Углублённый курс ACI 04 — Искусство толкования, часть 1 (1998, Билакуппе, Индия), занятие 3

[Говорящий 1]
First I ask you the following question. Is there a contradiction in the wording or not? Forget the meaning.

Is there a contradiction in the wording? Why is it contradictory in the wording? What makes it contradictory in the wording?

He'd like you to repeat the words that you think are contradictory. Could you tell me what he said in the first... Give me any example of what he said in the first turning of the wheel that contradicts any specific example from the second turning of the wheel.

You said, oh, in the wording it's contradictory. Hey, give me some wording from the first one that's contradictory to some kind of wording from the second one. Go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go, go

[Говорящий 2]
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[Говорящий 1]
Everybody, I'm sure you all know, but I'll just repeat a little bit, that we are in the mind only section of the two ways of explaining what is literal and what is figurative. And we looked at a quotation from the Buddha's own explanation of what he meant when he taught the sutras. And so we're in that division now of the two different ways of doing it.

We're in the mind only division. Just to repeat, we started yesterday afternoon from page eight, line six, where it says, ... ...

... There was a very great scholar in Tibet named John Lama, who came before Je Tsongkapa, or contemporary, I think, maybe. But he spent many years studying the question of what was literal and what was figurative.

And then he composed a book called Ngei Deng Gyatso, which means the ocean of the real meaning or the literal meaning. And Geshe-la says that at this point in the text, page eight, line six, that Je Tsongkapa is slightly criticizing a viewpoint of John Lama. John Lama was a very great scholar, especially in Tantra.

Geshe-la says he believes that John Lama was responsible for translating some of the Kalachakra Sanskrit texts into Tibetan. So no doubt he was a great scholar. But on this point, concerning what was literal and what was figurative, on this particular point, Je Tsongkapa is addressing a misperception by John Lama.

And still there are people who are practicing this John Lama. OK. The position expressed by John Lama, which he called the omniscient John Lama, was that when the three versions of the Prajnaparamita, there's a longer version, a medium version, and a shorter version, and when they are talking about those three during the second turning of the wheel, which we call the middle turning of the wheel, then remember that the Buddha was constantly saying things didn't exist by definition, things didn't exist from their own side.

And he said, remember that I've told you that throughout this book now, when they say things have no nature of their own, they're going to be referring to the statement in the middle turning of the wheel where the Buddha said, things don't exist by definition, things don't exist through any characteristics of their own. And so, when John Lama was explaining that or thinking about it, he said, you know, it seems to me that Lord Buddha is saying that, he adds the word ultimately. He says, din-dab-a-long-yi-me-pa means, ultimately nothing has any nature of its own, ultimately nothing exists by definition.

So he says, when the Buddha adds that ultimately, the Buddha is restricting, or the Buddha is saying that it's only what we call the deceptive reality around us, the normal objects around us, that he's talking about when he says things don't have any nature of their own. And John Lama's take on it is that the Buddha wasn't saying that about emptiness itself. So, according to John Lama, emptiness itself wasn't what the Buddha was talking about when the Buddha said nothing had its own nature and nothing exists by definition.

He says, because the Buddha said ultimately, then the Buddha was speaking about the normal objects around us, which we call the deceptive reality, and he wasn't talking about emptiness itself as being something that didn't have any nature of its own. That was John Lama's position. And then, Gentle Cop is addressing that misperception here.

Gentle Cop is telling John Lama, not only are you wrong, you're wrong with regard to both the mind-only position and you're wrong with regard to the Madhyamika, the middle-way position. So either way you take it, even if we just say we're going to stick to the mind-only position, you're still wrong when you say that, and then much less in the middle-way position. So you're wrong on both positions.

Yes, that's right. Yes, that's right. Then, in the next lines where it starts out, ten dampa la gompa yin, minos, and then it says, gondra, all of that means, when you, Jonampa, say that that description that things don't have their own nature, doesn't apply to ultimate reality, you're wrong.

And then, Gentle Cop starts saying, you know, you're wrong according to this scripture, this scripture, this scripture, all mind-only scriptures. So he's saying, you're even wrong just with regard to the mind-only school, much less with regard to the middle-way school. So he says, you contradict Dode Gongdo, which is the Buddha's own explanation of wedding men in the sutras, you contradict the writings of Master Sangha, and you contradict the writings of Master Vasubandhu on these points.

So, you're already in hot water when you say that, even if we're just restricting ourselves to the mind-only school. Then Gentle Cop is going to attack him in this way. He's going to say, let's just stick to the mind-only school, okay?

And you are contradicting the Buddha's explanation of wedding men in the sutras, because you are refusing that the words, they don't have any nature of their own, applies to all three attributes that are taught by the mind-only school. Remember we had three attributes taught by the mind-only school. So he says, you know, don't forget the three attributes.

They are dependency, meaning things that depend on other things, which are the normal objects around us. And then there are nominal stuff. And then there, remember there was, what do you call it?

Total existence or something like that. The third one, remember, referred to emptiness itself. So don't forget that the Buddha, in the second turning of the wheel, said that all three characteristics are empty or don't have any nature of their own.

So the Buddha said about the characteristic called total existence, which refers to emptiness, that it didn't have any nature of its own. So the Buddha, you're contradicting the Buddha's own sutra, where the Buddha says all three characteristics don't have any nature of their own. And one of the characteristics is total existence, which refers to emptiness.

So you're wrong. And Geshe-la says, if you want to see a direct quotation from that sutra, where the Buddha is explaining what he meant in the sutra, you can just turn to page 7. And there's one of those quotations.

And it's down there, about 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 lines from the bottom. And he says, remember he said, Oh, Bodhisattva, and he referred to him in his name. And then he said, things have no nature of having their characteristics.

Things have no nature of having started. And things have no nature of being ultimate. And that third one means the emptiness of things itself doesn't have a nature.

The third attribute of what we call total existence doesn't have a nature of its own. So in that quotation alone, Geshe-la says, on the page before, from that book by the Buddha, he states that emptiness itself doesn't have a nature of its own. So, what are you talking about, Genoa?

We'll get more on that later. I'm just giving you a little brief description of it. But of course it's going to come more later on the same point.

On page 13, the more detailed explanation of this point begins. He's not going to go there now, I don't think, but he just wants you to know that's where it starts. Seven lines from the bottom, on page 13.

And that's a direct quotation from Dorde Gongdel, from the Buddha's explanation of what he meant in the sutras, that says, moreover, the attribute that we call total existence doesn't have any nature of its own either. So that's another quotation directly from Lord Buddha that refutes the idea of jama-ma. The explanation before, that we just talked about before, is the shorter one.

And this is where we consider this the longer one, the more detailed one. And there'll be a more detailed explanation of this point coming up on page 13. I'm just giving you a rough out of this point, and later on you're going to get hit with it big time.

And then when Je Tsongkapa goes on to say, not only do you contradict this sutra where the Buddha explained what he meant in the sutras, you're also contradicting the two brothers, right, which is Master Sangha and Master Vasubandhu. And then Geshe-la says, you know, if you want to see how he contradicts Master Sangha, you can just go back to page 7 and look at the last line, where it says, NAM BZHED DUA SIL BDUR BA This is called Dasamari, and I was just wondering which Dasamari it was, and Master Sangha wrote a couple of Dasamaris. He says he thinks it's a certain one.

And then it says, So here's Master Asanga saying, remember what he said yesterday? He said what did the Buddha mean? If you ask me, you know, if you come and ask me what did the Buddha mean when he said that no existing phenomenon has any nature of its own, Mepa, I'll tell you, you know, what is it?

Due to the needs of the disciples, the Buddha taught three lacks of self-existence and self-nature. And he said that three different things don't have any self-nature. As you know, he's referring to the three characteristics or attributes of the Minoli school.

As you know, total existence is in there. And as you know, total existence refers to emptiness. So the Buddha said, according to Master Asanga, that emptiness doesn't have its own nature.

So, you contradict Master Asanga right there? You're also contradicting Master Vasubandhu. You can get a quotation on page 8, line 3, from his 30 verses, where he says, look, what did the Buddha have in mind when he said there wasn't any nature?

He had in mind that there wasn't any of those three natures, meaning the self-existent nature of the three attributes. As you know, one of the attributes is emptiness. And so you're also contradicting Master Vasubandhu.

So there's a proof that you're contradicting the Buddha, Master Asanga, and Master Vasubandhu. So, we've demonstrated quite thoroughly that you contradict the entire teachings of the Minoli school, and we've finished that. Now let's go on to the Middle Way school.

Let's So, this is a no-brainer. In the Middle Turning of the Wheel, the Buddha directly said, everything... this is my Dhammika people speaking, right?

He said directly, everything from physical matter on up to everything, doesn't have any nature of its own. Whether you say it doesn't exist by definition, or whether you say it doesn't exist ultimately by definition, it all boils down to the same thing. And when you say all existing phenomena, starting with physical matter on up to everything else, of course emptiness itself is in there.

So you contradict the Madhyamika schools also when you say that the Buddha didn't mean to say that emptiness itself didn't have an ultimate nature. So, you contradict the Madhyamika schools also when you say that the Buddha didn't mean to say that emptiness itself didn't have an ultimate nature. So you contradict the Madhyamika schools also when you say that emptiness itself didn't have an ultimate nature.

So you contradict the Madhyamika schools also when you say that emptiness itself didn't have an ultimate nature. So you contradict the Madhyamika schools also when you say that emptiness itself didn't have an ultimate nature. So you contradict the Madhyamika schools also when you say that emptiness itself didn't have an ultimate nature.

So you contradict the Madhyamika schools also when you say that emptiness itself didn't have an ultimate nature. So you contradict the Madhyamika schools also when you say that emptiness itself didn't have an ultimate nature. So you contradict the Madhyamika schools also when you say that emptiness itself didn't have an ultimate nature.

So you contradict the Madhyamika schools also when you say that emptiness itself didn't have an ultimate nature. So you contradict the Madhyamika schools also when you say that emptiness itself didn't have an ultimate nature. We're talking about page eight, six lines from the bottom, and there begins a discussion of how did the Buddha teach that nothing had a nature of its own in the second turning of the wheel, in the middle turning of the wheel.

And he could have gone through all the categories of everything that existed. He could have gone through every single category of all the things that exist in the universe and say, this doesn't exist by definition, this doesn't exist by definition, this doesn't have a nature of its own, this doesn't have a nature of its own, and he could have gone through all the different classifications of all the things that exist in the world. There's no time to do that.

He couldn't sit there and go through everything that existed in the universe and say about each thing, describe about each thing how it didn't have any nature of its own. So, tab kepa cene, with skillful means, the Buddha chose to classify everything into three groups. If you could say, this group, group number one, group number two, group number three, they don't have any nature of their own, then that would be a very skillful way by Lord Buddha to summarize every existing object, and he wouldn't have to go into the lack of self-nature of every existing object.

So, in a very skillful way, Lord Buddha has chosen or described these three attributes, which means things that depend on the power of other things, what we call total existence or empty things, and then all the other unchanging things, which refers to what we call nominal stuff. So, very skillfully, the Buddha has chosen these three categories or these three attributes and has demonstrated that each of these three doesn't have their own nature, and that gets him out of having to spend his whole eternity trying to explain the emptiness of every single object in the universe. You know, for example, if we wanted to go about proving that there wasn't any human being in the world that didn't have a mind, okay?

So, you know, we could go to America and pick out people one by one and stand them in line. We stand in line, you know, and pick the first guy out. You stand here, you know.

Look, this guy is not a person that doesn't have a mind. He's a person that doesn't have a mind. Okay, now you go.

Now, the second guy comes, and you prove that that guy has a mind, you know, and you say, look, he's not a person that doesn't have a mind. And you say, okay, and then you could go through the whole population of the United States that way. It would be a little inconvenient.

And then you'd have to do Tibet, and then you'd have to do India, for example. So, it would be like these three nations of people that you have to go one by one through the room and demonstrate that each guy is such that they don't not have a mind, right? But it would be a lot easier just to sit there and say, nobody among the whole American population doesn't have a mind.

Nobody among the Indian population doesn't have a mind. Nobody among the Tibetan population doesn't have a mind. And in this way, with three simple phrases, the population of America, the population of Tibet, the population of India, you can cover all the existing human beings of those three countries.

And then you say about those three, none of them is such that they don't have a mind, to prove that they all do have a mind. So, it's the same thing with proving that things don't have any nature of their own. You can just say, look, those three categories of things, okay, things that depend on others, things that are empty, and then things that are, what do you call them, nominal stuff, right?

You can just divide it into these three categories and say, everything in those three categories or nothing in those three categories has any nature of its own. You've covered everything. So, it's a very similar example.

So, you know, we can just summarize it in a very simple way. Don't forget that we are in the mind-only school. We're talking about the from-the-mind-only viewpoint.

During the second turning of the wheel, the Buddha was speaking about the emptiness of three different, or the lack of self-nature of three different categories. And in there, is there a category of emptiness? And did the Buddha teach, do you guys think, that emptiness itself didn't have any nature of its own?

Of course. Let's hear an answer here.

[Говорящий 2]
Okay.

[Говорящий 1]
And as you guys can easily grasp, in the mind-only, I'm sorry, in the middle-way school, they just say, look, in the second turning of the wheel, Buddha said everything from physical matter up to everything is such that it doesn't have its own nature. So, automatically you get emptiness covered in there. And obviously the Buddha taught that.

He said all existing phenomena, emptiness is going to be included in there. There's no big deal about the mind-only school believing that the Buddha did teach that emptiness itself doesn't have a self-nature. Okay.

Yes, that's true. So the Buddha, you know, we say the Buddha, in the second turning of the wheel, went through a bunch of different categories. He did describe a lot of categories.

He went through like 108 different categories. He spoke about 18 distinct different kinds of emptiness. And so he did go through all these categories.

He did speak all of that. Obviously, if he talked about 108 different kinds of existing phenomena, and obviously if he treated 18 different kinds of emptiness, then I guess he was talking about emptiness when he described that things didn't have a self-nature. So, I can't imagine who, with any kind of brain, would say that emptiness itself was such that it didn't have a nature of its own.

And Geshe-la says, you know, we just proved that everybody had a brain. But Geshe-la Kappa is saying here that anybody with a brain could understand that. He seems to be implying that Je Tsongkapa maybe didn't have a brain.

But we have to agree that Je Tsongkapa did have a brain. So, probably when he said anyone with a brain could understand that, he was probably meaning that he didn't have the brains to think about this when he was talking like that. Okay.

There's a new expression going around the monastery nowadays called... sam-me means like no spinal cord, or no brain matter, no gray matter. They call them grayless, meaning no gray matter.

But, you know, it's not really literal. You know, people do have some gray matter. There's a lot of new expressions coming around the monastery, especially, you know, people come from Tibet.

New refugees come to Tibet, and they don't know any Hindi yet. So, you know, people are talking about them. They use Hindi nicknames for them.

And one is kaccha. Kaccha means ganses. That means like a fruit that's not ripe yet.

Meaning they're tender, what do you call it, tender feet, newcomers. So they call them, oh, hey, kaccha, kaccha, kaccha. And they don't know what language it is, and they don't know what it means.

But that's how you get, you know, new words floating around the monastery. It's kind of like that. Brainless, grayless, nothing.

Just joking. Now we're going to get to the seventh line from the bottom of page nine, which is a new category. It's category number two, which says a more detailed explanation.

And here, although the subject matter and the points are going to be the same as before, there's going to be a little more detail on them now. Yes, that's right. You know, in the actual quotation from the sutra where the Buddha explains his own sutras, the intent of his own sutras, he doesn't really give the name of the three attributes that the Mainomi school follows very clearly.

He just says there's no nature to the characteristics of things, there's no nature to the beginning of things, and there's no nature to ultimate, to the ultimate. That's all he says. He doesn't clearly state what it is that doesn't have a characteristic, how it is they don't have a characteristic, what it is that doesn't start, how it doesn't start.

He doesn't get into that. So Je Tsongkhapa's point here in this next section is how do we explain the actual wording, which is kind of obscure, where the Buddha says things don't have any characteristics, things don't have any beginning or starting, and things don't have any ultimate. There's no ultimate.

Those three things don't have any nature of their own, which is actually referring to the three attributes of the Mainomi school, but he doesn't use that exact wording. So Je Tsongkhapa's going to go through and explain to you, particularly in the first case, what is it that doesn't have a characteristic, how is it that it doesn't have a characteristic. So he's going to go into that detail now.

He says, actually, Lord Buddha himself, later on in his own sutra, explains what he meant by those three expressions. So the sutra itself is brief in the case that we already had, and the sutra itself is going to help explain what the sutra meant further down in the sutra itself. So now we're going to get sort of a longer explanation, not only by Je Tsongkhapa, but in the sutra itself.

So if you think about it, we're going to go now into two different discussions. One is going to be the sutra itself, explaining in more detail what the sutra itself said. And then you're going to have Je Tsongkhapa, based on that explanation by the sutra, giving you a further clarification of what the sutra means when it explains in more detail what the sutra meant when it was...

when it made those briefer statements. I left something out on that last explanation, and I want to go back and just insert something here. It's very characteristic of the way that Je Tsongkapa approached his writing and his teaching.

When he wanted to... if you and I were going to try to refute the ideas of a person that was living in our time or around these days, we would say, so-and-so, living in such-and-such a country, at such-and-such an address, whose name is like such-and-such, has got this stupid idea, and then we would say, he's wrong on that, he's wrong on that, he's wrong on that, he's really stupid, I'm really great, I got this really good idea, here's what I think, and it would be a very personal confrontation, in a sense. But Je Tsongkapa, he says, Je Tsongkapa's style wasn't like that.

How does he treat the omniscient... he's called the omniscient... I hear you speak it six times, ten times, you know.

And Je Tsongkapa doesn't approach things like that. He doesn't say, oh, the omniscient Je Tsongkapa thinks that. He says, well, you know, a couple of people have expressed the idea that, you know, blah, blah, blah, and then he undertakes to tear it apart.

But he doesn't directly state in this text that he's talking about the omniscient Je Tsongkapa. He's just saying, well, you know, some people say that, and that's very much Je Tsongkapa's style. He does not attack the person he's attacking the idea, and then saying, well, you know, some people are saying that, you know, like that.

There are really two reasons why Je Tsongkapa doesn't choose to name the person whose idea he's attacking. The first reason why Je Tsongkapa doesn't choose to name the person whose idea he's attacking is because he doesn't want to be attacked by the omniscient Je Tsongkapa. The first reason why Je Tsongkapa doesn't choose to name the person who has these ideas directly is an indication that Je Tsongkapa himself possesses the three fine spiritual qualities that we call wisdom, holiness, and purity.

And it's to indicate particularly that he has the second quality which is called holiness, meaning he doesn't want to get into... He wants to avoid the implication that he is this big guy and the other guy is this little guy and that he is this great scholar and the other guy doesn't know anything and that he's up here and he's down there. Out of respect for his morality, out of respect for his own morality, he doesn't want to get into a situation where he's putting himself up and putting the other guy down.

He wants to avoid that. So the first reason why Je Tsongkapa doesn't name the other person is that he wants to stick to his vows. And his vows require him not to get into a situation where he's criticizing or talking down to somebody.

This is an indication of Je Tsongkapa's moral purity, what do you call it, holiness really, into them. The second reason why Je Tsongkapa doesn't mention Amnishen Jonangwa by name is that he wants to acknowledge that the spread of Buddhism in Tibet is due entirely to the kindness of these great lamas who came before. Amnishen Jonangwa is an example of one of those great lamas who came before Je Tsongkapa and helped spread Buddhism throughout Tibet.

If you look at a person's spiritual life, you can divide it into their worldview and into their activities. And from the point of view of their activities, meaning their bodhicitta, their feelings of renunciation, their compassion for others, that Amnishen Jonangwa and other lamas who have come before Je Tsongkapa had perfect love, perfect compassion. They were incredible bodhisattvas.

And so Je Tsongkapa doesn't want to in any way imply that they didn't make some incredible, extraordinary, beautiful contribution to the spread of Buddhism in Tibet. He doesn't want to say anything to them. He doesn't want to name them directly because he doesn't want anyone to think that he doesn't appreciate or that he doesn't understand how much their love and compassion and teachings on bodhicitta have caused the spread of Buddhism in Tibet.

But on the other hand, from the point of view of their worldview, how they understood emptiness, how they understood those subjects, he says, Je Tsongkapa's mission was to clarify things that they actually didn't quite grasp correctly. So he's not attacking Amnishen Jonangwa directly by name for that reason. But he is trying with great effort to clarify the view, the worldview, especially the understanding of emptiness of these lamas who came before, that it wasn't very clear or it wasn't expressed very clearly about emptiness.

And that's his mission. So that's another second reason why he doesn't mention the Amnishen Jonangwa by name. That was a little digression and now we're jumping forward again.

So don't think I'm... Now I'm going to jump to the other subject, so don't think that what I just said is part of the new subject. Listen, listen.

We're at the fourth line from the bottom of page nine. Je Tsongkapa is going to explain what the Buddha meant when he spoke about the first group of things that didn't have any nature of its own. If you remember, the Tibetan word can mean either definition or characteristic.

So when the Buddha said, nothing has any nature of having any characteristics of its own, what did Lord Buddha mean? He's referring, of course, to the first attribute or category described by the Maitreya School. So the Buddha himself, in the sutra where he explains what he meant when he taught the sutras, says...

Now, he goes on, after saying that things don't have any nature, don't have any characteristic of their own, he goes on to say, and what did I mean when I said that things didn't have any nature, didn't have any characteristics of their own? When I talk about characteristics or by definition, the word that I'm referring to is kundaka, meaning we've been translating it as nominal stuff, things which are just nominal. Remember it refers to unchanging things after you take out emptiness.

Okay. So now that we know what it was he was talking about when he said that things didn't have any characteristics, any nature of having any characteristics, and now that we know that he was talking about the fact that things which are nominal don't have any nature of their own, now that we've established the thing it is that doesn't have any nature of its own, when you talk about characteristics not having any nature of their own, now we can go on to explain how it is that they don't have any nature of their own, and we're going to do so in two modes. There'll be the negative mode where we're trying to refute something about it, or we're trying to prove something that it doesn't have or something that's not true about it, and then we'll go into a positive mode where we try to establish something about it in a positive way.

So here goes the sutra explaining why things don't have any nature of having any characteristics of their own, which refers to nominal stuff. First we'll talk about what he means in a negative way, and then we'll talk about what he means in a positive way. Now, out of the negative one and the positive one, he actually treats the positive one first.

So he says, what is the nature of things that are nominal, meaning in the mind-only school referring to things which are unchanging but are not right, it refers to the things which are only established through imagination, only established through mental pictures. So things which are established that way, we can say they don't... when we say things that are nominal, things that have characteristics or don't have some characteristics, we're talking about things that are imaginary or things that mainly depend on us picturing them.

That's right. And now comes the negative side where Lord Buddha says, okay, from a positive standpoint, these things exist through conceptualization, let's say, but these things don't exist through any nature of their own or by definition. So he's going on to say that.

So we finish the positive way to say it is, these things exist through some kind of conceptualization. The negative way to say it is that these things don't have any nature of their own or any... they don't exist by definition.

So here Lord Buddha has, for the first time, used the actual wording, don't exist by definition. Before he just said by their own characteristic or something. So here he's used the actual word, they don't exist by definition.

Okay. So if we express this, we go back to, you know, elementary logic, Tag-Rig. And so, I mean, it's good for you guys because you're studying this here.

So he says, we'll go back, we'll make a classical logical statement, and I'll express it that way. So we say, what's the Chöchen? It's the kundak-chöchen, meaning nominal stuff.

Let's take the things that are called nominal. They are what the Buddha referred to in the brief section as things that don't have any nature of their own with regard to their characteristics because, and now we get the tayang dak, the correct reason. And then the correct reason is going to be divided into a positive half and a negative half because they are only creations of our concepts, A, in a positive way, and then B, because they don't have any nature of their own by definition.

And that would be the negative expression of that. So that would be, in a logical statement, you'd say, consider all nominal stuff, it doesn't have what the Buddha said, any nature of having characteristics, why? Because A, they are products of our concepts, and B, they are not such that they exist by definition.

So, tan jik chik chela, and the Tsojokpong Rinpoche, tan jik chik chela, he's talking about the ten years, ten years of his life, he's talking about the ninja nibbana. Ninja nibbana, yes. And then from the second line of page ten, Je Tsongkapa is undertaking to give an explanation of the Buddha's own detailed explanation of what he meant.

So now we're getting Je Tsongkapa's take on the Buddha's explanation of what he meant in the very brief frame. So now, this is Je Tsongkapa's explanation, which is kind of a more detailed explanation of what the Buddha meant when he gave that positive explanation and then that negative explanation. So Je Tsongkapa says, why is it that the Buddha says that nothing has any nature of having characteristics of its own?

He says, in reply to that question, what Buddha is saying, what I meant when I said that was, from a negative point of view, nothing exists by definition, nothing exists to its own characteristics. And from a positive point of view, all things are just creations of your labels and your concepts. And that's what the Buddha is saying here.

Je Tsongkapa says, the first two lines are teaching that. Now, we've got to go back and find those first two lines, okay? When Je Tsongkapa, on page 10, line 2 at the end, says, the first two lines, dot, dot, dot, he's referring to page 9, third line from the bottom, where the Buddha himself says, what do I mean when I say that nothing has any nature of having any characteristics of its own?

I'll tell you what I mean. I mean that those things which only exist nominally don't have any characteristics of their own and don't exist by definition. So those are the two lines that Je Tsongkapa's talking about when he says, by the way, the meaning of the first two lines can be explained in a positive way, a negative way, and he goes into that explanation.

These are a question posed to the, you know, it's a rhetorical question by the Buddha and an answer by the Buddha, in which he indicates that that category accepted by the minority school called things that exist nominally is explained as having no nature by definition, or not having any nature of its own. Okay. So Je Tsongkapa is reporting a second rhetorical question by the Buddha on page 10, line 4, where he says, now why would that be true?

Okay, so you've got to jump back to page 9, where you have the second line from the bottom, where the Buddha himself is saying, now why would that be the case? And then the Buddha himself goes on to explain why that would be the case in a positive way and in a negative way. So Je Tsongkapa, reporting the second rhetorical question, begins on page 10, line 4, to say, well, here's what the Buddha, here's the second rhetorical question where the Buddha says, now why would I say that?

And then the Buddha goes on to explain in a positive way and a negative way why he would say that, what, nominal things don't have any nature of their own, okay, and are creations of our concepts. So in a positive way and a negative way. So this is now the second rhetorical question Je Tsongkapa is going to clarify for us.

Okay. Now what they mean when they say things are a creation of your concepts or labels or something like that, and what they mean when they say things don't exist by definition, we're going to get into that in a lot more detail in the next few days. Okay.

Okay. Okay. The next line, which is page 10, line 6 at the end, says, this opening of your eyes towards the true meaning of the sutra, and what that means is Je Tsongkapa's clarification of what the sutra means in the two rhetorical questions in the sutra.

In the latter two, in the two which are to come, you can also apply this explanation of that statement in the sutra to the latter two which are to come. What are the latter two which are to come? The other two attributes of the mind-only school.

So they're going to apply these two rhetorical questions to the explanation of what it means to be dependent and what it means to be, I think we're going to get, yongdrup, which means the emptiness of things, right? So Je Tsongkapa says, I opened your eyes right here to the meaning of these two rhetorical questions. Now you take that understanding, and don't forget to take it with you when we go down to the other two attributes of the mind-only school, and it'll help you a lot when you get down there.

Okay. Now, the next section is very cool. Je Tsongkapa is going to go into the point where, you know, the mind-only school says that things don't exist by definition.

And the Madhyamika, the higher schools also say, especially Prasangika, say that things don't exist by definition. What do they mean when they say that things don't exist by definition? The wording is the same.

When a mind-only person will say that things don't exist by definition, a middle-weight person will say that things don't exist by definition. But what they mean is totally different. You know, what those words mean to the mind-only people and what those words mean to the middle-weight people is completely different.

So Je Tsongkapa, in the section immediately to follow, is going to clarify the distinction between what those two, the members of those two schools mean when they both say the same thing, that things don't exist by definition. Je Tsongkapa is going to clarify the distinction between what those two, the members of those two schools mean when they both say the same thing, that things don't exist by definition. So Je Tsongkapa is going to clarify the distinction between what those two, the members of those two schools mean when they both say the same thing, that things don't exist by definition.

Je Tsongkapa is going to clarify the distinction between what those two, the members of those two schools mean when they both say the same thing, that things don't exist by definition. Je Tsongkapa is going to clarify the distinction between what those two, the members of those two schools mean when they both say the same thing, that things don't exist by definition. So you have this difficult expression in the Sutra where it says things don't have their own characteristics, things don't have a nature of having characteristics.

And now we've explained it as meaning things don't have a nature of existing by definition or through their own characteristics. So what do they mean when they say that? In the mind-only school, they're saying that whether something exists through its own characteristics or by definition or not, refers to the question of whether or not they are simply constructs of our concepts or not.

Are they simply constructs of our mind or are they not simply constructs of our mind? If they are simply constructs of our mind, they don't exist by definition. They don't exist to their own characteristics, to their own nature.

And if they are not simply concepts of our mind, then they do have some existence through their own nature or by definition. That's what a mind-only person means. That's how they draw the line between whether or not something exists by definition or whether or not something exists through its own characteristics.

That's what they mean. Is it or is it not simply a construct of our mind? If it is simply a construct of our mind, then it doesn't exist by definition or through its own characteristics.

If it is not a construct of our mind, then it does exist by definition or through its own characteristics. Yes. The expression in Tibetan for existing nominally or this just exists as a concept or something like that is actually two different elements.

It says ming dang de shakpa means established by use of labels and terms. So you have to remember those two words. In the mind-only school, when they say it's nominal, they're talking about that it's established through the use of labels and terms.

And those each have their own special meaning. When you say it exists through labels, the word label refers to its actual name. So in the case of a water pitcher or something, it would be the word or the sound, the name, water pitcher, pitcher.

But then when in your mind you think this is a pitcher or you picture it as a pitcher and you think of it as a pitcher and you have a mental image of it as a pitcher, that process is called term here. So when you say nominal means exists through names and terms, name refers to its physical name, the name that people use for it, and then term refers to the conceptualization of it as a vase or thinking of it as a vase or mental picture of it as a vase. Ha ha ha ha!

Ha ha ha ha! So remember that we're in the mind-only school and they're talking about the meaning... when you say that things don't exist by definition means that they are simply constructs of your mind, labels and terms, right?

But when you say that, don't forget that just because you've labeled and termed something doesn't mean that it necessarily exists, okay? There are lots of things that you can imagine that don't exist. So there are things that you can imagine that do exist and there are things that you can imagine that don't exist and we have to draw a distinction between them.

For example, we could take, he says, a rabbit's horns. And he says, well, maybe that's not such a good example because, you know, Geshe Lothar came over and showed me a postcard from America one day of a jackrabbit with these horns on it and so I'm not sure if they exist in America or not. Maybe they do.

Maybe that's not such a good example to take, you know. We better stick to something more clearly non-existent, like... How about a flower that grows in mid-air without any dirt, no water, no nothing, you know, just grows like here, and he says, no, that's not really a very concrete example.

Let's look around and find something. How about these glasses, you know? The fact that I'm holding in my hand glasses which are made of gold, okay?

The glasses, the eyeglasses in my hand are made of gold, okay? So when I say that, I'm applying a label to that. I'm saying, glasses made of gold.

There's a name, right? There's a word. There's a name there.

Now, how about a term? The term comes shortly after that. You know, I say, glasses made of gold, and in your mind pops up this thing of, you know, glasses that are shining with yellow metal and things like that, and then already you've got a term.

So you've got a label and a term, and you've got a word and a thought and a concept about it, but that doesn't mean that the thing, that they do exist, eyeglasses made of gold in my room, okay? So, you can imagine something, you can label something, you can construct something mentally, but remember that that doesn't necessarily mean that it exists, okay? You might think to yourself, only a crazy man would start talking about golden glasses, but, you know, I'm just trying to give you an example, okay?

Absolutely, it didn't exist. So, Je Tsongkhapa is trying to point out here that the whole point right here, just this last point with that, just because you can imagine something doesn't mean it exists. You have to draw a distinction between things that you imagine which do exist and things you can imagine that don't exist.

So, things which are constructs of names and thoughts, right, meaning labels and terms, can be divided into those which exist and those which don't exist. Existing being what the mind-only school is talking about when they say nominal stuff, and then nonexisting examples being my golden glasses, and things like that, which don't really exist. Yes, sir.

So, don't forget that when we talk about nominal stuff, that whether you're a middle-way person or whether you're a mind-only person, you're still going to accept that it doesn't exist by definition. Still you're going to say this is only a construct of... I shouldn't go that way.

Still you're going to say that it doesn't exist by definition. But don't forget that they mean totally different things when they talk about something not existing by definition. When they say that things are constructs of names and terms, labels and terms, meaning words and thoughts, when they say that things are constructs, what the mind-only school means when they say things are constructs of words and thoughts, and what the middle-way people say when they say things are constructs of words and thoughts, those two things are totally different.

What they mean when they say that, when they give it that positive expression, things are just constructs of your mind and thoughts, they have a totally different meaning in mind when they use those words. Therefore, when they're talking about the lack of that, or when they're talking about that things don't exist by definition, they have, again, a totally different meaning. So there's a totally different and contradictory, clashing idea of what it means when we say things don't exist by definition, because there's a totally different idea of what we mean when we say things are constructs, what it means to be a thing by virtue of a construct.

If you say things are constructs, This is getting a little tough, OK? Okay, where both schools are talking about the same objects, remember, they're talking about what we call nominal stuff, okay, they're both referring to what the mind-only school describes as nominal stuff. And the point that Je Tsongkhapa wants to make next is that when you look upon nominal stuff as a mind-only school and try to think of it as existing by definition, then you are automatically thinking of it as existing by definition in the way that the Madhyamika school explains existing by definition.

So I'll say it again, when you're in the mind-only school and you're looking at this nominal stuff and you're saying, I wonder what it would be to look at it as if it existed by definition, you are automatically then also looking at it as existing by definition in the way that that expression is used by the Middle Way school. But, okay, if you get into a formal debate about this in the debate ground, you get into a big hassle, okay? So I have a question to ask you, okay?

Now, don't forget we're sticking to the mind-only school, okay? And when you're in the mind-only school and take anything that's a nominal, let's take nominal stuff itself for example, okay? Nominal stuff and you're focusing on nominal stuff and you're thinking of it as existing by definition, okay?

You're trying to think of it as if it were existing by definition. Is that a good state of mind or a bad state of mind? Is that a good perception or a bad perception, to see nominal stuff as existing by definition in the mind-only school?

So, we agree, do you think it's a bad state of mind? You know, it's a wrong state of mind. I just want to check, are you all a single mind-stream or do you have separate mind-streams?

Because if you have separate mind-streams, I would expect everyone to, you know, give a slightly different answer, or everyone to give an answer, but if it's just one person giving an answer, I guess I have to assume that everybody here has a single mind-stream. Let's hear an answer, guys. You're right when you say that in both schools, it's wrong to think of nominal stuff as existing by definition, and now you've jumped to my second question already.

You're really good because you covered two of my questions at once before I got to the second one. I asked you whether I had teeth or not, and you answered me, yeah, you have teeth and hair. You're right, I have teeth and hair, but I don't have hair, and I don't have teeth.

I don't have hair, and I don't have teeth. And he doesn't want you to take any offense. It's like you're giving him two answers, which is good.

And I think about Tibetans, they like the Dharma so much that if they get a chance to go to two classes, right one after the other, back to back, that they'll definitely agree, they'll say, oh yeah, I'll go to both. And then you say, would you like to have a meal right after you've already had a meal? Would you like to come to both?

They get embarrassed, You know, they say, well, you know, I really shouldn't eat twice, right at one after the other. But, and you Americans look like you're the same. You know, you have great faith in the Dharma, and you look like you could take back-to-back classes, and you'd still come back for more.

And so I'm glad to see that you're coming back for more on the question, too. Looks like, based on that, I have to say you must have a lot of faith in the Dharma, because you like back-to-back. I could guess how you were going to answer, even before I asked the question, you guys in general that, you know, you seem to be very interested, and when I ask a question, I'd like to get more answers as good.

retain the Middle Way and the Mind-Only School. On this question, why does it mean for a thing to exist by definition? What do we mean when we say that a thing exists by definition?

If we go to the Prasangika, the consequences, the school, the higher school of the Middle Way, the higher school of the Middle Way says that, when we examine something to determine and whether or not it exists by definition. We try to find, take any object, let's take a person for example, okay? There's two kinds of ways of looking at a person.

You can just leave it and not think about his parts or trying to find the real person there or something like that. Just leave it. Leave it alone.

Don't think about where is this person really. There's somebody standing there, somebody's walking, somebody's eating lunch, somebody's doing all these things. If you just leave it like that, there's a person there and you can't deny it.

There's a person there, they're doing something, okay? But if you really look into it and you try to examine where is the person? Is the person in their finger?

Is the person their finger? Is the person their hand? Is the person their body?

Is the person eating one part or the parts all together or something like that? If you really tear it apart and go looking for the person in any of the parts, for example, the person, and you keep checking, checking, checking to find where is the thing that I give the name person? Where is the object that I give the name and the idea of person?

If you go into the parts, if you analyze, if you rip it apart, you'll get kind of lost in it. You won't find any person. So you get this sort of feeling of loss or something.

You're looking for a person and you really can't find any clear person when you go digging into the person. And that fact that when you go digging into and looking for the person in the parts of the person and wandering around checking for the person, the fact that you don't find any person is an indication that person doesn't exist by definition. If you could then find a person, you know, digging around in the parts, examining, not just satisfied to say, oh, he's getting up, he's walking, he's eating, he's doing it.

But if you really go in and try to find the person in all the parts of the person, if you were then to find a person, that would be a person that existed by definition. And that's what the Middle Way School means when they say a person doesn't exist by definition. Because if you found something then, that would be a person that did exist by definition.

Now the Mind-Only School has a totally different idea. They say if you wander around looking for the person, you'd better find something that's the person. You'd better find something that we call the person.

When you go digging into the person, is the person in their hand, is the person in their parts, where is the person, you'd better find something. Because if you don't then there's no person. And when you find something, that person, that's what it means to say, rangasena yadubha, that's not what they mean.

They say you'd better find that it exists by definition when you're looking for a person. But remember before we were talking about normal things, now we're talking about people, which are not normal things. But when you go looking for a person as a person, you'd better find something.

And when you find it, that's existing by definition. They have a totally different idea. So the Middle Way School says when you don't find anything, then you've established that it doesn't exist by definition.

The Mind-Only School says you'd better find something when you go looking, and that does exist by definition. So a totally different idea of what it means. How does the text on it say so?

In name only. The same expression, but not... Mind-Only believes that when you look for a person in their parts, you'd better find something, and you will find something, and in that sense they do exist.

The Mighty Miga says when you go looking for the person in their parts, you won't find anything, and that's what it means to not exist by definition. You better right now stop and get that clear in your mind very carefully, because you can't forget it and you're going to need it later. The Mind-Only School, when they say something doesn't exist by definition, what they mean is, when you go looking for the thing which is given the name person, and you go looking for that thing which is given the name person among all the parts of the person, you're not going to find the person, and that's what it means not to exist by definition.

So you have to get that clear in your mind. When they say something doesn't exist by definition, what they mean is, when you go looking for the thing which we call person among the parts of the person and elsewhere, and you don't find anything, that means it doesn't exist by definition. If you did find something which is impossible, that would exist by definition.

Don't forget, that's what the... you've got to fix that in your mind at this point in the class, that that's what the Middle Way School thinks when they say something does or doesn't exist by definition. Now we go to the Mind-Only School's meaning, or idea of what you mean when you say something exists by definition or something doesn't exist by definition, which is totally different.

... Now when something exists by definition, right, in the Mind-Only School, which they say things do, some things do, it means that it is not just a product of our conceptions, it is not just a product of our conceptualization, but rather, from the object's own side, it has some real existence, it has some definitive existence from its own side, without my thinking about it in a certain way. And to them, that means the thing exists by definition, and that means in their thinking, this makes something almost real.

This means that it has some reality. It's got some reality from its own side, it's not totally dependent on my thinking of it in a certain way, and that's what it means to exist by definition. They don't say that nothing exists by definition.

They say that many things do exist by definition, and existing by definition means it's not just a product of my concept, it's not just a product of my mind, it has some true existence from its own side. So what does it mean when we say, this object has its own unique way of existing, it is existing from its own side, in its own unique way, and that's a description of any particular object. Oh, what?

It's not just I made it up with my mind. It has some particular existence of it being that particular object, right? It has its own unique way of being, that it's coming from its own side.

What do they mean when they say it has some unique way of being from its own side? It has, from its own side, some way of being. It's not just a product of my concept.

What does the mind-only school mean when they say it has some unique way of being from its own side? It has some true reality from its own side. First of all, what they mean is, it has its own causes.

It has been produced from its own causes. That's one way of describing what the mind-only school means when they say objects have some true existence from their own side, of their own. Okay?

What the first thing they mean is that, for example, if it has come from its own causes, clearly comes produced by other causes, then that thing has some unique way of being of its own. And then there's a second way of describing what it means when the mind-only school says that this object has some unique existence from its own side, and that is, it has some is-ness, it has some own characteristic-ness, it has some own true reality of its own, it has some kind of true nature of its own, it has some kind of unique identity of its own. And so that's the second meaning they have when they say it exists from its own side or it has some unique being from its own way.

So remember the two different kinds of unique way of being from its own side. First one meaning, in the mind-only school, right, that it is coming or it has been produced by its particular causes. That is a unique way of being.

Second unique way of being is that it has some side of its own identity or of its own real nature, of its own reality, its own unique quality of its own. And those are the two ways in which the mind-only school thinks that something must have its own unique way of being from its own side. I've got a question for you guys.

We're in the mind-only school. Mind-only school takes all existing phenomena and groups it into certain groups. How many groups then?

It's a pity that only one person can answer. It makes me think again that you all have only one mind-stream. In Tibetan class, everyone answers like as one.

I go, three! You don't have to yell because you probably get a sore throat. But anyway, try to all answer at once.

If not all at once, then slowly each person answer. I'm pretty close to the time. I guess everyone agrees that it's three.

Now, careful question, and I want a good answer from you all, okay? You go into those three groups. Take your mind into those...go through those three groups mentally. Try to pick out the group or groups that would involve things which come from their own causes. Tell me how many groups involve things that are coming from their own causes. Remember we talked about its unique nature meaning coming from its own causes.

How many groups are there that involve stuff that comes from its own causes? And what is the name of that group? You can answer in English and you don't have to answer in Tibetan.

So you got one. Any more? Okay, so you've covered my first half of my description of something having a unique nature coming from its own side, right?

Which was, did it come from its causes? So I admit you covered that pretty well. Now take your mind back to those three groups and tell me if there's any objects which seem to have a unique identity of their own, or a unique identity coming from their own side.

Are there any things in those three groups that involve things which have a unique special identity coming from their own side? How many, how many, how many? First decide whether or not there are any in those groups and then how many of those things, you know, how many groups involve things that have a unique nature that's coming from their own side.

Now I want to change my description of what it means to have its own nature or its own identity or its own way of being. Let's say if I, what happens if I restrict it to some kind of ultimate way of being, some kind of tip-top way of being, some kind of highest way of being. How many of the things in those three categories have some kind of ultimate way of being, some kind of ultimate identity?

How many of the things in those three categories have some kind of ultimate way of being, some kind of highest way of being? So I think there must have been somebody that came with you who believes the same thing that if you ask them, do you want to come to dinner, they'd say, no, I don't feel like right now, but he said he wanted to come to the Dharma class, and they would run to the Dharma class, so... Karanda, payu chibu chibu ne yata ne.

You seem to be... Maybe we've got another Tibetan here, not just an American. That's what he's saying.

The kind of person that would run to a Dharma class and say, I don't have time for dinner. You sound like Mike Paisano. From the same place.

Anyway, chikgyo ne sumidu. Now, take your mind through those three categories again. Go through them and tell me which of them exist by definition, or in which of those three categories are stuff or things that exist by definition.

So don't forget now, stick it in your mind, okay? Remember. Oh, he says, no, you better correct it here.

Stick it in your mind, okay? Remember what it is when you're in the mind only school and you think, you say, things do have a definitive nature, they do exist by definition. Remember what it means.

It means they are not simply constructs of my mind. They have some unique way of existing that comes from their own side. And never forget, okay, keep that in your mind.

You have to remember that for this whole class, that when you're in the mind-only school, and when you're a mind-only school person, and when a mind-only school person says, this thing has some kind of definitive existence, or existence by definition, what they mean is that it's not just a construct of the mind, it has some ultimate or some unique way of existing that's coming from its own side. Okay. So when I say that the mind-only school says that when they think of something existing from its own unique way of being, you know, that something exists from its own side with its own unique way of being, how many unique ways of being pop up in your mind?

How many unique ways of being from its own side can you think of? Just all of them as a group. When a mind-only school person says, this thing has some unique way of being from its own side, how many different unique ways of being are they thinking of when they say that?

He went through that.

[Говорящий 2]
And...

[Говорящий 1]
Yeah, yeah. You answered so well that we're going to stick some extra robes on you and send you over to the debate ground and see if we can catch you as a monk. Alright, so you agree there's two?

Yeah, unique way of being has two kinds of flavors, of unique way of being, right? One is coming from its own cause and what is the other one?

[Говорящий 2]
Yeah.

[Говорящий 1]
Well, how many of you guys think there are very quiet ones in the back there? Are your two the same as her two? Yeah.

You must, at this point in this class, make sure that you understand now the distinction between those two schools. When they, from their mouth, say the same words, right? Existing by definition.

Having some definitive existence. You better know at this point that they mean totally different things. One school meaning, you know, something impossible, right?

The middle way school saying that's an impossible thing, nothing can exist by definition. Because when you go looking for the thing that's given the name person, you never will find a thing that's given the name person among its parts. And if you did find something which is impossible, that would exist by definition.

And in the mind-only school, oh, those things must exist by definition. Because whether or not you think of them in a certain way, whether or not you project something in a certain way, they have some unique way of being from their own side. You better get that distinction straight now, or you're going to blow up your mind later.

And don't mix up things, you know. When I talked about things having their own unique identity from their own side, don't forget that this is a unique belief of the mind-only school. Don't go mixing it up with other schools.

It's only the mind-only school that's talking about, oh, this thing having some unique existence or identity of its own coming from its own side. Don't forget that that description of what it means to exist by definition or definitive existence is unique to the mind-only school. Don't go mixing it up with other schools later.

This description of what it means when the mind-only school says that something has a unique existence from its own side, right? Those two flavors of that description is not something you're going to find written down in books or you're not going to find descriptions of that in scripture. This is an oral tradition that's been passed down from person to person and that's how you're getting it, okay?

So don't go looking for it in a book. This is a very beautiful, unique oral instruction that's been passed down from ear to ear, he said. Right?

All right. ... ...

So don't forget that conversely when the middle-wave school talks about something existing by definition and don't remember what they mean when they say existing by definition, which is impossible according to them, right? Obviously, the minority school people will say, your description of what it means to exist definitively or by definition can't be correct, because it would apply to nothing. But our description of what it means, if we take your description of what it means to exist by definition, we think that applies to all things.

We believe that when you go looking for the thing which is given a certain name, you must find it. We believe that your description of what it means not to exist by definition actually is not something which doesn't exist, it's something which does exist, and not only that, that every object must have that. So we don't agree to the minority school system, the middle way school, your description of what it is to exist by definition, which you say is impossible with regard to anything, we say is not only possible, but requisite for every object that exists.

Surely when you go to look for the thing that was given a name, you better find something. So we don't accept. Conversely, the minority school system, the middle way school, your description of what it means to exist by definition is not only something that doesn't exist, it's something that must exist, must exist with regard to all existing things.

So when the middle way school says that the description of something existing by definition is something that if you looked for the thing which got the name right, ultimately you wouldn't find it. The minority school flips it around completely. They say every existing object in the universe, once it exists, it must exist in such a way that when you look for the thing that's given the name, you must find it.

So this is the big difference between the two schools. The minority school is saying that every existing thing exists in such a way that when you go looking for the thing that got the name of the thing, you better find it. And the Madhyamika school is saying, when you go to look for the thing that's given an independent name, you'll never find it.

There's a big distinction between these two schools. Think about what the Madhyamika, and especially when he speaks about Madhyamika, he's talking about Prasangika, the consequent school. So when the consequent school describes something as existing by definition, let's talk about it in the sense of the mind-only school's description of nominal stuff.

Out of the three groups, we're talking about nominal stuff. How does nominal stuff relate to the Madhyamika people's description of what it means to exist by definition? Question for you guys, expect an answer.

Okay? You're focusing on nominal stuff as described by the mind-only school. How does that relate to how the Madhyamika Prasangika school describes things that exist by definition?

How does it relate to the Madhyamika people's description of nominal stuff? kunda yinme dukse dupe je dabur du sri-dur Let's make it a simple yes and no question, okay? Think of nominal stuff as described by the mind-only school, and tell me whether what the Prasangika describes as existing by definition would apply to it or not.

Think of what the Madhyamika Prasangikas mean when they say existing by definition, and tell me whether the category in the mind-only school called nominal stuff has that or not. When you say that Prasangika's idea of what it is to exist by definition could never apply to any of the three groups excepted by the mind-only because it doesn't even exist, are you putting a Madhyamika hat on or are you putting a mind-only hat on? Whose viewpoint are you saying from?

I'm going to take your word for it. Was I asking you the question from the point of view of a mind-only person or was I asking you the question from the point of view of a middle-aged person? Maybe it's that I didn't translate it very clearly so you didn't know which school you were supposed to be in.

Now, I'll say it again more clearly. From the point of view of a person sitting in a... From the point of view of a member of the mind-only school, does the description of what it means to exist by definition according to the Prasangika school apply to the group that the mind-only school says exists nominally?

You didn't answer. You didn't answer. My question was that.

That was my question. Now we're back to the original point. This is kind of cool.

So, assuming you're a member of the mind-only school and when you say that the description of the Madhyamika school of what it is to exist by definition does apply to our group that we call nominal stuff and assuming you're in the mind-only school, don't forget when you think of nominal stuff as existing by definition in the way described by the Madhyamika school is that a correct state of mind or an incorrect state of mind? Don't forget, to a mind-only school person.

If you think of a nominal object as existing in a definitive way as definitive way as described by the Madhyamika are you, according to mind-only school thinking of that nominal thing in a wrong way or a right way? Sometimes...

[Говорящий 2]
So, please keep that in your mind.

[Говорящий 1]
We got to that place. Don't forget it. According to mind-only school if you think of labeled things in the way that the Madhyamika describes as existing by definition you're right on, right?

You're thinking of it in just the right way. According to the Madhyamika you're crazy, right? According to the mind-only school you're thinking of it in just the right way.

Oh yeah, if I look for the thing that was labeled Winston I would find a thing that was labeled Winston. If I think of things that are labeled, right? If I think of them that way, oh, you're right on.

According to mind-only school, you're right on. That kind of thought is perfect. That brings us back to the text where we started from like a long time ago, page 10.

That's right, that's right. So we got back to the original text, right? Where we were talking about when a mind-only person regards an object which is nominal, right?

Nominal stuff. And they think of it in a way which exists by definition as existing by definition is described by the Madhyamika school. Are they correct?

Yes, they are. We're on page 10, third line from the bottom. di rang cing ki dupa dzinpa yang yur la sak gi anagpa bu sak gi anagpa bu So you've got to understand the wording here in the Tibetan.

ungyang means but di rang cing ki dupa dzinpa yang yur la If you have the state of mind in which you believe that something is existing by definition then, with regard to things that are nominal then, tengyur rang cing ki dupa dzinpa yang yur la then you must also be regarding that nominal thing in a way in which the Madhyamika school describes as something existing by definition. You probably... you must be seeing it that way, right?

If you see nominal things as existing by definition, then automatically you must be seeing them in a way that sees them as existing by definition as is described by the Madhyamika. It's a problem with the Tibetan. You have to be able to understand the Tibetan pretty clearly to get what he's trying to say here.

But with regard to nominally existing things, that group in the mind-only school called nominally existing things, when you see it as... when a mind-only school person sees it as existing by definition, they automatically perceive it as existing by definition in the way that's described by the Madhyamika school. Is that a problem for you guys or not?

Is that hard to catch or does it feel comfortable? Any questions about it? Yes, what do you want to ask?

That seeing the instituted, the nominal stuff as in Ranggit-sannika-drupa is what the mind-only school sees. It's merely positived by the label of the thought. Yeah, you're right.

Things don't have the definitive existence... nominal things don't have definitive existence as that is defined by their own school. That's true.

So do you think that if you were a samsara, if you were a mind-only school person, and you thought that things did have definitive existence, as that definitive existence is explained by their own school, would that be a correct state of mind or a wrong state of mind? Rang-Rang-Ru-Gi-Shi-Shang-Che-Ne, Rang-Rang-Ru-Gi-Ranggit-sannika-drupa-se-ya-di, Rang-Rang-Ru-Gi-Gun-Dak-Gyur-Deng-Ne-Drupa-yin-se-wa-yin-na, Rang-Rang-Ru-Gi-Shang-Che-Ne, Rang-Rang-Ru-Gi-Gun-Dak-Gyur-Deng-Ne-Drupa-yin-se-wa-yin-na, Right, right. Exactly right, exactly right.

That so far is exactly right. Now the big question is, in the mind-only school, those things are described as nominal by the mind-only school, and when they say that those don't have definitive existence as we describe definitive existence, that state of mind is correct. No, you are mind-only school.

Mind-only school people say that the things that the mind-only school thinks are what we call nominal, that they do not have a definitive existence as described by the mind-only school. That's a correct state of mind. Now does that state of mind think of those same objects as having definitive existence as the Madhyamika people explain it, or doesn't it?

No, no, that's not the question. When a mind-only school person thinks of nominal stuff as not having definitive existence, in the way that mind-only school people describe definitive existence, that state of mind, which is correct according to them, does that same state of mind regard those same objects and think that it does or does not have definitive existence as described by the Madhyamika people? Correct.

Yes, that's correct. When a mind-only school person thinks of nominal stuff as not having definitive existence as described by the Madhyamika people, that state of mind, which is correct according to them, does that same state of mind regard those same objects and think that it does or does not have definitive existence as described by the Madhyamika people? Yes, that's correct.

When a mind-only school person thinks of nominal stuff as not having definitive existence as described by the Madhyamika people, that state of mind, which is correct according to them, does that same state of mind regard those same objects and think that it does or does not have definitive existence as described by the Madhyamika people? Yes, that's correct. When a mind-only school person thinks of nominal stuff as not having definitive existence as described by the Madhyamika people, that state of mind, which is correct according to them, does that same state of mind regard those same objects and think that it does or does not have definitive existence as described by the Madhyamika people?

Yes, that's correct. Okay, now I'm talking about a different state of mind. You are in the mind-only school.

You are thinking about things that we describe as nominal, in the mind-only school. But you're having a problem. You're believing that things do exist by definition as described by the mind-only school.

Now that is a state of mind which is wrong, right? Okay. So does that wrong state of mind think of those same objects as existing by definition in the way that the Prasangika describes existing by definition?

Yes, that's right. That's why the Prasangikas are coming out of school. Okay.

You're pretty much on the right track. Good. You're going the right way.

You're on the right track.

[Говорящий 2]
But...

[Говорящий 1]
Okay, so now you're back in the mind-only school, and they're looking at those objects. And they say, when you look for the thing that got the name of the thing, without the name of the thing, right? You have to say that, I think.

Which, according to my meekness, is impossible, right? But in their school, if you're looking for the thing that got the name of the thing, independent of the name of the thing, do you find it or not? They say, yes, you do find it.

You do find it. Now, is that a wrong state of mind or a right state of mind? Correct state of mind or incorrect state of mind?

That's a wrong state of mind. Hey, come on. We're talking mind-only school.

We're in the mind-only school. Is that a correct state of mind according to them, or a wrong state of mind according to them? That when you look for the thing that got the name, independent of the name, you do find the thing.

Now, Karishu, what is next? When you look for the thing that got the name, independent of the name, you do find it. Which one?

We have to see the term by the term. So, this is going to stand for all nominal stuff, my rosary is going to stand for all nominal stuff in the universe. So, forget Madhyamaka, okay?

In the mind-only school, when you're focusing on this rosary, and this rosary is standing for everything in the world, which is what we call namo, which is don't forget, refers to all unchanging things, right? Except for emptiness. Don't forget, okay?

So, when you're focusing on that, and there's a state of mind that says, when I look for the thing which is labeled that, independent of the label, I do find it. In the mind-only school, is that a good state of mind or a bad state of mind, right state of mind or a wrong state of mind? So, I'll give you an illustration that will help you.

This is a rosary, right? So, no matter whose mind it is, whose perception it is, if a state of mind looks at this rosary and says, this is a rosary, do we put that in the category of correct perceptions or incorrect perceptions? Yeah, yeah, yeah.

That's called the umamambutira again, that's called the umamambutira. Forget Madhyamaka, don't forget. I'm just saying, you know, you just got through a big dose of Diamond Cutter over and over again, right?

That's Madhyamaka, forget Madhyamaka. From the mind-only school, would any reasonable state of mind look at this and say, it's a rosary? Yeah, and would that be in the category of correct states of mind or incorrect states of mind?

And then suppose, according to the mind-only school, that another person comes with another state of mind and looks at the same thing and says, that's no rosary. Would that be in a good state of mind or a wrong state of mind? We call that a bad state of mind.

So will that stupid state of mind or wrong state of mind look at the rosary and also say, yes, this is a rosary? No, it won't think that, because it's thinking it's not a rosary, right? With the mind that had previously came and said, this is not a rosary, suddenly came and said, this is a rosary, he wouldn't be in a bad state of mind category anymore, he would have shifted over to a good state of mind category.

So forget Madhyamika, remember we're in the mind-only school, and you're looking at this rosary which is standing for all unchanging things except for emptiness, right? Nominal things, and it comes up and says, this thing exists by definition, and by definition in their own meaning of the word, right? Which state of mind is that?

Is that good or bad? Wrong. Exists by definition as they define, exists by definition.

Yes. Say, did that discourage you? Now, that same state of mind that takes it in the wrong way, right?

It says, this exists by definition as they describe existing by definition. Okay? Would that state of mind understand that when you look for the thing that is named this object, you find it?

Would it say that or not? Yes. Mind-only school.

Mind-only school.

[Говорящий 2]
Yes.

[Говорящий 1]
Would that wrong state of mind that says, this does exist by definition, which is wrong, right? Yes. Yes, about the kundas.

If that wrong state of mind came and looked at kundas and said, yes, this does exist by definition, which is wrong, even in their own school, right?

[Говорящий 2]
Yes.

[Говорящий 1]
Would that same state of mind come to the kundaka and say, oh, oh, oh, when I look for the thing named kundas, I do find something named kundas.

[Говорящий 2]
Yes.

[Говорящий 1]
So, if you say that the state of mind which wrongly held that it existed by definition, as existing by definition, is described in their own school, if you say that that same state of mind perceived that this, when you look for the thing named kundas, you do find something called kundas, would that wrong state of mind come and said, this is not a rosary, suddenly came and said, this is a rosary, he wouldn't be in a bad state of mind category anymore, he would have shifted over to a good state of mind category.

Yes. So, forget Madhyamika, remember we're in the mind-only school, and you're looking at this rosary which is standing for all unchanging things except for emptiness, right? Nominal things.

And it comes up and says, this thing exists by definition, and by definition in their own meaning of the word, right? Which state of mind is that? Is that good or bad?

Wrong. Exists by definition as they define, exists by definition. Yes.

Say, did that Dukkhade. Now, that same state of mind that takes it in the wrong way, right? It says, this exists by definition as they describe existing by definition.

Okay? Would that state of mind understand that when you look for the thing that is named this object, you find it. Would it say that or not?

Yes. Mind-only school. Would that wrong state of mind that says, this does exist by definition, which is wrong, right?

Yes. About the kundaka. If that wrong state of mind came and looked at kundaka and said, yes, this does exist by definition, which is wrong even in their own school, right?

Would that same state of mind come to the kundaka and say, oh, oh, oh, when I look for the thing named kundaka, I do find something named kundaka.

[Говорящий 2]
Yes.

[Говорящий 1]
So, if you say that the state of mind which wrongly held that it existed by definition as existing by definition is described in their own school, if you say that that same state of mind perceives that this, when you look for the thing named kundaka, you do find something called kundaka, wouldn't it shift over to the good state of mind? Because it was right about that. Oh boy.

Last, I'm getting lost in the drama. You've got a wrong state of mind. In the mind-only school, it's looking at kundaka.

It's thinking that nominal stuff, and it's thinking that this stuff does exist by definition as we describe what existing by definition means, which, even according to them, is a wrong state of mind. But if that same state of mind were to say to itself, if I look for the thing named nominal stuff, I do find something, ultimately, then wouldn't it, according to their school, shift over to the correct state of mind? Yeah.

Yeah, yeah. Yeah. So, now is he bad state of mind or good state of mind?

Everything. But wouldn't you have to say it's sort of a mix? That's really too bad.

You're going to agitate this mind into two parts and say, oh, this part's better, this part's better. Sounds like you're saying we've got to split them in two now. Oh, I know what you mean by that.

I don't know. Now, so, question for you guys. In the school of the mind-only school, in the mind-only school, do they say that when you look at kundak things, right, when you look at nominally existing things, which for them, don't forget, is things that are like concepts or constructions.

When you look at them, do they in their own school say that when you look for the thing which is given the name of that, you find it, or do they say that you don't find it? Huh? They say that you don't find it.

When you say they don't find it, what are you thinking of? Are you thinking you might make it in here, or what? Didn't you?

Yeah, didn't you? I have closed and locked the door of Madhyamaka. I told you not to go there.

In the mind-only school's own belief, when you look at something which exists by concepts, is it true that when you look for the thing that was given that name, do you find something? Yes. So, in the mind-only school, does that state of mind belong in the good minds or the bad states of mind?

So that previous state of mind which said that it did exist by definition, as they describe existing by definition in their own school, which is the wrong state of mind, according to you, if it started thinking like that, that it did find something, then we'd have to move on over to the good states of mind. Right? Right.

You were describing, you know, if we say it in terms of people, right? That there's some kind of bad person, like somebody who's never studied, not interested in Dharma, never doing anything, and then suddenly you decide to promote him to the good side. Just with regard with people, that'd be a little weird, you know?

Like they don't change that quickly. Okay, so make up your mind. Is he on the good side or the bad side?

[Говорящий 2]
I think it's enough for you to still think the other way.

[Говорящий 1]
So, it's not your fault. I'll try to make it a different way, okay? Is there a state of mind that at first says, this is not a rosary, and then later says, oh, oh, oh, I was wrong, this is a rosary, like a day later or two days later, and says, yeah, oh, oh, oh, yeah, this is a rosary.

Is there such a change of the state of mind? Could a state of mind change like that? People can change like that, but can a state of mind change like that?

People can change like that, but can a state of mind change like that? So, you've got two different states of mind here. You've got one saying that these objects exist by definition according to the way we describe existing by definition, which is a lousy state of mind.

And can that lousy state of mind suddenly say to itself, oh, when you look for the thing that's given the name, nominal stuff, you do find it. So, this is my state of mind. You've got one saying that these objects exist by definition according to the way we describe existing by definition, which is a lousy state of mind.

And can that lousy state of mind suddenly say to itself, oh, when you look for the thing that's given the name, nominal stuff, you do find it. So, you've got two different states of mind here. You've got one saying that these objects exist by definition according to the way we describe existing by definition, which is a lousy state of mind.

And can that lousy state of mind suddenly say to itself, oh, when you look for the thing that's given the name, nominal stuff, you do find it. How are you? It's true with regard to nominal things that they don't exist by definition.

And when you do go looking for the thing that got the name, independent of the name, you do find it. Those two things, according to the mind-only school, both apply to nominally existing things. But can the state of mind that says this does not exist by definition, I'm sorry, this does exist by definition, all simultaneously say, when you look for the thing that's given its name, you do find it.

Can that happen? From the beginning, this has been my only question. When you say that one state of mind has changed to another, when you say that the mind changes, you're not saying that one state of mind is the other state of mind.

That's his real question. He's not saying, can the mind over time change? He's saying, can the way in which one state of mind views things actually be the way the other state of mind views it?

Are those two ways of viewing something contradictory or not? It's a bad luck how they did get what it is. I can send you to Dubai in a second, and Tanyi Tape Tantric Service in a near second, but that low state, they did get what it is.

OK, let him go ahead, let him go. OK, if you want to raise an objection, go ahead. But generally don't do that, OK?

Now go ahead. This whole hassle started from page 10, third line from the bottom. But the book says, right there, that if that state of mind is holding that nominal things exist by definition, then it's also holding that they exist by definition in the way that the mind-only school says it, Middle Way School says it, is that right?

That's what the text says.

[Говорящий 2]
OK, got that clear?

[Говорящий 1]
I'll say it again. The state of mind which is holding that it exists by definition as the mind-only school describes it, is also a state of mind which is holding that it exists by definition in the way that the Prasangika holds it. Now, is that possible or not?

He just got through saying it wasn't possible. Does one state of mind have those two aspects at the same time? In the mind-only school?

In the mind-only school? No, no, from the point of view of the mind-only school, can one state of mind have those two aspects at the same time? I'll say it again.

OK, I understand now. So one state of mind has these two, in that the mind-only school has these two but the Prasangika has only one, so the mind-only school can be thought of as having only one, But the book states that with non-existing things that one's state of mind can and does simultaneously believe.