after you talk about kick-out emptiness.

And, you know, the Buddha could have just sat there on that point and said, that's enough, you know, I told you constructs are unchanging and unchanging things are constructs, except for emptiness, right? And we could have left it at that. Why did we drag in changing things?

Why are we talking about changing things being the arena in which we examine the concept of constructs? There you go, because it's a lot easier to understand emptiness if you take a changing thing as the arena in which you explore the idea of a construct. So then, by taking changing things as the arena in which you explore the idea of a construct, you can come to very easily to an understanding of the emptiness.

So if you just go around being satisfied with explaining, oh, you know, constructs are unchanging things, empty space is an unchanging thing, empty space is a construct, that doesn't help you so much in establishing the meaning of totality or emptiness. But if you take as your arena all changing things and then you examine them in this way, with regard to this construct, the existing version and the non-existing version of this construct, then you come to this very subtle and very beautiful understanding of emptiness, which you never could have had if you didn't take xian wang, or dependent things, as the arena in which we're going to discuss constructs. That's nice. That's what I call it.

If you're going to write something down, you better do it now. You might forget it. You know, why did we bring in xian wang?

That's a very important point. I hope somebody's taking good notes. I don't have time.

That was the whole problem when we started today. I didn't know what the heck he's talking about. He's talking about xian wang, he's talking about kunda.

Why is he bringing in xian wang? We also distinguish the two kinds of... Remember we talked about two kinds of kundaks, two kinds of constructs.

He says, you know in Tibet we have a much more beautiful expression to refer to the two kinds of constructs. You know, you can call... the first one could be the one that is a...

koa in Tibetan means a necessary akutaman, okay? A necessary akutaman for understanding the emptiness of the stick. You see?

The one that you have to be thinking about to understand the emptiness of the stick. And then there's those other ones like, you know, general kundaks like empty space and all those other ones, you know, all those other general unchanging things which are not necessary akutaman for understanding the emptiness of the stick. But here, these ones, we can divide constructs in a different way, right?

Rather than saying the ones that exist and the ones that don't exist. There's the ones that you have to focus on in order... which are necessary, which are a necessity or a prerequisite for understanding the emptiness of the stick.

And then there's all those other ones that are not such a necessary akutaman for understanding the emptiness of the stick. Two kinds of constructs.

[Говорящий 2]
Yes, sir.

[Говорящий 1]
And again, Geshe-la wants to go back to these scriptural authorities. So you don't know, he just made up that whole last presentation, and he wants to tie it down, link it to an actual part of the text. He says, we'll go back to the...

don't forget, we'll go back to where we were on page 23 later. But I want to jump ahead to page 25, second line, and this is the scriptural reference which backs up what I just said. Here, the text says, we are not going to now treat the other kinds of constructs.

We are going to concentrate on the kinds of constructs which are the one in the middle. So here in the text itself, it says, we are not in the process of identifying what constructs are. We are going to focus on this specific kind of construct, and we're not going to talk about constructs in general.

We're going to use this one which relates to establishing that other important thing. This is Je Tsongkapa's own wording for that concept. And he says here at the end of those lines, we'll get into this more later, I'm going to explain to you now, I'm sorry, I should have said, I'm going to explain to you now, through this method, what it means to be a construct.

How to identify what constructs are. When Je Tsongkapa says here, I'm going to explain to you the constructs in this line, in this particular line, he does so much further on. And Geshe-la wants to show you where, because I'm not sure we'll ever get that far in this particular series of classes, so we'd better jump there now.

Page 85. Going down to page 85. Seventh line.

Here is the direct quotation by Je Tsongkapa, and here's how it goes. We are on page 85, we are on the seventh line from the top, and it says, generally speaking, there are other kinds of constructs. For example, all chi-tzens.

Chi-tzens are like ... In general, there are different kinds of ... this is very difficult, but in logic, there are things like yu-myin ...

what do they call them? Archetypes. It's a thing called like an archetype, okay?

As opposed to the thing which the archetype refers to, the actual object. And that's called chi-tzen or nang-tzen. So he says, all those things which are called archetypes in some schools, and all those things like empty space, and other kinds of unchanging things.

These are unchanging things. There are many, many different kinds, but the sutra in which the Buddha explains the intent of his sutras, which is the main sutra which the Manjula school uses, right? To back up their school.

That one doesn't mention those. It doesn't talk about those. What does it talk about?

Or why doesn't it talk about them? It doesn't talk about them because those kinds of constructs are not the ones which are necessary aku-domo for understanding totality, meaning emptiness. And that's the later that comes on page 25.

Sixty pages later, you get the later, where Je Tsongkapa says, this is why Lord Buddha, in that particular sutra, doesn't mention all those other ones when he talks about constructs. He goes straight for the ones that are necessary aku-domo for understanding the idea of totality or emptiness.

[Говорящий 2]
Okay.

[Говорящий 1]
Do you want detail or not? I said, sure. You guys are the jet set generation and back in Tibet we didn't have any cars, we didn't have any railroad, we didn't have anything.

We just plodded along in our own pace. It's okay if we go through the book like that? He did that day.

I don't know. Maybe airplanes are better. What do you think?

Just kidding.

[Говорящий 2]
Okay, when you talk about the one in the middle, okay, remember there's the one that exists, and remember there's the one that doesn't exist, right?

[Говорящий 1]
The non-self-existent one and the self-existent one, right? The one that exists by definition and the one that doesn't exist by definition. Did I get that right?

No. Oh, sorry, which doesn't exist by definition and does exist by definition. That's better, right.

So, this one, as opposed to all those other kinds of constructs like empty space and all that, is required, or is a necessary kutama in two senses, okay? Necessary kutama in two senses. First of all, it's the positive one, the one that does exist, okay?

The one which is like really there between the mind that's thinking of the stick and the stick itself. The one in which the mind conceptualizes stick, that picture stick, right? That construct stick.

That one is needed for the stick in the sense of the stick being the object which is empty, okay? So, we call it in Tibetan, the construct between the stick and the mind perceiving the stick, which is necessary for the thing which is empty, okay? All right?

It's a necessary kutama of the thing which is empty, okay? So, in establishing the emptiness of the stick, you're not only going to talk about the construct which doesn't exist, you're going to talk about the construct which does exist. The construct which does exist still stays in the category of necessary kutama for establishing the emptiness of the stick, because it's a necessary kutama for the thing which is going to be proven to be empty, which is the stick, okay?

So, in that sense, it's still a necessary kutama for understanding emptiness of the stick, because it's a necessary kutama for the basis or the thing which is empty, which is the stick itself, okay? The stick considered from the point of view of being the basis or the thing which is empty, has to have a necessary kutama of the construct with which we perceive it, okay? So, that's a necessary kutama for that sense.

Then there's the other version of the construct, which is the one that doesn't exist, okay? A construct which could come from its own side, a construct which could exist by definition, which doesn't exist, right? That one is a necessary akuta-ma for establishing the gaccha, you see?

That one is a necessary akuta-ma for establishing what it is that we deny to reach the emptiness of the state, okay? So that's a necessary component or element in understanding what it is that we deny when we speak of emptiness. So in two senses, each one of the two versions or the two flavors of this construct, the one that does exist and the one that doesn't exist, are both necessary akuta-ma for understanding the emptiness of the state.

Okay, got it? That's really cool.

[Говорящий 2]
Okay.

[Говорящий 1]
Now we're shifting back into the very first mode we came to this class with. If you think about everything we've said so far, we've been talking about a state of mind which is focusing on the stick and saying to itself, this is a stick, stick, stick, that has the mental picture of a stick, right? It's been focusing on the very nature or the very identity or the very stick as a whole, right?

But what about a state of mind... Can we apply all this logic, can we apply all this reasoning to that second mode, right, that we talked about at the very beginning, which I mistook for the three features, right? We never got to the third one.

You'll catch it later in the tape. There's a state of mind which says, oh, the stick is impermanent, the stick is changing, the stick is something that was made, the stick is something that was produced, which is focusing upon characteristics or features of the stick. Can you apply all that we've said so far today to the state of mind which is saying about the stick, oh, you know the stick is impermanent, you know the stick was produced, you know the stick started at some point.

Can you apply everything that we've said to that state of mind as well? This is very, very important because this is a very, very difficult phrase in Tibetan when you study chang-e, which is nyugul khyepa la kundapi kundap. Very, very difficult phrase to translate.

Nyugul khyepa la kundapi kundap means the state of mind which is creating a construct, the constructing state of mind which is creating a construct with regard to a feature of its object. The constructing state of mind which is creating a construct with regard to a feature of the stick, meaning the stick, the fact that the stick grew, the fact that the stick is changing, as opposed to focusing on the stick itself as an object. Now it's focusing on certain characteristics or features of the stick, and that's called in Tibetan, a very difficult phrase, nyugul khyepa la kundapi kundap, the constructive state of mind that's creating a construct about the features of the stick.

I used to drive me crazy trying to translate that. Now you've got it. When you talk about all three elements with regard to perceiving the feature of the stick, that's what you're talking about.

Yes, sir. Okay, question for you guys. Wake up.

Forget all those other kinds of constructs. Not talking about empty space, not talking about archetypes, not talking about anything like that. We are just talking about this one in the middle, with the stick.

We're restricting ourselves to this particular construct. Forget the divisions I made. I want you, yourselves, to think carefully over.

If we had to make a very basic, elementary, initial division of these kinds of constructs into two. You know, for example, in the way that we take all existing objects and split them into changing things and unchanging things. Could you guys think up a way of taking these constructs, these particular constructs that are staying in the middle here, and dividing them into two or three broad groupings.

Can you guys come up with one?

[Говорящий 2]
I'm just making sure you guys are surviving.

[Говорящий 1]
Good question, and you can consider them as... We want to know both, the ones that exist and the ones that don't exist. So you can take the ones that don't...

You can also throw in the ones that don't exist and give me a division of those two together.

[Говорящий 2]
Yes, yes.

[Говорящий 1]
So just with regard to the constructs that relate to a backscratcher stick. Restrict yourself to the constructs that relate to a backscratcher stick. I want you to consider that like all of Seram Monastery, the whole Seram, the population of Seram Monastery.

And then you grab all these guys and you say, You're members of Sarah J and you grab all these guys, so you're members of Sarah May and you come up with two great groupings Can you come up with one? You're not yet How many how many groupings you guys I mean how many are gonna be in your groups? I mean, I'm gonna be two three four Yes Let's hear what they are Shing gi ngor la jar gyu kundata, shing gi khepa la jar gyu kunday nyi su yunas Are you their legally elected representative or would the people like to talk?

[Говорящий 2]
They're running for duty, you know like there's tick tick tick tick and the one is changing There's a thing that's changing and they're like changing how to do it And the other three words are the three different kinds of kundas.

[Говорящий 1]
I'm really difficult. Kundas don't change. The three different kinds of kundas are...

The first kunda is called Dhammendasah. The second kunda is called Dhammendahsah. The third kunda is called Gyogi Gyogi Gyogi Gyogi Gyogi.

And the fourth kunda is called Gyungi. I think he's saying, look, everything has their own constructs, right? And there are lots of different constructs.

But with regard... I think what he's trying to say is that, with regard to one object's constructs at a certain given moment, and not talking about how the different constructs might arise as different constructing minds arise, at any given... I think what he wants to say is that at any given moment, the construct of any given moment which doesn't change would be...

Can you give me divisions of that one?

[Говорящий 2]
I think I saw it. I think he's saying the thing which is the basis of having teachers. And then the teachers allow for things.

[Говорящий 1]
He wants to make sure that your point was addressed to your satisfaction because he sees you kind of looking like that, you know. He's talking about the construct of the whole piece of wood, you know, when you say wood. And then the construct of when you focus on wood and say, the wood is impermanent, or the wood is changing, or the wood is breaking, or something like that.

Is that what you meant to say? So, it wasn't the case that you meant to say that the mental construct of a piece of wood, or the mental construct of the piece of wood as a changing thing, was itself changing all the time. You didn't mean to say that.

So, you're both in the same Chikpa Chowdhury. He says he likes it when somebody has a problem with something he said, and is doubting, is trying to figure it out, is obviously having a question about it, and is obviously trying to work something out that they don't get that maybe other people... It's not like I can hand out paychecks to everybody and refuse you a paycheck.

You have just as much... You should, in fact, raise your questions and chase your questions until it's resolved. And I much prefer that in my classes than people sitting there like that and not bringing up any issues at all.

I love issues. And I love people who bring up the issues. And in my class, I want people bringing up issues rather than sitting there...

OK. Last one. The whole point of a class is to go from a state of non-understanding to a state of understanding.

And there's another state in which people sit, which is repeating like parrots what I say and not really understanding it. And since the whole point of the class is to go from a state of non-understanding to a state of understanding, and since interchange, exchange is required for that, going back and forth on an issue until the issue is resolved is required for that. I like issues.

And I like resolving issues. And we just resolve an issue.

[Говорящий 2]
Thank you.

[Говорящий 1]
So you both... All right. In fact, you're all three, right?

When you say that there are two kinds of constructs, if you think about it, there's a construct which is constructed with regard to the central or the main nature or main identity of an object, and then there's a construct which is constructed with regard to the features of that object, and you got it. Nothing. Nothing.

With regard only to this back scratcher stick, this piece of bamboo, and with regard now, we are restricting ourselves to the construct which is being constructed with regard to its main identity, not to its features. How many of those? Remember we divided them into constructs which are constructed with regard to the main thing, and then we talked about constructs which are constructed with regard to the features of the thing.

Now, forget the second one. Just the first one. Constructs which are constructed with regard to the main thing.

How many of those are there? How many divisions are you going to give me on those? Ni yore, sum yore.

Don't forget, you're three. Money. Who said two?

Let's hear the two. Give them a name, you know. You got an abbot, you got to name the abbot.

[Говорящий 2]
There's the construction which doesn't relate the thing to the object.

[Говорящий 1]
Ngo la kun dape kun da, yu gyur yin khen na, me gyur yin khen ni yore. Okay, we got your two. We want to hear the three that this one brought up here.

If she's already covered two of yours, you can just throw in the third. Ah, let's forget it. It's two.

Exactly that. The one which exists and the one which doesn't exist.

[Говорящий 2]
Me gyur kun da pha la khen la.

[Говорящий 1]
The first, the one which does exist, okay, in this case, with this example, is the one which is a necessary akuta mong of the object which is going to be proven to be empty. The object which is said to be empty, which is the stick itself. And then the one which doesn't exist, okay, the construct which doesn't exist, is going to be the one which is said to be a necessary akuta mong of the gaccha, which is necessary for establishing the gaccha.

The thing which emptiness is empty of. So you guys can figure out easily that the same divisions can be carried on to the constructs which relate to the features of the object, right? The same two divisions that we just mentioned can be applied to the constructs which relate to the features of the object.

So he goes through the whole process, which is very hard for me to remember when he's going to turn. He goes through the whole process with the kid, right? Let's go back to the kid.

Remember the kid and the whole process of naming the kid. So, there is a construct which relates to the kid. During the naming of the kid, there has arisen a construct named Tashi the Kid, right?

The kid named Tashi. That construct has arisen. It is only something that is a projection, or it is only something which is a construct of the mind.

But that's not to say it doesn't exist, okay? It does exist. The construct does exist, okay?

And then with regard to this construct, we can say of this construct that it's not something which exists from its own side, with its own unique nature. This construct is only something which is a construct of the mind, first, okay? And then the second step is that it is not something that comes from its own side, with its own unique nature.

And in this example, what we said was, it was not something that came along with that kid the minute he was born out of the womb, okay? That middle thing, the construct, was not something that popped out when the kid popped out of the womb, okay? So, that's a sign that the construct is not something which is coming from its own side with its own unique nature.

That's an indication that it really is just something that is a construct of our mind, because it only happened later when the daddy said, Oh, now I'm going to name this boy Tashi. So, the construct, in being something that did not pop out of the womb along with the baby, is therefore not something which comes from its own side, through its own unique way of being. That's a sign that it doesn't come from its own side with its own unique way of being.

And that's an indication that it is only a construct of the mind. The fact that it didn't come along with the baby from the first moment. And that's an indication, or that's what it means when we say that that thing doesn't exist by definition.

That's what it means when we say that that thing doesn't exist by definition. And the fact that that doesn't exist, the fact that a construct which does exist by definition, is something that could never apply to the boy, is the yondu, or the totality, or the emptiness of the boy. The fact that there could never be a concept which did exist by definition, or which did come from its own unique way of being, which applied to the boy, is the very emptiness, or what we call totality, in the mind-only school of the boy.

And there you go, you got all three of those groups of the mind-only school. Cool?

[Говорящий 2]
I'm sorry, I'm not letting you.

[Говорящий 1]
If you think about it, I've now described that process with the same object, like three times. Now there's a thing in Buddhist writing called the default of repeating yourself too much. What's it called?

There's a word in English. Yeah, redundancy. So he says, you might think I'm getting into that compositional fault called redundancy.

Not the point. I'm just trying to get it clear in your mind, so don't think I'm being redundant. We've been through it with the same object about three times.

I hope you're not saying, thank you for being redundant.

[Говорящий 2]
Thank you.

[Говорящий 1]
We started out this class running that bulldozer through the forest, and we had all these tree trunks laying around, and all this crap on the ground and everything. Now the whole thing is one nice, clean field, flat, even, well-ranked. Did we get there?

Did it really, in your mind, become a clear, clean, open field?

[Говорящий 2]
Not so clear. Not so.

[Говорящий 1]
Establishing these three, which is very, this whole concept is very tricky. Establishing the three groups, right? With regard, the three very groups of concepts, sorry, constructs, dependent things, and emptiness itself, what we call totality.

Establishing those three in the same manner, through using these three ideas, with regard to unchanging things, is a little tricky, right? What was our arena? Our arena was changing things.

Now if you go on and use, if you try to explain the existence of the three elements, with regard to unchanging things, or by using unchanging things as your arena, a little bit tricky, okay? It's a little bit tricky. That's going to be a little bit of a tricky thing.

We got a little bit left, just a little bit of cleanup work to do. Mop-up. There's a little bit of mop-up to do with establishing what it means to be a construct.

We're just about at the end of it. Remember we are trying to identify what it means to be a construct. We got, most of our work is done.

We got a little mop-up to do about it. We'll try to get to that other point. We'll cover that, how do those three groups apply to things which don't change, unproduced things.

But right now, next time we'll just try to do a little bit, at the beginning we'll just do a little mop-up work on constructs and then we'll move on. Okay, just to wrap up, just a little concluding dessert. We're talking about this stick, got this stick here.

Don't forget in what school we're in. We're in the Mind Only School. I'm going to come up to you, and someone's going to walk up to you and say, Hey, what's the yong druk?

What's the totality? How do you describe the antithesis of the stick, please?

[Говорящий 2]
What's the yong druk? The antithesis of constructs and things which mean the mind is larger than the stick. Oh, that's not right.

That's cool. That's a project, right?

[Говорящий 1]
Could be, could not be, we'll talk about it. Anybody else? Want to bite?

[Говорящий 2]
The construct came from the stick. It didn't come from the stick. The construct came from, there's a stick in the literature.

You say the word stick, and you have construct. In fact, it didn't come from the stick. It's impossible.

That's the antithesis, right? It can't exist.

[Говорящий 1]
Ok. So, that's a pretty sophisticated idea, pretty beautiful when you think about it. Not quite sure it's exactly the one we're talking about, but the fact that he paused and thought about it means it's really beautiful, it's very, very close, and it's a beautiful way to think about it.

How about you, Mr. Winston?

[Говорящий 2]
Well, I guess, if I could put a question back, what we're talking about, how would you characterize the emptyness of the stick, or the concept, or the concept?

[Говорящий 1]
We're talking about the stick, the basis, the thing which is empty. Okay. So, how would you characterize the totality, meaning the emptiness of the stick, in terms of the Mind-Only School's language, using their concept?

[Говорящий 2]
I would say the absence of the construct of having any existence independent of the constructing mind is the totality of the stick.

[Говорящий 1]
Okay.

[Говорящий 2]
Okay.

[Говорящий 1]
He says, you're close, but you need a bit of a brace to walk down the street. Yours was pretty clear, and yours was concordant with theirs. But he says, the one it is, is that, from the beginning, the fact that, from the beginning, I lost it.

What?

[Говорящий 2]
What, what, what?

[Говорящий 1]
What?

[Говорящий 2]
What? What?

[Говорящий 1]
What? To make it easier, you've got a kid that's named Tashi. You have the state of the mind that calls it Tashi and creates the concept, or the construct of Tashi.

And then you have the construct of Tashi as a kid. Tashi the kid as a construct, which does exist. But the absence, the fact that the boy does not have any nature of having a construct which applies to him, which construct is existing by definition.

The fact that a construct which existed by definition could never apply to the boy is the emptiness of the boy. And that's pretty much it. Yeah, I think that's pretty much it.

Exactly, exactly. The fact that the non-existent construct doesn't exist with the boy. The fact that the boy doesn't have the construct which doesn't exist is the boy's totality, meaning the boy's emptiness.

The yugyu dewa. But you could also, you know, instead of expressing it, don't forget you can also always say that the existing construct does apply to the boy, right? That the existing construct, which is not something which exists by definition, right?

That the existing construct, which is just, I'm sorry, that the fact that the existing construct which doesn't come from its own side through any unique nature, the fact that that applies to the boy, you can also get into that, okay? That's another way of, I mean you can get into that also. See, you don't only have to go at it from the point of view of the construct which doesn't exist.

You could say the fact that the construct which does exist doesn't apply to the boy as a thing which comes from its own side, it's also related to the boy's emptiness. So he said, just before he said it, I feel a little uncomfortable if you justify it in terms of the construct which doesn't exist. Because you could also describe it in terms of the construct which doesn't exist, not applying to the boy as a construct which exists through any unique nature of its own, from its own side.

[Говорящий 2]
Okay, okay.

[Говорящий 1]
Nothing, nothing. Now, we'll ask a little bit more questions. We ran out of time, but we'll ask one more question.

Okay, last question. There's this construct of Dashi the boy, right? There's this construct of Dashi the boy, and it applies to Dashi, right?

It didn't apply to Dashi when the boy first came out, right? There wasn't a concept called Dashi the boy that applied to the baby when it just came out of the womb. But can you say that there's a concept of Dashi the boy which applies to the boy later, after it's been named?

[Говорящий 2]
Never do.

[Говорящий 1]
So I go along, I remember that your first point was that the construct which doesn't exist, the construct which existed from its own accord or something like that, that that doesn't exist later on top of the boy named Dashi.

[Говорящий 2]
It's different now. I don't think I've ever heard the name Dashi. I have never heard of the name Dashi.

[Говорящий 1]
I don't know why they call it a name. I don't know why. It's because of Yugi-kun.

[Говорящий 2]
Yugi-kun, I've never heard of the name Dashi.

[Говорящий 1]
Me neither, me neither. I've never heard of the name of the boy. the boy, in its self-existent form, right?

As something which comes of its own form, from its own side, and it's not just something constructed by your mind. The fact that that does not exist, or that the fact that Tashi does not have just that kind of kundat, that kind of construct, is the yondu, is the totality, is the emptiness of Tashi. And I agree with you, and I think it's important to say that the fact that when you speak about the construct which does exist, the construct of Tashi the boy which does exist, the fact that you have to keep repeating that that does exist with Tashi, that Tashi does have that, that you do have to say.

You have to be careful not to describe the emptiness of Tashi as being directly related to the idea, to the construct which does exist, because that would be dangerous. You say, I like the way you did it in the first place. It's a good way to do it.

And then there's another idea in mind only, the fact that Tashi is the thing called Tashi. Okay? The fact that Tashi is the thing called Tashi.

Now whether that exists by definition. Okay, that's what he's saying, he's sort of getting us ready for that. The fact that Tashi is the thing called Tashi.

Now we got to talk about that. Okay? What's its nature?

Does that exist by definition? We're getting into a whole other question, but I like it, because I've always wondered about it. The fact that Tashi is the thing called Tashi, does that exist by definition?

No. The fact that Tashi is the thing called Tashi, does that exist by definition? It would seem to be you'd want to say yes, right?

He's kind of got it twisted around to the thing that's called Tashi, being something that exists from its own side. I don't know, I guess you'd say Tashi being called Tashi, does that exist by definition? And he says no.

And he says why? What's the indication? He says that's not such a hard one.

The fact that Tashi is called Tashi. The fact that Tashi is the thing called Tashi doesn't exist by definition, because if the fact that the thing called, if the fact that Tashi is the thing called Tashi existed by definition, the minute the kid popped out, everybody would call him Tashi. Oh, that's hard for me.

Another indication of that is not just that he wasn't called Tashi the minute he popped out. Another indication of that is that who is it that has the most authority in creating this baby called, in creating, quote, Tashi the baby, Tashi the boy? Who is it that has the most power?

It's the state of mind that calls him Tashi, right? That's the one who has the authority to create the thing called Tashi the boy. And that didn't happen until later, right?

That doesn't happen on its own accord. And that's another indication that that thing doesn't exist by definition. The fact that Tashi is called Tashi doesn't exist by definition, because it's the state of mind that names him Tashi that has authority over the whole matter, and that didn't happen until later.

Michael's not lying when he says last question, because each proceeding one is the last question at that point. At that point it becomes the last question. He says it worked in your mind and then you got it and you started giggling.

...of the word which is applied, right? And remember when we had it before, we had the word which is applied and it was confused with the words which are applied, the applying words, which seemed to indicate the applying state of mind, the state of mind which was giving the labels to things, the state of mind, whether it was verbal calling them things, or whether it was mental thinking of them as things. And Jetsun Kappa was careful to say, don't confuse that phrase which literally says the names of the label, right?

Don't forget that here it refers to the kundaka itself, the construct itself, not to the constructing state of mind. So the construct itself, meaning here the self-existing construct, the construct which doesn't exist with regard to Tashi, the construct which is not true about Tashi, but which hangs out there between the constructing state of mind and Tashi as an object to be labeled, right? There's this other thing between there, there's this construct or this idea you have about Tashi which is actually wrong.

The fact that that doesn't apply to Tashi is Tashi's emptiness. And that's that whole process again, right? The fact that a non-existent construct doesn't exist with regard to Tashi, being Tashi's emptiness, is the meaning, Jetsun Kappa, of the words that came before.

Now what words is he talking about, that very beautiful thing, three, six, nine lines from the bottom of 43, where he says that thing which is empty of that thing, which, okay, that thing which is empty of those things, right? That's all the words say. And Jetsun Kappa is nailing it down for you.

That thing meaning those changing things, which are empty, yong drub, of what? Those things meaning those self-existing concepts, okay? And so he's just nailing it down for you, what that thing which is empty of those things means, nine lines above, nine lines above.

So then Jetsun Kappa himself explains those words, what's left over, right? Remember I was like stumbling on that and I asked him, he clarified it. This is on the fourth line from the bottom, page 43, and Jetsun Kappa says, hey, you may wonder what that word left over is talking about, okay?

Lama that's talking about, what's after all is said and done, that's the implication in English, okay? After all is said and done, what do you have left over? You know, what can you come up with?

Well, you got two things which exist by... I'm sorry, dopa-tsam-tse-ya-di do-je-kyi lo-tsu-yo-ru-mi-nye. Then what you come up with, what's the leftover after you come to that?

Fourth line from the bottom, page 43, ngupa-tsam, meaning the things which got the label, meaning changing things, okay? Those things which received the label, and then dopa-tsam. Dopa-tsam means, and the labeling state of mind.

Those two things exist by definition, okay? So what do you got when all this, after all is said and done, what is left over? Oh, the thing which got the label, which does exist by definition, and the labeling state of mind, which also exists by definition, okay?

That's what you got left over, and that's what the words mean in bodhisattva levels when they say, after all is said and done, what you got left is...

[Говорящий 2]
That's it, that's it.

[Говорящий 1]
Okay, here we go. A repeat of what bodhisattva levels meant when they said, that thing which is empty of those things, right? So now there's a nice summary of it, starting from three lines in the bottom of page 43.

GANG GI STONG PA NI KUN DANG means, what is it which the thing is empty of or devoid of? Oh, its constructs. And Geshe-la points out again, he's anxious to point out, we're not talking constructs in general, are we?

We're talking about that construct which is the ultimate dak chak, the ultimate thing which emptiness is empty of, the ultimate thing which emptiness denies, right? Is those constructs which don't exist. So when they say here, in this line, oh, that thing which those things are devoid of, meaning constructs, he's talking about the non-existent construct which is the self-nature of objects, right?

Then he says, and what is it that's empty of it? Shen wangs, right? Changing things.

So you have that thing which they are devoid of, which is constructs that don't exist. What is it that is devoid of them? Changing things.

And the fact that the latter is devoid of the former is the meaning of yonggru, or totality or emptiness, okay? So the wording here is that the fact that the latter is devoid of the former is what totality or emptiness refers to. And it's about this that people are arguing whether or not these things exist, okay?

And then Geshe-la says, go back to page 39. Go back to like, one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, about eight lines from the top, where he begins to talk about... They're not talking about whether or not things exist nominally.

They're not talking about whether or not things exist in general. The argument here is whether or not those things exist ultimately, okay? So remember that the wording, you know, there was a distinction between when the mind-only school talks about, to the Madhyamika school, saying, you don't believe these things exist or you do believe these things exist.

The argument is not about whether or not these things exist. The argument is not either phrased about whether or not these things exist nominally. The debate is about whether or not these things exist ultimately.

The word is ultimately, right? So, Je Tsongkapa, when he says on page 43, in the last line, don't forget that the meaning here, when they talk about existing and non-existing, is with regard to this process of this thing being empty of this thing, and that being its emptiness, okay? The fact that this object doesn't have this true about, or is devoid of this, is its emptiness.

We're talking about existence and non-existence with regard to that process. We're not talking about existence and non-existence in general. And that's why at the page 44, at the very top, Je Tsongkapa says, existing and non-existing as we clarified it above.

And so you got to go back to page 39 and see, that's what we're talking about. That's when Je Tsongkapa says, as we clarified it above, it's back on page 39. If you've been very sensitive to the words here, and I asked you to go back to page 39, if you actually did go back, all it said on page 39 was, they're talking about doesn't exist.

We're not talking about doesn't exist nominally. We're not talking about doesn't exist in general. We're talking about doesn't exist ultimately.

Then when we got to page 44, and the very end of page 43, we said, the meanings of existence and non-existence here are, as I mentioned before. You should have wondered, well, you know, when you said before, you were just talking about the ways in which they didn't exist. There's no mention on page 39 about the ways in which they do exist.

When he gets to page 43 and 44, then he's talking about, oh, when we mention existence and non-existence, we mean it in the way before. Actually in the before on page 39, Je Tsongkapa only mentioned, we don't mean doesn't exist nominally. We don't mean doesn't exist in general.

We mean doesn't exist by definition. But his implication there is, we're talking about existing or non-existing, or existing or non-existing. So when he says doesn't exist, Je Tsongkapa is actually, what he's referring to is that the distinction here, or the argument here, is between not existing or existing nominally, not existing or existing at all, not existing or existing by definition.

And then he says that on the end of page 43. That's where he gets that from.

[Говорящий 2]
Okay.

[Говорящий 1]
He says, the text at this very instant said, is eliminating this particular, and then it

[Говорящий 2]
says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it says here, it

[Говорящий 1]
And Je Tsongkapa is saying, okay, well then, in so doing, we have eliminated, we have prevented the extreme of believing that something is there when it isn't there, and also later on he says we've prevented thereby the extreme of thinking that nothing is there when something is really there. So remember those are the two, we call it overrating and discounting states of mind. So especially, he says, if you get rid of the overrating state of mind, then as we went back on page 36, six lines from the bottom, the very opening of this whole section, remember, was talking from the bodhisattva levels and it was saying something like, if we are able to eliminate not only the state of mind which overrates things, but that non-existent thing which it is grasping onto, which is the extreme itself, which we call the extreme itself, and the non-existent thing which the opposite state of mind is holding onto, when it denies something that really is there.

So once you can overcome those two extremes and reach a middle, remember that from the very beginning we said that it was the hope and dream of the mind-only school that if they could show you how to avoid this extreme and prove that that extreme doesn't exist even, and if they could help you avoid this other extreme, then by doing so, when you avoid this extreme, you reach a certain conclusion. By canceling one extreme, you thereby establish a certain kind of truth. By canceling the opposite extreme, you establish another kind of truth.

And one of those two extremes really, in essence, says on page 44 at the top, these are called the extreme of thinking that things do exist and the extreme of thinking that things don't exist. The extreme of thinking things do exist means do exist self-existently, say. And then the extreme of thinking things don't exist is normally described as thinking if they don't exist self-existently, then they can't exist at all.

So those are two different extremes. One that believes things are as they seem, and the other which says if they're not as they seem, then they don't exist at all. Those are two different extremes.

We call them the extreme of thinking things do exist as they seem, and the extreme of thinking that things don't exist, meaning if they don't exist as they seem, they don't exist at all. So really, the two extremes from the mind-only point of view. The first extreme in which you are overrating something is to say the extreme of existing.

That is the same thing as holding on to the extreme of existing. And Geshe-la repeats that, don't forget that the state of mind which is believing that thing and the belief which that state of mind holds on to are separate things, right? The state of mind is called overrating.

The thing it holds on to is called the extreme, or the cliff, or the chasm, or the edge of the cliff, or something like that. And in actuality, that object which that state of mind is grasping on to doesn't even exist. What it believes is there is not there, and that's the overrating state of mind.

So from one point of mind-only school, by avoiding one extreme, they are establishing or setting forth a kind of truth. When you have managed to avoid or cut out that extreme, you have in a sense come to a middle way on one hand. And then when you are able to refute or deny the other extreme, then you are also established.

So you've got like, here's the two extremes, and then the truth of denying those two extremes is somewhere in the middle. He's kind of making a pun, right? Because this kind of makes the middle way, right?

So then they have come to some conclusion in the middle of avoiding those two extremes, which in their mind finally establishes the true meaning of emptiness, from the mind-only school point of view. Now we've established the great goal set forth, page 36, where Bodhisattva level said, if you can deny what the overrating state of mind thinks is there, and if you can deny what the discounting state of mind thinks it is there, then you really come to a very perfect understanding, a complete and perfect discrimination of what it is in the mind-only school for something to be empty. And that's the meaning of page 44, the first three lines there.

That thing which don't exist is talking about the state of mind which is underrating, okay, discounting, okay? And referring to their dini-yukti-yupa-dharmepa means the two extremes which those two states of mind think they see which don't exist, right? Those two states of mind, one overrating and one discounting, they are both grasping on to something that doesn't exist.

So, the actual text of the Bodhisattva level says those previous things and those non-existent things, the way they are, the existence and the non-existence they think they see, that thing which is free of those two, okay, meaning free of the two extremes, which don't exist at all, right? So, those two states of mind, things that they think they see, and that other thing which is void or devoid of what those two states of mind think they see, that thing, now there's a third thing, okay, got it? That thing which is devoid of the thing which the former thing thinks it sees, difficult section, page 44, line 4, end of the line, it says, now we will quote Bodhisattva levels again, okay?

Mūrpa-Lama means, very difficult word here, it says, the preceding thing, okay? Don't forget that the word mūrpa can refer to a functional entity, and then sometimes in scripture it's just used as entity altogether, just thing, things, you know, and it means, in that case, whether the thing is changing or unchanging, it refers to all things. So, here you've got a very tricky thing, it says, that thing which is the previous thing, and that thing which is the lack of the thing, okay?

And Geshe-la says, now when they talk about the previous thing, they're talking about the state of mind which overrates, okay? When Bodhisattva level says, that previous thing, it's talking about the state of mind which overrates. And then it says, that thing which doesn't exist, it's talking about the state of mind which is underrating, okay, discounting, okay?

And referring to there, jīnī-ji-yobha-dharmepa means, the two extremes which those two states of mind think they see which don't exist, right? Those two states of mind, one overrating and one discounting, they are both grasping on to something that doesn't exist. So, the actual text of the Bodhisattva level says, those previous things and those non-existent things, the way they are, the existence and the non-existence they think they see, that thing which is free of those two, okay, meaning free of the two extremes, which don't exist at all, right?

So, those two states of minds, things that they think they see, and that other thing which is void or devoid of what those two states of mind think they see, that thing, now there's a third thing, okay? Got it? That thing which is that thing which is devoid of the thing which the former thing thinks it sees and which that other thing thinks it doesn't see, okay?

So, now this is how the tantra ends up, this is the Bodhisattva level. That thing which is the voidness of what the former thing thinks it sees and what the other thing thinks it doesn't see, okay, that thing which is the voidness of those two is the perfect middle way which is free of the two extremes. And he describes it, he talks about nisa-mepa means which is non-dual, free of duality.

Free of what duality? Free of two bubus, okay? Free of two extremes, okay?

Non-duality meaning that object, that non-dual thing, okay? Now you've got it like that. That non-dual thing which is empty of what the one thing thinks it sees and what the other thing thinks it doesn't see, that thing in the middle which is free of those two things, which is therefore non-dual, and that thing which stays in a state of non-duality is the middle way, okay?

That is the ultimate middle way which is free of the two extremes, okay? Whose wording is this? This is Master Asanga, okay?

He's describing the perfect middle way. What? The mind-only perfect middle way, okay?

[Говорящий 2]
That's it. Okay. Okay.

[Говорящий 1]
So it's really beautiful. This is how the mind only gets to their emptiness, right? This is how the mind only gets to emptiness.

If you think about it, that emptiness which stays in the middle, right? Yongru, is free of any gaccha tattva, any ultimate object which we deny exists, right? So this state of mind over on this cliff side, right, is holding to say, if this state of mind is thinking that something is there, a non-existent self-nature is there, okay?

It's believing in the gaccha. It's believing in a self-existent thing which is not there. So this state of mind which is overrating holds to a certain object which is really what emptiness is empty of, the self-nature of things, okay?

So the fact that that thing which this state of mind thinks exists doesn't exist with regard to emptiness is how we avoid the one extreme which is what the state of mind that overrates thinks is there. Then we avoid the other extreme by what? There are certain schools, meaning Madhyamika, Prasangika, who say that nothing exists by definition at all, right?

So things which really do exist don't exist by definition. But the fact that this is devoid of what they say doesn't exist, meaning it does have something that does exist by nature, fulfills its other half. So over here you have the fact that it doesn't have the existence that this state of mind thinks exists, and it does have the existence that this state of mind doesn't think it has.

The thing which is in the middle, which is the non-existence of this, and which is the existence of that thing that was said not to be there, the fact that it does have the existence that these people said it didn't have, the fact that it doesn't have the existence that this state of mind said it did have, That fact, that thing which has both of those qualities, is perfect. Rakti-chala means perfectly defined, perfectly, beautifully laid out emptiness in the state of mind, according to the Mahayana school. That's how we get to nisam-epa means beyond any kind of extremes, meaning free from the two, non-duality.

Non-duality means free of this extreme and free of this extreme. Beautiful, free of the duality of these two extremes. Beautiful, perfect emptiness.

Defined as what you get after, right, left over? What you get after all. Now here's another sense of what you get after all is said and done.

After you've cancelled this one that they said it did have, and after you've established that it does have this thing that they said it didn't have, then you've, what do you got left? Perfect emptiness, according to the mind-only school.

[Говорящий 2]
That's it. That's it.

[Говорящий 1]
That's it, that's it. And, and...

[Говорящий 2]
That's it.

[Говорящий 1]
That's it. Geshe-la says, you know this word about what's left over, right? What's left over.

You know if you think about it, it can apply to either changing things or emptiness, according to the mind-only school. Why? Because it is devoid of what these people say does exist, and it does have, and it's not devoid of what these people say doesn't exist, okay?

That thing which is devoid of what these people say exists, and that thing which is not devoid of what these people say it is devoid of, is exactly in the middle, and that can be described in, if you think about it, what's left over, you can think of as a perfectly established emptiness, according to the mind-only school, but it doesn't hurt also to think of it as what's left over in the sense of a perfect, existing-by-definition changing object, okay? So you can put either one in the middle, he says. In other words, what do you got left over, after all that's said and done, you can apply it both ways.

You can say it's both of those two attributes, okay? So if somebody was going to come up to you and say, what's the definition according to the mind-only school, I'm sure you guys now could give me a perfect description of what's the definition of, you know, how to describe emptiness according to the mind-only school. In fact, I'm so sure we don't even have to ask you about it.

So, I'm sure you would have said, right, if I'd asked you, what is the ultimate description of emptiness according to the mind-only school, I'm sure you would have said, oh, okay, it's those things which are empty of any of the most subtle forms of self-existence, and those things which do exist by definition, the fact that they don't possess or that they are devoid of those very, very subtle forms of self-existence is what it is to be empty in the mind-only school, that extreme of what people said it wasn't devoid of, right? That extreme of it possessing the ultimate object which is denied when we talk about emptiness. The fact that they don't have that, and that they are nice, pretty, whole, existing-by-definition things that you get out after that, that's what the mind-only school is talking about when they talk about emptiness.

I'm sure you would have said that. So, what I've said, if you think about it, it can apply to shenwangs and to yongduns, right? Everything I've said could apply to changing things, and it's also equally true of the other thing that exists by definition, which is emptiness itself, according to the mind-only school.

That's all I have to do today. Arina, are you ready? How's your cold, everybody?